Ladies & Gentlemen, let me put these big news in proper perspective. It is diplomatic maneuvering. It has nothing to do with mines, nor even opening the Strait by force.

As I discussed in my earlier article, there are no suspected mines in this part of the Strait.

This is why the two destroyers, part of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group transited the strait without any mine clearing vessels (that we know of) opening the way for them. Had their really been a threat of mines, in this deep fast-flowing part of the Strait (which is quite difficult to mine), the Destroyers would not not be ordered to detect them by blowing up upon finding them.

The Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are not minesweepers, nor are they known to even have minimal minesweeping capabilities. The Navy would use the older Avenger-class ships, recently retired from the 5th fleet, or newer Littoral Combat ships with the MCM package for this purpose.

So if there are no mines what is going on?

Iran, in an attempt to just barely stay within the 2-week ceasefire, but not give up its leverage, went from actively threatening any civilian ships transiting the strait without Iranian approval with destruction, to simply declaring that they would be in danger from mines.

Basically the Iranian idea is that, Omani territorial waters (where the traditional sea-lanes in the Strait run through), are a mine danger zone, and so ships must transit through Iranian territorial waters - through the Iranian toll booth, giving effective control of the Strait to Iran.

By saying that the Omani waters may be mined, Iran could feign plausible deniability in regards to actively threatening civilian shipping during the ceasefire.

The US decided to call their bluff, or at least to show that two can play the game. If the issue is just mines, and not the IRGC shooting drones or missiles at the civilian ships, then... no problem the Navy will just clear, verify and certify a sea-lane (through Omani waters in the south) with no mines.

In reality it was likely a bit less clever and daring than that, because earlier in the day we saw reporting, specifically from the NY Times, that Iran did not know where many of their mines were. The headline, which reads as an Iranian apologetic, tells us that Iran of course would love to abide by the ceasefire and let all ships through, but alas, it cannot find all its mines.

This indicates to us that the US at first, went along, or at least pretended to go along, with the Iranian claim; accepting that they are no longer closing the Strait actively (even though ships from the are were even reporting, and recording, radio threats of destruction by the Iranian authorities), but simply have mined parts of it. The natural next step is to ask where those mines are, and if the Iranians can remove them, with the answers to both being in the negative. So, if Iran would gladly remove its mines if it could, then it certainly won’t mind if the US Navy removes them for free right? And so the stratagem was born, perhaps not brilliantly from the start, but in fits as the US realized the Iranian ruse. Alternatively, the US pretended to buy the ruse as all of this took up a couple of days of the two weeks that the US is hoping to pass under a ceasefire for political, strategic and logistic purposes.

Of course, as discussed in more detail in the previous article, since the ruse began, and even before it, it behooved Iran to lay as many mines as it could (as it allows for passive and retroactive threatening of the Strait), so its possible some areas of the Strait are indeed mined, or that Iran will mine them in the near future. But in general, the mine threat is and was a bluff, especially in the deep and narrow part of the Strait, and the US almost certainly knows it. And if that really was the issue, then mine-clearing with Iran’s cooperation (as opposed to under threat of its fire) is no issue at all.

In any event, the idea thus being that as the Navy declares a sea-lane safe, ships will start taking it, and Iran will be forced to actively shoot (or threaten to shoot) at the civilian ships, clearly breaking the ceasefire, if it wishes to keep control of the Strait. If it doesn’t, it will have lost control of the Strait, its only leverage and pretty soon a large coalition of countries under EU or NATO, will be patrolling the Strait to keep it open for traffic.

Closing it at that point, will require picking a fight with that large coalition of countries. The additional Naval assets would allow protection of shipping corridors and/or convoys, while the US can focus its assets on fighting Iran once again. With the current US force disposition, and the US’ reduced Navy (~292 ships vs the ~600 in the 80’s, and nearly 1,000 a decade earlier), the US could not attempt to protect ships or escort convoys, while prosecuting the war. The few Destroyers were needed protecting the Carrier Strike Groups from constant Iranian drone and missile attack.

Adding a few dozen destroyers to the mix from various countries, changes the picture significantly. And while the international community is not willing to join in forcing the Strait open, it is willing to patrol and protect it, once it is open.

Basically, Iran thought it was very clever with its mining threat, allowing it to break the ceasefire while enjoying it, and it has backfired. Ironically, Iran’s only move now is to continue to close the Strait by any means possible. The US clearly required a week or two for regrouping, logistics and even for legal & constitutional purposes, and Iran would be foolish to grant it. Once the US is repositioned to restart the fight, the regime would have few cards left, especially if the new US disposition will include the potential to seize or open the strait by force. The US would be foolish if that was not the case.

All of which means that the war is JD Vance’s to lose1. Only the scenario where Iran balks, and allows ships to transit in the “cleared” Omani waters (or worse, doesn’t but the US ignores the clear breach out of desperation), while somehow getting the US to accept a deal detrimental to the US would see Iran able to claim victory. The regime firmly still in power, and the Americans negotiating with them (the Iranians) as peers, looking for approval to end the war that they themselves started. Would be a sad display for the US indeed.

Anything else, leads to the conflict restarting with a better prepared US force and new plans, or an intelligent Trump administration accepting nothing short of an Iranian capitulation. The Iranian mine ruse, which for a moment halted the perception that Iran was actively threatening civilian shipping transiting the Strait, makes it very difficult to re-instate, and has backfired spectacularly.

The Iranians, overconfident in their manipulation skills, created an opportunity the US quickly and deftly exploited. Kudos to the strategician which thought of it over there.

Now, Iran’s only chance to regain even the perilous position it was previously in, is to dig deep and find the courage to once again overtly and violently re-close the Strait to civilian and military traffic defying Iranian authority.

Do they have it in them? And will the US tolerate it? Probably only for as many days as they require to refit. We shall see.

Article version of the original April 9 2026 post:

Thus far the ceasefire has played out precisely as we expected.

“The announcement has the tint of negotiation with himself.”

We discussed as much in the piece above. In fact, there hardly was an agreement at all. In reality Trump self-imposed a 2 week truce, accepting as a negotiations starting point, a 10-point Iranian plan that had already been previously sent.

Afterwards, it seems that the administration is using the fact that there were some differences in the Persian and English versions (regarding uranium enrichment), as well as a post ceasefire version sent to the media by Iran, to imply that there is a much better secret version (that they won’t publish) that Iran sent privately. This effort aims to simultaneously discard the Iranian 10-point plan from the public discourse (supporters can simply chalk it up to disinformation and imagine the private one is much better), and use it as the basis to why the ceasefire was declared in the first place (imply it is a sign of Iranian desire for a ceasefire if not outright capitulation).

Again, as we discussed, the obvious Trump desperation for a ceasefire aside, what matters most is the intent. Allowing for additional troop arrivals and deployments, magazine and supply reloading, troop rest, and resumption of the flow of oil, LNG & commerce etc, before an operation to force the straight open, means ironically it is the Iranians who would be foolish to accept the short ceasefire and provide their enemy the breathing room he requires.

I previously wrote that the Iranians may have committed a strategic blunder in closing the Strait (forcing Trump’s hand in requiring an outright victory), and they would be reinforcing the blunder by agreeing to a ceasefire meant for their foe to reposition for a knockout blow.

Further I wrote “I think we will see at least mixed messaging and actions as far as Iran “immediately” opening the Strait of Hormuz. Not sure the entire command structure in Iran is onboard with this at the moment.”

We have seen this quickly come to pass quite precisely. Without tediously recalling every action and statement in the last couple of days, the bottom line at the moment is that Iran continues to exert control of the Strait, and requires ships to pass through its territorial waters, and request permission (and often pay fees), before they can transit.

This was basically the status quo before the ceasefire. Thus far, carriers have not taken Iran up on this opportunity and crossings remain very limited, still mostly of ships coming to and from Iranian ports.

Traffic had been increasing somewhat, as we had earlier predicted, with and without Iranian permission but the new uncertainty seems to have slowed the flow once again.

The Iranians, or some parts of the regime at least, are making claims that the ceasefire has been violated by the US and Israel, specifically with Israel continuing its fight against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Let us be clear about this, as the media reporting has been terribly misleading.

First, to be frank the ceasefire technically is a non started to begin with.

Trump’s statement was that “Subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz, I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks.”

Not only has the complete, immediate, and safe opening of the Strait not occurred, but even Iran’s response, penned by Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Araghch was in contradiction.

Though it accepts the 2-week ceasefire, and acknowledges that there is an Iranian 10 point plan, and a US 15 point plan, that will be the basis for further negotiations, at its conclusion it states:

“For a period of two weeks, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via the coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due to consideration of technical limitations”.

Having to coordinate passage with the Iranian army is already at odds with a “complete, immediate, and safe” opening of the strait, but more worrying is “technical limitations” which leaves Iran able to limit volume of traffic.

With this in mind, the Iranian complaints about US/Israeli violations of the ceasefire are illogical, and I explain this further here (click on post for full text):

The truth is that both sides are thus far accepting the pause in fighting, de facto, but the ceasefire does not exist de jure. Because both sides want the pause, I think it has a good chance to continue if not the full two weeks, for a fair amount of days despite any violations.

The proof is clearly evident from the US perspective, who has continued to abide by the ceasefire despite Iranian closure of the Strait (which will become politically more difficult each passing day). Because the US badly wants this 2 week pause (if not a complete exit to the conflict), it is liable to continue to pressure Israel to curb or stop its fight against Hezbollah in Lebanon, even though this has been confirmed to never have been part of the ceasefire proposed, nor accepted.

Though Israel is likely to foolishly oblige, it shouldn’t as the US and Iran both want a pause anyways, and both are seemingly willing to overlook violations (or what they each claim are violations).

For example, though the original statement by the Iranian FM already laid the groundwork for non-compliance to US terms regarding opening the strait (”technical limitations”), Iran has already shifted to a more plausible reasoning.

Iran has warned that the normal shipping lanes (per the IMO Traffic Separation Scheme) in the Strait are mined, due the chaos of war of course, and despite the fact that they are mostly if not entirely in Omani and not Iranian waters. For their safety of course, ships should not traverse Omani waters but rather Iranian territorial waters in order to cross the strait.

This excuse enabled the Iranians to go from actively threatening ships with destruction (clearly would violate the ceasefire and likely to restart US action) to passively threaten them with actions taken in the past (when presumably it mined the waters). The result is the same of course, the Strait is being controlled by Iran, but the plausible deniability is there.

Of course, the mines are most likely non-existent. The US wasn’t ready for many things in this conflict, but the potential mining the strait was not one of those. It closely monitored any such attempt and very aggressively went after Iranian mining capabilities.

Though Iran may try to use the ceasefire to mine the strait now and make its ruse real, for the moment I imagine everyone knows the danger zone is made up; in terms of mines that is. What it really clearly communicates to civilian shipping is that they are liable to get attacked and destroyed by Iran, if they attempt to traverse those waters without their approval.

And so what you have are two boxers looking for a breather, both willing to ignore the bell calling for the next round. Both can’t afford to let their public see them as weak or scared, and so the ceasefire is likely to partially and broken go on for a while, if not the full term.

Iran and the Gulf states have continued attacks on each other on a daily basis despite the ceasefire. The Gulf states were not party to the ceasefire, but Iran obviously was. Iran is insisting on adding Lebanon to the ceasefire, despite the original agreement, and as discussed, has thus far refused to open the Strait.

As far as the long term negotiations go, the positions are so far apart that a deal is most likely impossible in the two week period. The most that could be achieved on that front is additional extensions of the ceasefire.

But as we have discussed, unless Trump is now really much weaker than most give him credit for, the ceasefire is meant only to buy the time needed for the knockout blow.

I hope to have the time to do a deeper dive into what happened later, but in short we have a fairly simple set of facts.

How did we get here?

The US and Israel had a shorter campaign in site that would topple the regime. The original plan may have included the Kurds, special operations and giving air support to armed “protestors”. For some reason the plan did not work (meaning didn’t even start) or Trump decided to deviate from it (more likely). For example, after having been convinced to arm the Kurds and support their invasion of Iran, Turkey’s Erdogan and Iranian opposition parties (including the Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi) may have convinced him that backing them will lead to the partition of Iran, the hardening & unification of Persian resistance in support for the regime, and/or regional instability. In fact, we discussed these “dangers” regarding the Kurds at the outset of the war. I wondered if the US administration was unaware of them.

Once that original plan went out the window, Trump was still left with simply stopping the strikes and declaring mission accomplished. But as we discussed at the time, Iran closing the Strait changed everything. The war went long enough that now it could not be stopped without a clear winner and loser being discernable (a phenomena I discussed during Israel’s first 12 day round as well). A successful strike is one thing, a war another. And a superpower pleading with a supposedly defeated enemy to open the Strait is yet another still.

Thus, the Strait had to be opened by force, in order for the US to win decisively. Additionally, such an operation, if successful, is likely to lead to the end of the regime as well (due not only to economic and loss of prestige reasons, but also because of contact between Iranian populations in the areas seized and US forces - the opposition under air cover can spread from there).

The forces to do this were not in place. And they would take weeks to assemble. Trump kept up the air war as is for as long as possible, and when at end of his tether, politically, logistically and economically, he reached for this ceasefire.

For just a brief look into what some of these parameters includer, consider that VLS canisters require friendly ports to reload (Duqm, Oman and Diego Garcia at the closest). Original Tomahawks and interceptors aboard the warships are depleted. The US Navy still has not mastered VLS reloading in open waters, especially under potential fire (though its coming soon). Forces need rest and time to regroup. Bases within Iranian missile and drone range require repairs, hardening and additional bunkers. Units, ships and systems require maintenance and resupply. A pause in the tempo is required for calm planning the next offensive. Trapped carriers and oil tankers need to get out of the Gulf to keep barrel prices at bay. And of course, new units, both by sea and airlift need to arrive; they require not only the time to do so, but also airstrips and bases not under constant drone & missile fire. Supply stocks need to arrive and need to be distributed and stored securely. So much of what had been previously planned and prepared, at the 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain was of no use, and needed to be relocated to outside the Gulf.

When it comes to units, about a week was still needed for the 11th MEU (onboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4), USS Portland (LPD-7) and the USS Comstock (LSD-45), and the USS George W. Bush carrier group to arrive in the area. The USS Ford CG was rejoining after repairs in Split Croatia as well. Additional forces and supplies may arrive airborne to regional air bases.

Thus, Trump needing the pause typically set up the ceasefire to look like an Iranian capitulation (and hoped to get one if possible). Once he already had received the 10 point plan in reply to his 15 point plan, he upped his rhetoric and threats.

He declared the civilization-ending ultimatum knowing that he would not need to follow through. He would make it seem like his threats worked and Iran broke. In fact, he know that at worse case (which is what happened), he could already refer to the 10 point plan as a workable basis from which to start negotiations and self impose a ceasefire.

The catch was that of course the ceasefire needed an open Strait at the minimum. Firstly for political reasons but also because it was likely one of the most important reasons for needing the ceasefire to begin with. Not only did the armed forces need rest, refreshment, resupply (and the arrival of the newly deployed forces), but the markets needed cheaper oil. Two weeks of free passage across the Strait, combined with the increased production elsewhere that has stepped up to fill the gap in the meanwhile (and enjoy the high prices), would be more than enough to weather any additional disruption the newly started and hopefully final campaign would cause.

Once the Strait was under US control, Trump could reverse the equation, Iranian ships could not transit while everyone else’s could. The regime could not survive the blow and the subsequent economic siege. US troops could leave the occupied parts of the Strait as soon as a new interim government was in place. The UAE could occupy the islands it claimed anyways and replace US troops.

In any event, once the Strait is open even for a bit... the European/NATO led efforts would patrol to keep it open. Once an international force is deployed, it inherits the fight if it comes under attack.

So that is what we have... the US needed more time to put in place forces to do a job it did not originally foresee it would have to do. If Trump has the strength to see this through, he can still bring about a great victory. If not, as I stated often, Iran brings home the prize.

One interesting sign is that we see the UAE escalating against Iran. It is seems to be trying to derail the ceasefire, either with or without US coordination. The UAE, as the most right wing of the Gulf states is the fiercest enemy of the far left Iranian regime, and it undoubtedly wants a clear victory over the regime. It also desperately needs the Strait opened. Not having taken the chance to join the fight with the US and Israel, it may find it more politically acceptable to start it now without them, as an Arab effort (perhaps to be joined by other Gulf states).

If the UAE knew that the ceasefire was a short term ruse, perhaps it would not see the need to take such actions. Alternatively, one could suspect it is the tool, perhaps along with Israel, to bring about the collapse of the ceasefire, in coordination with the US. Less likely but who knows. Disgust and desperation at the ceasefire and Iranian control of the Strait seem more likely the catalyst.

Another worrying sign is that if the ceasefire is not a ruse for time, but signals actual desperation for an offramp by the Trump administration, then the only path I can see they are considering is the following:

1. We get a ceasefire of any kind going, for negotiations and get the Strait open. Oil prices calm down and all is well.

2. The UK’s Starmer and his 30-odd countries, and/or NATO take the lead and start patrolling the now open Strait.

3. At that point, not a US problem anymore, at least not a lone US problem. If the Iranians try to close the strait again, they will inevitably clash with the large coalition keeping it open.

While this is a reasonable strategy if taken AFTER a US victory in forcing the Strait open, it is a terrible strategy if hoping to implement it after the Strait is open due to a US defeat. And not least of which, is because in defeat the Strait is not opened but left in Iranian control... as we are seeing now, despite promises and ceasefires. At that point the world may or may not wrest control of it back, diplomatically or otherwise, but the loser stays the loser either way. I’d like to believe Trump is indeed playing for time rather than simply desperate to get out.

Finally, the ceasefire, for as long as it lasts, brings about some new factors previously hidden by the fighting.

Firstly, Iranian leaders and commanders, previously terrified to meet, go out in public, and use communications will do all of these while under the protection of the ceasefire. They will go back to their cell phones and radios. This will be an intelligence bonanza for the US and Israel, and will allow for increasing infighting within the regime.

Secondly, the economic impacts of the war will be increasingly felt. The already tittering economy will succumb into even higher inflation as the regime comes to grips with the devastation it faces. It will have a very difficult time with state salaries, let alone with attempts at reconstruction and re-armament. The air campaign’s devastation, and its consequences, will gradually come to bear.

The regime’s single salvaging factor is the Strait of Hormuz. Both as its restriction has set oil prices soaring, as well as in the fees Iran has and wishes to continue to take. Even 20% of previous volume paying about $2 million per ship would be a massive bonanza for the stricken regime. But if the ceasefire requires its unrestrained flow, or the US otherwise forces its unrestricted opening, then oil prices come down and there are no “toll” fees for Iran. That is without even speaking of the US actually blocking its (Iranian) oil exports. That, the regime could not survive, especially when its demise means not only the export of oil once again but the removal of the harsh sanctions, along with billions for reconstruction.

This leaves us with a possible third scenario. Even if the US means to negotiate to end the conflict, and the additional forces are at most meant to partially re-open the Strait, not by occupying any Iranian territory but simply by increasing pressure on its forces trying to exert control of the strait, with the hope that NATO and an international coalition began patrolling, mine clearing and escort duties within the Strait; the regime may increasingly start to collapse (ironically reverting the situation back to the original plan), and put the US within reach of a victorious outcome despite its previous decision to be humiliated and defeated. This is not an impossible outcome and it would look something like this:

1. Talks lead nowhere. Ceasefire extensions at most.

2. Iran continues to restrict traffic across the Strait of Hormuz.

3. Ceasefire holds anyways. At least in terms of the US holding its fire.

4. Iran gradually eases restrictions on the Strait, in return for sanction relief, unfreezing of assets, reconstruction funds.

5. At some point, after or during any of the above, it becomes clear that the regime is collapsing in the face of dire economic straits, inflation and failing utilities (water, electricity, fuel, internet), either due to regime in-fighting, increasingly active insurgency and/or mass protests. The US switches positions and backs anti-regime forces, providing support, logistics and air cover.

Keep in mind that in the absence of number 5 in the near future, the not unlikely scenario spells a strategic US defeat. But as always I remind, wars are battles of wills, and here we are to see if the West still has even the small amount of will, honor and self respect required, to defeat a determined but vastly inferior foe, who has shown, even if it is largely due to existential lack of choice, the will to fight, resist, and not easily give up.

Mr. Trump’s 2-week ceasefire announcement, combined with the over-the-top warnings and threats of the last 2 days indicate POTUS badly wanting this off ramp to begin with.

The announcement has the tint of negotiation with himself. I think we will see at least mixed messaging and actions as far as Iran “immediately” opening the Strait of Hormuz. Not sure the entire command structure in Iran is onboard with this at the moment.

Reference to a 10-point plan announced days ago (which importantly includes a $2 million fee per ship to cross the strait, permanent cease-fire and lifting of all US sanctions) indicates that Iran offered nothing new - did not cave to the current Trump ultimatum, with all its civilization-ending rhetoric. Trump already had the cards he needed, in the worse case, to nullify his own ultimatum when he made it. It appears it is his “worse case” scenario and received nothing new.

The question is if Trump, is simply yet again buying more time, as two weeks finally puts 3 carrier groups, the USS Abraham Lincoln (currently there), the the USS George H.W. Bush (arriving late April), and the USS Gerald R. Ford (back from repairs in Split, Croatia after the laundry fire) in the area and ready for operations.

A fourth group, (USS T Roosevelt) may be on its way to relieve a group or temporarily reinforce. The 31st MEU and the USS Tripoli have arrived, but a second MEU, the 11th, in the USS Boxer, USS Comstock and USS Portland are also to arrive in the next 10 days.

That array of forces (and accompanying logistics) may give Trump the force he needs to reopen the Strait by force if needed. Holding on as is was becoming difficult politically, and even routine issues like reloading of tomahawks and other VLS munitions is not doable at scale while at sea (require friendly port). Bahrain being out of commission, and within contested waters, is not an option in most cases. Ships must go to Duqm, Oman and/or Diego Garcia for reloading VLS canisters.

Alternatively, Mr. Trump could simply be desperately looking for an offramp.

If the latter is true, it will become painfully obvious because Iran is likely to continue to overplay its hand regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Not really open it to begin with, and yet the ceasefire will go on in one way or another; would make for a sad sight indeed.

How the regime appears to have withstood US military might, will in turn influence whether its population still respect and/or fear it enough to not attempt to topple it. Economic pressure on the regime when the bombs stop falling will be massive.

Victory or defeat here, as usual, are of great importance for both sides, and spin will not do.

Previous:

We discussed where the war was heading and how the Strait had become pivotal here (and before the mass coverage):

Then on March 26th, as Trump first mentioned a deal within 5 days, a statement which sent the IDF (an me) racing for the Litani (river) for a few days (then the Generals went back to regular IDF glacial speed), I posted the following interesting analysis and prediction (click for full text):

Then, on April 3rd 2026, as it became increasingly the US was most likely buying time for a Strait of Hormuz (or other) operation, or aimlessly looking for a way out of the conflict, I posted the following, in response to a John Bolton post:

Article version of original post March 15th 2026:

As we have been discussing, the ultimate scoreboard on the war will relate to passage in and out of the Persian Gulf. If the US is able to largely resume traffic without a deal with the current regime - so either dealing with a new regime, accepting what amounts to a surrender from the current one, or forcing the straits open to shipping in spite of Iran's desire to close it - all amount to a US victory. Iran has no other cards left.

Anything else, namely a US end of the conflict in return for opening the strait (or worse a US end of the conflict without an Iranian commitment to cease attacks on commercial shipping, but only a hope of it) with the regime still in control is rightly considered an Iranian victory in the conflict.

Note that this potential Iranian victory would not necessarily detract from the fact its missile and nuclear programs lie in tatters (only would reinforce that this should have been the only goal of the conflict as I advised from prior to even the June hostilities), and that the regime itself could be toppled a bit down the line due to economic conditions and the massive damage it sustained. Even so, the appearance of having resisted and bested the world's superpower would help it endure, contrary to the perception created in the 12-Day war with Israel alone (one of weakness and exposure of the Iranian Paper Tiger). This is why the former round, as I predicted then, led to widespread protests against the regime after war (but not before).

In any event, I am a bit surprised at the US' lack of preparation in keeping the strait open. While Israel has focused on northwest and north-central Iran, its economic, administrative and population core (including Tehran), the US's turf was the southern coast and the Strait of Hormuz.

CENTCOM commander for the last 7 months or so is Admiral Brad Cooper. It is very rare to find the CENTCOM commandeer having come from the Navy.

This shows how important maritime issues and the Gulf including the Strait were in the administration's thinking. It also probably explains why there was such a focus by US forces on the Iranian Navy in the opening days of the war.

One is enticed to think that Cooper, was overly focused on old fashioned Navy thinking. The Iranian Navy was hardly more of a threat sunk then floating. Their ability to physically close the strait, as I discussed in the past, in the face of US forces was near zero. The obvious threat comes from drones (air and sea), anti-ship missiles and mines. That is with mines the least important threat as they come under traditional navy and maritime threats well understood by Naval forces for many decades.

The US seemed to focus on Iran's traditional Navy and mining capabilities. Mines played a very important role in the Tanker War of the 80s.

One can only conclude that the administration was really convinced (specifically contrary to my published advise) that the regime would fall quickly and easily while under attack. It did seem to have thought about insurance and war risk premiums, which is what froze up the flow of traffic through the strait originally, but do not seem to have a plan in place to eliminate near 100% of the anti-ship and drone threat in the gulf which is what is needed to keep traffic flowing at normal rates. Especially for Western companies under massive liabilities for ecological damage and the lives of their crew, far beyond what any standard policy would cover.

In any event, whatever administration officials thought previously, they are certainly trying to focus on this issue now.

We have seen much reporting about Kharg Island. The US recently struck 90 military sites on it, on the news of a Marine MEU (31st MEU) aboard the USS Tripoli being on their way (~1 week away or less by now).

Kharg Island - A Diversion?

As we already discussed, destroying Kharg Island's infrastructure is quite unnecessary. Seizing it is a good symbolic achievement (perhaps liable to be leveraged due to Amoco’s old rights, violated when the regime nationalized them) and perhaps allows you to "tax" Iran's oil exports, but would obviously increasingly incentivize them to export through Jask Port & elsewhere beyond the Strait. Really, since the US controls the water east of the Strait and around the Gulf of Oman, Iran already can only export with US acquiescence. The US is apparently letting Iranian oil flow because it helps keep oil prices down while the other Persian Gulf exporters are bottled up.

As that changes, the situation may reverse (allied oil will flow, Iranian stopped). It seems to me the US is committing a short sighted mistake in this regard. Iranian oil exports should be stopped while Iran continues to block the Strait. At the very least, the tankers should be taxed, where for example 50% of the oil is taken by the US to allow the other half to proceed.

If Iran is desperate enough, and depending on what the tax threshold is, it may continue to export in this manner, which would then not contribute to diminishing oil in the world market (both halves end up available to customers). But simply leaving Iranian exports to sail freely while they block the strait is odd to say the least. It indicates desperation in regards to the world barrel price.

In short, taking Kharg Island would block these Iranian exports (it would be awkward to attempt that they continue), which the US is allowing anyway as we speak. Makes little sense.

It is also strange to "telegraph" such an amphibious invasion so far in advance.

Previously discussed earlier in the war why those (such as Yair Lapid) arguing for the destruction of oil infrastructure on Kharg Island were missing the point.

With this in mind, we might be looking at different targets for the MEU and other US forces, while Kharg Island may turn out to be a diversion in the media to fool Iran.

I will follow up later on with more details on these, but note that due to the shallow waters of the Gulf, large tankers need to sail between Greater Tunb Island and Abu Musa island.

These islands conveniently disputed by the UAE, as Iran seized them in the 1971 (part of a somewhat complex story I can cover more in detail later).

Iran has refused to litigate the issue in international courts, and by closing the Strait, Iran gives the US an excellent pretext to seize them and it risks losing them to UAE or international sovereignty. There are excellent ecological reasons for non-Iranian sovereignty over them which western media can happily consume. From endemic coral carpets to sea turtle and migrating bird habitat, the Persian Gulf islands (especially Abu Musa) are ecologically very interesting.

More critical for the narrowest parts of the Strait when considering larger and populated landmasses, not the small islands, is Qeshm island (along with neighboring Hengam and Larak Islands). At its narrows, the strait is a little over 50 kms between the Iranian mainland and Oman, and only a bit less between the Omani coast and Qeshm Island. However due do the depth of gulf and visibility differences,

we see that Qeshm island, and other Strait islands are of supreme importance in controlling the Strait. Only 100 feet height above sea level typically gives an observer a 12 mile visibility arc towards the horizon. Ships have to sail very close to that visibility window when it comes to Qeshm island.

Additionally, Qeshm is in the way of the high mountainous areas in the Iranian mainland which threaten the Straits.

While Arleigh Burke Destroyers are ideal for integrated Air Defense and can help keep the Straits open in the short term, as a long term solution you want land-based systems.

These drop dramatically in efficiency if they are "behind" what you intend to guard. It is very difficult to protect shipping in the Straits with AD systems in the mainland south (or west) of the ships they wish to protect. Especially against smaller caliber and low flying (or seaborne) munitions and drones.

Having land based systems north and northwest of the ships is ideal.

The US has about 80 Burke Destroyers, and in a pinch can send 3 to 6 more to the region without causing too much disruption to its other commitments (including repair & maintenance etc). These can help create a AD box in the Straits, but a longer term solution will depend on land based systems to a greater extent.

This is not to speak of the entire length of the Gulf. We should keep in mind that Iran's ability to strike along the entire gulf diminish with the greater width, shipping lane proximity to Gulf state defenses and Navies (pretty absent thus far), and with time as it continues to get degraded by US and Israeli offensives.

As its ability to observe ships diminishes (radars, forward observers etc), it will be very hard for Iranian forces to hit ships moving at speed in the Gulf, even with drones. Once you get closer to Basra, and the Iranian borders gets very close again, it once again becomes easier.

Note that almost all recent strikes have been against stationary ships.

Sailing at night is likely to become very important. Not only is it more difficult to observe targets (commercials hipping) and its escorts, but more importantly it is easier for US and allied forces to find the source of fire. Launching and firing light up the night sky.

This is why Iran has mostly stopped firing ballistic missiles at Israel during the night, and switched to daytime launches. Too many mobile launchers and their forces were being hit before they could escape, and there are fewer and fewer willing Iranian forces daring to fire each day.

The most important defense will continue to be offense. Whenever Iranian forces fire, the allied forces must be ready to strike at them fast. The willingness to engage commercial shipping will then likewise diminish.

Despite all this, escorts for the length of the gulf will be very important in any prolonged conflict. This is where ethe US is likely to want international cooperation. Escorts and Destroyers can escort convoys for close protection. However, if this fails to materialize, the US is still capable of providing the additional escort Destroyers if it must. Though this is certainly a sign that the US Navy is currently much smaller than it ought to be, as after al this is a relatively small conflict against a weak adversary. Should China chose for example, the opportunity to invade Taiwan, the US would find itself in an uncomfortable position.

Dealing with regulations & insurance will also be important. Mainstream carriers with millions and billions in equity cannot chance the crossing with western rules in place. The 100 million in equipment insurance for the ship is nothing compared to the liability. Liability in case of harm to the crew and even greater liability in case of environmental harm. This is why "Shadow Fleet" ships are already crossing the strait and will continue to in growing numbers.

Western regulations also often greatly limit ship self defense. There are plenty of private companies that will offer a high level of protection for the ships, but depending on the carrier's flag, these may or may not be allowed. The administration would be wise to pay attention to these issues and encourage brave crews to be able to challenge Iran in the Gulf as much is possible. The higher premiums are there to reward the courage. Western rules often negate and prohibit courageous action.

In a later piece we will analyze the islands, and the topography with more detail, but the interesting factor at play is that we may be seeing Iran again miscalculate and inviting an amphibious invasion of one or more of its strategic islands that ensure control over the Strait of Hormuz. In different terms, by throwing down the gauntlet and proving that the Strait is closed in defiance of the US and Trump, they have encouraged the President to proceed until a complete victory, whereas previously he was amenable to stop the strikes quickly. Stopping now would be correctly interpreted as an Iranian victory, due to the US’ impotence in reopening the strait.

To recap, Kharg Island, if the US is cunning, might be a side show. It would add nothing as far as control over the Strait, nearly nothing as far as control over the length of the Gulf, and likewise nothing over control of Iranian exports which as it is must traverse US controlled waters east of the Strait.

Importantly, the US should announce loudly and clearly, that weapon shipments, especially anti-ship weapons, will be intercepted in the Caspian and elsewhere regardless of the carrier. You want to avoid a situation where Russian carriers are bringing anti-ship missiles to Iran and attacking them is an escalation. The mere announcement of the policy puts Russia in the position of escalating, which it does not want.

Iran's ability to continue its threat over commercial shipping requires ongoing advanced munitions and drones. Its domestic ability to produce these is already destroyed and will continue to be as long as the US and Israel maintain the air campaign over it. This means that it would require import of such weapons, that given the US control of the waters we discussed above, is only possible through northern land routes and the Caspian Sea, with its direct access to Russian Caspian ports.

The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

A Marine MEU is a small (about 2,000 men) amphibious unit that can definitely take the kind of small islands we are talking about. An MEU includes a Ground Combat Element, reinforced battalion size, an Aviation Combat Element, and a Logistics Combat Element (also battalion size). They typically form an ARG (amphibious ready group) in 3 amphibious ships (other escort them forming a larger ESG) including a LHD/LHA (in this case the LHA on its way is the USS Tripoli), an LPD and a LSD - reminds of the Falklands war. Wonder what Commodore Michael Clapp and his adventurer Yachtsman Lt. Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour are saying. Probably that they don’t know what they are getting into… but the Gulf in March is not the South Atlantic in winter. And unlike in the Falklands, no air force opposes them.

We don’t know if the entire ARG is accompanying the USS Tripoli. My guess is that it is (otherwise you have a very weak amphibious unit) and probably being accompanies by a couple of Littoral Combat Ships that were also in SE Asia which can serve as escorts and demining platforms. Opposed amphibious operations are the most complex military operations and require a professional and well equipped force to carry out successfully. It will be very interesting to see a modern MEU take on this task, even if in a small island. The Ground Combat Element of the MEU includes specialist forces like the combat engineer platoon, reconnaissance platoon, an artillery battery, an others which would be crucial in setting up defensive systems on the island.

You likely want to take an island with an airstrip and a basic dock already existing, so that a garrison can be logistically sustained after the MEU moves on. Abu Mussa, Greater Tunb, Siri and the large Qeshm islands all have basic airstrips. The smaller islands would be an easy capture, though Qeshm is another story, much larger (1,500 sq kms) and populated (149,000 people) across from the major Naval installations of Bandar Abbas. Then again, the entire Hormozgan province has a wide mix of ethnic minorities (who came in search for work) and relatively a protestor stronghold, so who knows.

The Market Predicts Lower Oil Prices

Finally, let us briefly address oil prices.

Reporting, rather incorrectly is focused on the current spot price.

There is nothing to be said that about the fact that dozens if not hundreds of tankers had their routes disrupted at the outbreak of the war.

Ships are slow, and so naturally oil that was expected in many places in the world did not or will not arrive as was expected. This forces these customers to scramble to buy it elsewhere and biding competition raises prices. That is.. if you want oil Right Now you have to pay more for it.

But the market seems to be betting on the US (together with world output flexibility) solving this issue. From greater US domestic production, to Saudi and UAE shifting export through pipelines that lead outside the Strait, and Persian Gulf flow resuming to some degree, they see ample possibilities for solutions.

The oil futures, both West Texas Intermediate in the US and Brent Crude in Europe see a pretty dramatic drop in prices in the next few months. We see that by the beginning of 2027 (and the Nov election), prices for both are nearly back to the historically low price pre-conflict on Feb 27 2026 (only 8.7 - 9.7% higher).

The drop from now until then is fairly linear and significant each month, especially in the next couple of months. So, the markets have plenty of confidence in the Trump administration's (or at least in the world oil industry's) ability to handle this situation. Hopefully the administration has the same confidence in itself and goes ahead and does so.

Once again, it would be another final nail in the coffin of the West if the Iranian regime's strong show of will, would overwhelm what tiny amount of will needed by the West, to defeat it.

Happily, my readers are no strangers to seeing make some accurate predictions. But the last few days has been a real quality streak. Here is a recap, and where we may go from here.

Let’s take a look. Most importantly we discussed how both sides had at least in some ways “drank their own Kool-Aid”. The West had exaggerated the par between the Iranian people (at least the Persian Shia majority) and the regime, as well how easily it could fall.

Iran for its part believed in its own hype and so lashed out at everyone in order to sow the chaos “experts” had warned us about for decades. Because they are pin-prick attacks rather than anything approaching what is needed to sow chaos, the strategy seemed a bit absurd. You won’t hear anyone else explaining this phenomena, that only reason it baffled folks was because its weakness.

Starting with this article on March we discussed that the point of the strategy was, and how people, counterintuitively, were actually confused by it due to its weakness.

It included the following section:

Next pushed the concept even further, noting that both the West, and the Iranian regime, had incorrect preconceptions (drank their own Kool-Aid), and how each reacts to clash with reality will determine the outcome.

This March 6th article included the following:

Late March 7th we discussed in good humor indeed seeing breaking news reporting not only on the apology by the Iranian President on the attacks on neighboring countries but in quick succession signs of the internal divide on the issue.

The referenced X post reads:

In the same articled we had discussed how the US needs an armed group on the ground that it can give air support to. This group could quickly advance because of the massive close air ground support. As we warned in our previous discussions, the popular Persian uprising will not be as easy to ignite as the US mainstream believed. In leu of such a group, others can be found which more easily would take up arms against the Revolutionary Islamic regime. Most notably the Kurds and Balochs. We then discussed how while many of them would be happy to rise up in autonomy or independence of their regions, using them to advance towards Tehran would not only terrify the Persian majority but harden their resistance and unite them against such a force (pre and post their advance).

Shortly after our discussions on this, there was reporting that Trump himself had spoken to the two major Kurdish leaders in Iraq (of the left and right leaning leaders respectively) to urge them onto the offensive. This was quite extraordinary (that the sitting US President would personally call them both).

Our discussions then once gain highlighted the complexity and dangers of a Kurdish advance on Tehran. They included (in the second article referenced above):

The very next day Mr. Trump seemed aware of the complexity surrounding a Kurdish offensive (which will still likely happen in one form of another btw):

I will add that knowing Trump, he may have been daring them a bit here as well, politely wondering out loud if the Kurds could possibly be cowardly? “…We don’t want to see the Kurds get hurt or killed”. More likely it was just a reference to them being hurt before and the complex implications of their involvement on a drive to Tehran as I had explained, but for some reason I sensed a bit of sarcasm there from Trump.

Welcome partial Strategic Change & Yair Lapid

Then most importantly, Israel changed direction and finally started hitting the right type of oil infrastructure; in this case fuel depots west of Tehran in Chigrit. As my readers know, on many occasions since the outset of the first Round 7 months ago, I noted that it is firstly the oil refineries (fuel production) and prisons (referring to freeing of prisoners) that have to be hit in order to encourage an uprising down the line.

After this change had begun, our unimpressive, unwise, and unoriginal head of the opposition, leftist Yair Lapid jumped on the bandwagon explaining that this alone will topple the regime. Maybe he read my posts as well!

If he did, he didn’t quite understand them (his English is not nearly as good as Bibi’s anyways), and so there was a huge error in his dramatic demand.

My argument on this is worth summarizing here.

Lapid demanded the destruction of the “all the oil fields” and “energy industry” on Kharg Island. Firstly, Kharg Island houses Iran’s major oil export and processing hub. It’s major significant is that of Iran’s major (90% of total crude exports) export terminal.

The importance of the island is not its oil fields. There is some oil on the island itself, but far more surrounding it; the island is a central collection and processing point for massive offshore (and inland) oil fields. So firstly not sure Lapid understands the significant of the island - if you wanted to destroy “all the oil fields” of Iran, Kharg Island would be the least of your concerns.

More importantly, since the island sits in the Persian Gulf, and is Iran’s main crude export terminal, while the US controls the seas east of the Strait of Hormuz (and Israel & the US the skies over it), Iran’s oil exports have already dwindled to zero.

The allies can maintain that as long as they wish. On the contrary, the US is desperately trying to get the gulf states to be able to export via the Strait, working on offering insurance and escorts, without success yet. So US allies cannot export via the Persian Gulf at the moment, much less so Iran.

It goes without saying that if the goal is regime change, and you intend achieving it, having that oil infrastructure other than destroyed would be a positive for the new government, and world oil prices (which the US very much cares about). Very high oil prices benefit Russia of course most of all, but even Iran to the limited extent it can get hydrocarbons out via the Caspian and through land routes.

So what I have been talking about?! Oil refineries.

No need to rehash here, but the highly subsidized domestic fuel in Iran is critical to its economy, and obviously to its armed forced (that don’t consume crude oil). Refining, especially in Iran, is highly concentrated at a few sites and easily destroyed, unlike the hardened, and dispersed oil infrastructure that spans large parts of the country. Needless to say, Kharg Island has no major oil refinery (it is Bandar Abbas that is the largest in Iran meeting ~45% of domestic demand alone).

For a more in depth look at this oil infrastructure in general vs oil refining as it relates to strategic targets, see my discussion of the subject in the case of the Russo Ukrainian war.

So Yair Lapid, before you copy Netanyahu’s moves and claim them as your own, learn a bit more about them.

If all of this was not enough, I had also correctly speculated that it was not that all Iranian launchers had been destroyed as started to be reported a few days ago. The drastic decline in barrages, had to do with the nature of war and man.

The post speaks for itself (click on the thread if you would like to read in full).

On March 7th, reports quickly circulated that Israel estimates it had destroyed 150 launchers, and that only 100 remained for the regime’s use.

Many Israelis were surprised that Iran had that many launchers left, even by Israel’s estimates. My readers and I of course weren’t. The issue is about the likelihood of being killed while launching. In a firefight, if you suppress enemy fire, it does not mean that they are out of men, rifles or ammunition, but rather that they are afraid of getting shot and so are keeping behind cover (heads down).

Of course, over time more and more launchers will be found and destroyed.

With all this fun behind us, let us briefly comment on one aspect of the war moving forward.

Air Superiority?

In a similar vein, I do not believe complete air superiority has been achieved over the whole country of Iran by Israel and the US. The US especially I think has only achieved air superiority over a relatively narrow strip along the southern coast, while Israel has been able to open up a corridor through northwest Iran through to Tehran.

The allies are working largely in waves of attacks, and this is especially true for the Israeli air force. The targets are far from Israel and the route complex (over less than friendly territory). Israeli jets cannot maintain long mission periods over Iranian territory; and needless to say Iran is a vast and mountainous country.

The idea is or ought to be, to degrade Iranian AD systems to the point air force drones (such as the Hermes 900 and the Heron-1), which have very long flight durations, can maintain near 24/7 surveillance over large parts of the country. Since these drones are high altitude, they are fairly immune to Iran’s vast arsenal of old AA guns & artillery (best suited for short range / low altitude targets). Little by little, once the advanced Anti-Air missile systems are destroyed, the AA guns can be targeted as well, allowing cheaper and more numerous lower altitude drones to operate over Iran as well.

Until a large number of drones can be flying consistently and constantly over large parts of Iran, they will be able to maintain some level of launches; Ballistic missiles less and less, but at least drones. To date, satellites are doing a lot of this work instead, detecting forces setting up launch sites, and then with luck allied fighters are near enough to get there in time.

Due to reported Israeli and US drone losses during the first days of the war, I suspect that the allies may have jumped the gun on using the drones, not yet having really established the air supremacy required. Since drone losses seemed to have stopped, it is likely so did their use in many parts of the country. As the manned jet fighters pick away at Iran’s AD system and expand their area of complete air superiority, they will be able to establish drone patrols in more and more areas. These are critical to stop Iran’s strikes.

While ballistic missiles require a more involved and lengthy procedure and longer logistics tail to successfully launch, Iranian long range suicide drones can be relatively quickly and easily launched. Iran’s stockpiles of these are voluminous. While they are of little use in targeting Israel, in large numbers they are effective in hitting civilian and infrastructure targets of the gulf states, and most importantly keep the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz under threat.

I know from experience how even an air force as powerful as the IAF can never stop the firing of smaller caliber rockets, missiles and drones without the ground forces advancing and holding the ground. I have seen Hezbollah fighters time and again quickly deploy in pickup trucks, fire dozens of rockets and disappear a good 5 to 10 minutes before IAF jets show up to bomb the area. Lebanon is close and tiny compared to far off Iran, and stopping small caliber fire with air power alone typically proves very difficult if not impossible.

Now, it goes without saying that firing long range munitions that can cover the 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers is a different matter. This is why it may be possible to reduce the launching of ballistic missiles to zero or near zero levels (at a level that interceptor numbers are not an issue for Israel or the US). But the race against time is much more critical in respects to Iranian drones such as the Shaheeds. If the regime does not collapse quickly, the US must open the gulf for traffic. The plentiful Iranian drones are the main threat here.

With a critical view of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz in mind, an Admiral led Central Command destroyed much of the Artesh’s Navy. Much has been said about the “other” Iranian Navy, the IRGC Navy and their asymmetric warfare based on fast boats. Because those boats not sea drones, like Ukraine uses in the Black Sea, my opinion is that they are quite worthless. They require brave men to man them and attack the US Navy. Their theoretical swarm tactics will not amount to much, and to date have not even been dared in this conflict.

It is the suicide drones and other loitering munitions which are the major threat for ships wanting to cross the strait, and for the Gulf states in general which do nto possess the AD systems (nor the interceptor numbers) to defend their entire civilian infrastructure.

With this in mind, it is imperative for the US and Israel to extend and expand the air corridors, establish full air supremacy and as large a drone coverage as is possible over strategic parts of Iran to stop the firing of both BM and drones.

More importantly, it is imperative to advance the plan and its subordinate operations to change the reality on the ground. It is particularly important for a friendly force (if not US force) to hold the coastal strip along the Strait of Hormuz and parts of the Persian Gulf on the Iranian side in order to stop closer range weapons from being fired on commercial ships, enemy recon, spotting and observation (to direct longer range fire) ships, and to establish AD systems on the north and northeast side of the Gulf to stop suicide drones coming from further inland before they reach the gulf (knowing Trump he is likely at least considering seizing terminals, ports and Kharg island to seize certain amounts of oil exports at least temporary to offset America’s war costs and the rising oil prices).

However, getting shipping flowing across the strait again has more to do with insurance and escorts than stopping all Iranian fire. If the US can arrange escorted convoys and provide insurance for ships, we may see the flow restored, this is critical to stop oil prices from going even higher.

Because of this and other reasons, with the regime remaining in firm control for the moment, expect to see special operation forces conduct operations deep within Iran. We may see Israeli and/or American special forces reach nuclear sites, command centers (to capture leaders), missile and drone storage depots etc. A great opportunity would be using such forces, under heavy air cover, to free political prisoners from certain prisons (of course to have any effect they’d have to release them locally and not extract them from the country).

I think we will yet see some very interesting moves from Israel and perhaps the US before all is said and done.

In any case, the attrition cuts both ways, and much more so against the Iranian regime. As soon as payroll can’t be made (or under hyperinflation as they simply print money), the subsidized fuel stops, the strategic bombing campaign takes its toll, and the country starts to run out of everything… things may yet take a different turn. Once they start to unravel, it tends to happen increasingly fast. Meanwhile high oil prices are quite helpful to Russia, who has been suffering under very low prices throughout the latter pars of its war, which doesn’t bother me one bit… and the huge US shale oil industry (not to mention natural gas) which can ramp up production volumes by huge margins and simply rake in millions.

On the other hand, over $100 a barrel oil, could be tittering Cuba’s final straw. And all the “sustainable” energy folks should be really happy, as once again other forms of energy can become, at least temporarily, a bit more competitive.

Hope to next be able to briefly cover the myriad reports about water infrastructure (as a target for Iran) circulating about, and the internal political divisions within the Kurds that are playing a big part in what does or doesn’t happen. The Kurds, like everyone else, have a political left and a right (besides important regional and tribal differences) who don’t agree on much.

Having discussed various parts of the Iran conflict, this current round, the previous 12-Day round, and for many years previous in general, with some detail, I want to take the opportunity here to make some shorter points relevant to the current state of the war and its future.

A good place to start for background is this last piece:

• Thus far, I am afraid to say that my concerns of the regime change goal, we first discussed at the outset of the 12 Day War, are proving correct. The difference between the Persian Shia Iranians and their regime is an exaggerated one in the West. It is a popular uprising that overthrew the Shah and installed the Ayatollahs and not the other way around. More importantly, people don’t like to be, or to seem to be, treasonous. While the Jews and Americans are bombing you, at least in the short term, people are unlikely to hit to the streets.

• The key targets to destroy if you indeed aim for such an uprising, are the prisons (with the effect of releasing prisoners), and the major Oil refineries. Though we are starting to see the very earliest of reporting on this (Some prisoners released or escaped in Western Kurdish regions, likely a sign of regime loss of control in at least these regions), and some fuel storages in Tehran were hit by the IDF, these critical components have not yet systematically targeted by the allies.

  • Note that even you do hit these, along with the military and government control assets that have been hit, a popular rising would sill likely need you to stop the Air War. At least until the popular uprising began, at which point you can provide it with air support. You could maintain a limited Air war against the missile program and launchers, but would have to be seen to have ceased operating against the country at large. The US and Israel are unlikely to wish to take this risk (of stopping for now, hoping for a regime change later), a luxury you lose when your stated goal is regime change, and one you could have enjoyed otherwise.

• In lieu of a popular national uprising, as we discussed often you can face separatist actions, specifically by the Kurds and Balochs, perhaps also by Azeris and some Lurs. More on that later.

  

• If a popular uprising does not organically take place, the US requires the quick formation of a defiant group to hold ground. Once they hold ground, they can advance quickly with US and Israeli air support. Aras they control will be supplied, while areas controlled by the regime will be increasingly isolated and blockaded.

  • However you have to chose your strategy and group wisely. Firing in all directions at once will not be helpful. Encouraging the easiest such group to act and advance, the Kurds, will only strengthen the nationalist resolve and cohesion of the Shia Persians backing the regime. One thing is to support the Kurdish uprising in Kurdish lands, another is to use them to advance on Tehran. Intelligent use of these forces can still be used as a launchpad to later create a broader insurgent group but a largely Kurdish advance on Tehran would cause panic among the Shia. Whatever government they did set up would not have broad support. I for one, would prefer to not once again take advantage of the Kurds under false pretenses but rather see the rise of an independent Kurdistan (and watch Erdogan’s reaction). The Kurdish reluctance to act at the moment, is well informed by the many times they were left hanged out to dry by the West.

• If the Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, is to have any legitimate support in taking over the helm of government, if at a political or constitutional monarchal level, he would need to arrive relatively on the ground, where this group controlled the territory and advance with them. This would make him quite popular if not legendary. Arriving after the fighting is done as a US/Israel installed puppet will not endear him to anyone, nor be the likely start of a lasting and stable regime. A King must earn his crown (I’d love to see that).

• Many folks were confused by Iran’s seemingly illogical attack on virtually every country in the region, when only two countries on earth were attacking it. I posit the only reason it seemed strange to people is because of its weakness.

• Just like West drinks its own Kool-Aid, and thinks all Iranian people love them and just want to live under a Jeffersonian Constitution, all except the old Ayatollahs that rule them of course, so do the Iranians (drink their own Kool-Aid). We have been warned by the “experts” for years that attacking Iran would be catastrophic, lead to global chaos and even WWIII. Well how does that happen? Exactly like this, by Iran sowing chaos in the region in retaliation. It can’t strike out at the US at all, and barely at Israel, so it will strike out at everyone else. This is in order to do several things:

  • Cause a significant cessation of global shipping (especially oil shipping) and air travel. With the war in Ukraine going on, closing the Azerbaijani airspace is a strike at the heart of the bottleneck maintaining east-west travel across Eurasia. If it can cut air travel across Saudi Arabia and the strait of Hormuz further south, it is nearly a full blockade.

    

  • Create the impression on many countries that it is the US and Israel’s fault that they are being attacked, not Iran’s fault (the actual attacker). And that the US relations and literal military bases that they thought protected them, are actually the cause for them being harmed. At the same time, the Iranians wish to show that the Americans cannot protect them.

  • While ballistic missiles require equipment and forces to fire that are fast being wiped out in Iran, drones are a different story. They can often successfully target civilian areas of gulf states close by, they are cheap, available in vast numbers and do not require much to launch (though as long as the US and Israel remain resolute, as the air superiority is maintained and strengthened in Iran, we will their ability to continue to launch these in large numbers also diminish). Much of the world did not make the distinction during the 12 day that while Israel was targeting military and regime targets in Iran, while Iran was trying to hit any Israeli apartment building, they are noticing it now. The defense game is completely different. Iranian families don’t have to spend nights in bunkers as Israeli families did. Iran’s AD doesn’t have to try to protect every home in Iran from attack, just military and regime sites. Anyways, despite this asymmetry we managed just fine. The gulf states are having a harder time protecting civilian buildings, even just from slow moving drones and not ballistic missiles.

  • The Iranian strategy is simply to hold on, relying on the Western misunderstanding of their country, and hold on while the chaos they sow around the strategically important region grows, and causes mass pressure on the Americans to back down. Ideally, much like the Ukrainian strategy, by attacking enough players (all with their own complex set of geopoitical interests), Iran hopes to draw other people into the conflict and break down the alliance against it.

• That was always the plan. The reason it seems so absurd now is because Iran does not have the strength to carry it out. It is not sowing chaos around the region, it is lashing out with pin prick attacks all over the place. And that is why the strategy looks strange. Now, with a sufficiently weak willed US administration, it can still work. The regime as I have said frequently certainly has longer staying power than the Americans believed. And some may see the the virtual cessation of shipping across the strait of Hormuz as evidence that they can disrupt world trade, and critical the global flow of oil.

• To address that let me briefly assert here that the Iranians have not closed the Strait of Hormuz, and they can’t. Much like in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, at least in relation to the chain reaction of bank failures, was caused not by organic bankruptcies but by government rules, namely Mark-to-Market accounting rules (or as is more commonly thought and the mainstream media explained the reason, “Greed”), here we have something similar at play. The insurance rules today require huge capital requirements based on “black-swan” events. Adapting quickly to these is very difficult or impossible so insurance carriers preferred to drop their war risk insurance on ships traversing the region. The Iranians are not stopping the shipping, but rather western government rules on insurance policies are.

  • One encouraging sign I saw of intelligent planning work having taken place on the American side, was that Insurance and/or escorts would be provided by the US to all ships. Now, it would take a long article in itself to discuss these mattes, but sufficed to say that this shows geopolitical and economic understanding, as opposed to the usual circus we see in Washington in recent years (think the Woke-driven push of Ukraine to war with Russia, the entire Democrat section of the Senate kneeling on one knee wearing some form of African attire (ns giant face masks of course).

    

  • That’s the usual circus. Compare to that, knowing that they would have to issue insurance to shipping pre-strikes was quite refreshing. In any event, if the US can solve this issue, you will see traffic across the Strait without issue. Not necessarily I mean without issue whatsoever, there is a war going on after all, but I mean relatively uninterrupted. Prices fittingly should go for example, from 1 to 2 percent of value (for insurance) to 3 or 4 percent.

• The Iranian strategy is logical and is the best they can do at this point. It is not stupid, stupid is what they have done for decades since the revolution. At this point, there isn’t much they can do other than hold on and cause as much chaos as they possibly can. With that said, attacking Azerbaijan of all places, might prove a mistake as that is a country with honor, and which knows how to win wars. They also share a border with a large Iranian region of majority Azeris. The weak attempt at blocking the air corridor was probably not worth invoking their ire, but then again… even an Azerbaijani intervention can throw off the US’s goals… Iran wants as much chaos as possible. Having seen been weak by their population (I discussed that at length in the past) too often, they now have no choice but to play strength till the end.

• Finally, note that a very likely outcome, if the US can neither find nor create its force on the ground to support by air and rapidly advance, nor trigger a nation-wide uprising, then a fake regime change can take place. Members of the army (but not the IRGC), the Artech, or other such lesser known regime figures can take over and negotiate an end of the war with the US. This would be the regime surviving chameleon style, while giving Trump a way out in declaring victory regarding his regime change. From Israel’s point of view, as long as the deal made with them regarding the nuclear and missile program is clear and effective, and the subsequent “friendly” regime doesn’t end up being a shield of immunity to protect them instead, that would be just fine. Who rules the Persians is their business. I just don’t like failing to achieve declared goals. Which is why it’s good to think about them first.

We then had plenty of discussion on the subject over half a year ago, during Israel vs Iran, Round One. I was quite frustrated at the nearly complete 12 day war being stopped short of Israeli victory, by pressure from the Trump administration, in its early chaotic days.

We discussed it in pieces such as this one:

This American pressure is indirectly why Bibi Netanyahu some months later, had only finally bent on a Gaza Ceasefire because Trump promised him among other things, that correcting the state of affairs regarding the unfinished business with Iran.1

I discussed that in much more detail in this piece:

It was clear to me that Round 2 was not far off and that regime change was a more difficult task than the Americans, at least, (along with most Israelis) assume. This is due to the phenomena of drinking your own Kool-Aid. Iran is not made up of 100 million people being oppressed by a few very religious old men. A popular uprising put them there to begin with.

I personally thought we should avoid regime change as a goal for many reasons. But I argued that if you did want it at the national level, prisons and the fuel refineries were the key targets. I also warned from the outset, that if a national uprising does not take place, Iran faced the prospect of losing its Kurdish and perhaps Balochi territories. If a new government that promises these regions respite, local autonomy etc, is not established then outright rebellion and secession is their path. And this can take the form of a Kurdish breakaway region (of incalculable importance to the region, as it would trigger the movement for a Kurdistan across regions nominally Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria), and would undoubtedly lead to limited or full scale conflict with Turkey). Perhaps even more worrying to the Shia Persians, the extreme version of this scenario is not a Kurdish breakaway region, but an advance of Kurdish forces onto Tehran.

A bit calmer sometime after suffering our imposed ceasefires (on Iran and Gaza), and as speculation of a US strike on Iran intensified, I analyzed the lessons of the 12 Day War and the implications for the next round. I find this piece very important given where we are today, specifically the conclusion that Trump delayed strikes in order to have a much fuller plan to achieve complete victory:

I reference these posts as they are a good background for where we are now, and what I wish to add in this analysis. First, let us continue on this regime change vein and the subject of the Iranian ethnic landscape.

Recent Uprisings and their Characteristics

Let us think back to recent popular uprisings in the Arab world. They are without exception either largely ethnic, religious and tribal in nature, more akin to a civil war (ie Libya, Yemen), or a religious uprising against a secular regime (Egypt, Tunisia). Most have had aspects of both, a good example being Syria2.

Note that “religious” in the first scenario refers to peoples of different religions fighting, such as in the case of Lebanese Christians and Muslims, or Sunnis vs Shiites. In the second scenario it refers to people of nominally the same religion fighting because of vast difference in religiosity or observance, such as the Muslim Brotherhood battling the Egyptian military establishment over control of the state. The Arab Spring in fact was in much of the Arab World, simply a fundamentalist Sunni or Jihadi uprising against secular socialist regimes left over from the Cold War (no longer propped up by the Soviets). But in other places, it was a tribal and ethnic conflict.

In no place, was it what the Western Media reported at the time (Freedom Protestors). My readers of course, even way back then knew what it was. In any event, the celebrating population you saw dancing at Saddam’s downfall were Shiites. Iraq has ever since been largely separated into three distinct regions, Shia, Sunni and Kurdish (also largely Sunnis). The West’s forceful imposition of Democracy in that country meant a Shia majority (~60%) domination of the Sunni minority (~40%). This was a sufficiently terrifying concept to inspire the long deadly Sunni uprisings of northern and western Iraq culminating in the ISIS takeover.

So while we have seen ethnic conflicts and have even seen poor religious masses uprise and topple secular wealthy (and often corrupt) elites (including Hamas over PLO/Fatah), we have not seen the opposite in recent history. We have yet to see secular mobs toppling a religious elite. This is what the West expects to happen in Iran.

So having said that, let us briefly understand where we are as we speak. Obviously, against my better judgement, the US and Israel are indeed aiming for regime change. They also have elected to use targeted killings on a massive scale, another aspect I am no fan of. This was done due to the realization that the popular uprising so easily envisioned was not forthcoming during the 12 day war. When widespread protests did start later on (as I predicted in my earlier pieces then), after the war ended, they were fairly easily squashed by the regime’s forces. The thinking here is apparently that people need not fear the dead, thus be encouraged to hit the streets, and also that the pure elimination of a regime’s leadership is a sort of guarantee of regime change. Since regardless of what happens there will be new faces at the top, a sort of successful regime change can always be declared. If the people don’t topple them, then the missiles will be declared to have done it.

The Military Picture

In any event, in an in the purely military aspect of the conflict, Iran is fast being defeated. Have been posting regarding this on X:

The number of sirens and race to the bunker my wife and children are enduring each time have been drastically reduced. Incidentally, this is more likely the result of deterring the launching forces rather than the destruction of nearly all launching infrastructure and equipment, though it is not reported this way. Folks don’t like blowing up, and they won’t launch missiles if while doing it there is a high likelihood of them doing so. Air superiority is fast being achieved over much of Iran. Rather than firing standoff precision munitions, increasingly even US fighters (who at first were not taking the risk), are actually flying over Iranian airspace. In fact today we got the first reports of strategic bombers taking action over Iran, including the old and legendary B-52s.

This pivots the game of attrition (Iran’s only play) on its head. Western weapons have become advanced, expensive and produced in low volumes; we discuss this often when it comes to the Russo-Ukrainian war. But once you have air superiority and strategic bombers are freely in play, the equations change drastically. Now, vast tonnage of accurate, but inexpensive munitions can be used. The US has massive stockpiles of these munitions, and your firepower not only gets more voluminous and cheaper, but also more powerful. Heavier munitions can now take out bunkers and especially fortified positions of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, large amounts of expensive and slowly-produced interceptors are no longer needed, if Iran can’t fire to begin with.

Despite plenty of misinformation to the contrary, Iran is losing this war fast, for those that it is not evident already. Now, some may be puzzled on why Iran has lashed out seemingly at everyone in the region. Missiles have been fired at all the gulf states (nor surprisingly, the most at the more right leaning UAE), at international shipping, and even British bases in Cyprus. Ironically the UK had even been denying US use of its bases for the operation until that point. Only two countries were attacking it and Iran lashed out at nearly every country in the region.

That may seem quite stupid. Well maybe but the truth is that the stupid was already long in the past. At this point, the regime does not have many options. All it can do is hope to cling on, and somehow outlast the fickle Trump who always loves a deal. Just like during the first round, the regime’s only chance at avoiding a complete defeat is Trump. And again, any new face leading the show can be played off as in fact a new regime making the deal.

But short of that, it hardly matters what Iran does or doesn’t do. And a regime fighting for its life, and having prepared for over thirty years for the eventuality, will fire everything its got, at everyone it can. The truth is that Iran is simply trying to optimistically enact the very strategy the various American Democrats, American doomers and Americana adversaries have been prophesizing. Iran too, drinks its own Kool-Aid. The idea here is that Iran must survive by fighting a war of attrition with the democracies of the US and Israel. Being democracies, they can be defeated by eroding popular support for the war. All they need to do is cause casualties, cling on to power, and cause as much economic havoc as possible.

We have long been told about the catastrophe Iran’s closing of the strait of Hormuz would be (the Iranians as I explained previously cannot close the strait nor much of anything else). So they are simply tying to cripple the world’s, or at least the Western, economy. By hitting oil, water and maritime infrastructure all over the region, they hope to bring shipping to a halt. If they are able to cut oil output from the region, and eliminate shipping within the gulf, for a significant period of time, certainly overwhelming pressure would force the US and Israel to back down.

This is why they have lashed out at everyone. Of course, the Iranians lacked the power to execute this strategy on day 1, and they are further away from it each passing day. As I mentioned before, their attempt at closing the strait would see their Navy sunk. In the event, it was sunk even before they made a believable attempt at a closure. Ships will continue to traverse the strait and the Persian Gulf, simply at increased insurance rates or without insurance. As a sign of situational awareness, I briefly read that the US will be offering not only Navy escorts to commercial shipping, but also war insurance in case the primate markets for it freeze up. That is a sign of thorough planning (what did I say Trump learned from the Maduro operation?!).

Ironically, the only part of the Persian Gulf that will see shipping fall to near zero, will be shipping to and from Iran. We already see this phenomena in action:

As you can see, it is the northern (Iranian) side of the Gulf that is virtually empty. Iran will be forced to make due with small ports on the Caspian for trade via Russia, and the land crossings of Turkey (dominated by the Kurds) and Pakistan (of very poor logistics, and dominated by the Balochis).

So what looks like lunacy in the lashing out at everyone randomly, and largely ineffectually, is just the anticlimactic poor execution of the strategy experts told us for decades would lead to catastrophe and at the least WWIII. Iran thought it would bring down the house, the price of having directly attacked the Iranian Revolution, would be complete chaos, destruction and economic collapse for the region and the world. Not so much. The seemingly absurd strategy is incompetence, ignorance and arrogance all at once and at full display.

Of course, as they realize the futility of their strategy given their limited and diminishing power, they may attempt to change tactics; since they are not really sowing chaos, why anger the region’s neighbors against them to no benefit? They may even waver back and forth on this strategy, as internal arguments rage on its efficacy, or issue statements that contradict its actions (saying they won’t attack their neighbors while doing so, or and/or vice versa). This would all be typical Iranian regime behavior. For what it’s worth, having angered the neighbors already and shown their true colors, only steadfastness gives them a chance, regardless of how small. Stopping attacks on their neighbors now will only remove any beneficial (to the regime) incentives on the Gulf states, and leave their wrath and desire for vengeance. It will also show weakness and that the regime is declining in strength, under stress and conflicted if not desperate. The Arab world doesn’t join team up with those showing those traits.

So what Next?

Having discussed the past, and the present military situation, we return to the pesky question of regime change. I maintained since the beginning of the previous 12 day war, that expecting the Iranian people to rise up against the regime while Israel (or America for that matter) was bombing them, in the short term was foolhardy.

If you hit them hard and fast, they would not be toppled during the fast strike, but perhaps down the road (as began to occur). They lost face, respect, credibility and the tittering economics came crumbing down. To this end if you seek regime change I recommended hitting the refineries (which they haven’t done in their belief that they are friends of the Iranian people and enemies only of the regime.. or at least in the attempt to convince them that this is so… hearts and minds).

But in the short term at lest, while you bomb them a popular uprising won’t occur. Now, as I said then, if you simply maintain an air campaign long enough, anything can happen. But it’s not a great strategy.

On the other hand, while we know that Air Power alone cannot win a war on its own (in terms of actually controlling land), “at least not yet” as I wrote in a 2014 article that is quoted in this earlier substack written shortly after Oct 7th 2023:

… it can be very effective when supporting forces on the ground, and those forces don’t have to be your own. We have discussed how the original post 9-11 Rumsfeld Afghanistan campaign was brilliant in its efficiency of force. No (regular) US boots on the ground. Simply by supporting the Northern Alliance, which still barely held on in the far north of the country, and giving them massive air support (by embedding with them the famous US Horse soldiers), they quickly overran Taliban-held Afghanistan. Holding it afterwards against the wishes of its majority Pashtun (Taliban) people is something else entirely, but the point is that nearly any determined force can advance and take vast swaths of territory from nearly any opposing force, however stronger, if backed by effective Air support enjoying complete Air Superiority.

If any such group actually takes to the streets or arms itself and concentrates, then it can receive air support and finish the job. People might be greatly surprised at how fast (especially in open country and rural areas) such an armed group can advance with air support and against a crumbling enemy, who cannot concentrate nor maneuver lest they be destroyed from the air. The key is that as I have consistently argued, a popularly supported armed Shia Persian group like that is unlikely to organically to spring up. But an inorganic one can certainly be created.

And an even less creative choice would be the already fairly militarized Kurds. Not only can you organize and arm them within Iran, as we discussed has probably been happening more intensely since the First 12-Day Round, but they can also be organized and armed in Iraq, where the US has vast influence and bases, and then can cross into Iran. A Kurdish force, supported by US Air Power could indeed advance far beyond its traditional Kurdish territory and even from the core of a force that marches into Tehran. What that would mean afterwards is hard to say.

Unless the Kurds make a Reuben-Gad-Manasseh3 deal with the US in that they would lead the assault to topple the regime, and after victory would return to their lands, you likely would end up in a situation of endemic conflict as a vengeful Kurdish elite tries to rule over a terrified Persian population who would not accept Kurdish rule, unless exceedingly temporary.

In any event, whether Kurdish forces lead a core group that is later expanded to include many others, and advance onto Tehran (before inviting the Shah back?), or they simply establish their autonomy in the northwest, Turkey will vehemently and violently oppose them. The effective deletion of the Iraq-Iran border in the Kurdish regions (up until now, existing only by its forceful implementation by the regime), as supplies weapons and people cross back and forth while the regime loses control over it, will not only be difficult to re-establish once broken, but will in effect be the birth of Kurdistan.

Because unless Iraq is accepted to have grown and annexed parts of northwestern Iran (which no one will like or accept, even less so annexation in the opposite direction), then the flimsy facade of autonomy within an Iraqi federation goes by the wayside. No longer Northern Iraq, but an emerging Kurdistan will seek to include within its borders, Kurdish brothers in Turkey and Syria.

As if any more points of conflict were needed, Turkish incursions into regions held by such Israeli-supported Kurdish groups or emerging Kurdistan, will pit the two arch enemies against each other.

To summarize, unless the Israel / US plan is to stop after a clear military victory (which I prefer), simply enforcing an air campaign until there is an organic national uprising may turn out to be a long and dangerous waiting game. And unless a deal with a false “new” regime (post-Maduro Venezuela style) is the desired out come, then pro-active measures are likely needed.

These could be as simple as striking the right targets (we have discussed the fuel refineries and the prisons), and as grand as creating the first groups of organized opposition, which can be given air support as it grows and advances. It can also take the form of using Balochi and Kurdish forces which already exist to advance into Persian Iran under American and Israeli air cover. Azeri (and Lur) forces may turn out to be key as they are more integrated with the Persians at large. They also tended to back the Shah in earlier decades.

Which strategy is used will determine how fast and easily a new regime can take shape, how it can incorporate opposition leaders in exile, most importantly the former Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, and how stable it can be post military intervention.

Because its so messy among other reasons I prefer we (Israel) stayed out of nation building exercises in Iran, but I expect Israel and the US have quite an elaborate plan put together, since we concluded (or at least I argued) on our earlier piece that Trump delayed an execution of plain strikes in order to achieve something much grander. We shall see if it works and how well. At the end, war is ultimately a battle of wills. On the other hand I do look forward with honor at seeing a Kurdistan rise from amongst our enemies, and look happily to, if need be, help defend it from Erdogan and his minions.

For too long, and far too often, has the West betrayed Kurdish aspirations, and almost always in a feeble attempt to appease Turkey and in the hope of maintaining its false friendship.

It would thus quickly evolve into “Round 2” of the Israel Iran war that didn’t quite finish. We discussed it at significant detail in various posts such as here:

Let me briefly (or knowing me, not so briefly) summarize some of the main points we have discussed:

1. Regime change is probably not a good military goal.

   1. It is the Iranian’s business how they rule themselves. I care that they can’t nuke us. In any event, Iran is far more leftist and far more Shia than many people and governments understand. There are some who are not so leftist but very religious, and even more who are not so religious but very leftist. The overwhelming majority of the Iranian population is deeply leftist/socialist and at least nominally Shiite.

   2. Ethnic differences are somewhat set aside or deemed less important (than in many other Muslim countries) as long as the groups are Shiite. Iran is the mother base of the Shia world. This is a big deal in a largely Sunni Muslim world. It is only where the minorities are Sunni, that ethnic differences easily translate into armed conflict, mainly in the case of the northwestern Kurds and the Southeaster Balochis.

      1. Good example of this are the Azaris and Lurs. the Azaris (ie Azerbaijanis) form a large percent of the population and are clearly ethnically distinct, being a Turkish people with their own Turkic language. And yet tension with the Persian-dominated state is existent, but of low intensity. The Azaris are largely Twelver Shia Muslims, like the Iranian state and well integrated within it. Many political leaders are fully or partly Azari.

      2. Likewise the Lurs, who many even identify ethnically as Kurds (or at least the Laks & others within them as such), also co-exist in relative peace with the regime. Whereas the (Sunni) Kurds are in virtually open warfare with the state as they are openly Sunni. It is the same with the Balochis. In Iran, the Shia / Sunni divide is more important than ethnicity, especially as intra Shia ethnic assimilation and intermarriage has increased over time.

      3. Iran is very largely Shiite. This Wikipedia map does a decent (though simplified) job of showing the ethnic plus religious geography.

         

   3. As I like to say, it is hard sometimes to know if the Iranian Revolution were Shia Muslims dressed up as socialists or socialists dressed up as Shia Muslims. In the West, people are unaware of the Iranian leftism, but it is a driving factor of the “Revolution”. It is why the regime is friends first with leftists, regardless of religion rather than the other way around. Where you find socialists and communists, you will find Iran’s good graces, be it Venezuela, CCP China, Cuba, or Hamas-run Gaza. That Hamas is Sunni or Venezuela highly Catholic or the former Assad regime of Syria so secular is of no concern, they are socialists first. Their visceral hatred for Israel also comes from viewing it in socialist postmodern terms of an imperialist European colony rather than a state of the Jews (the way a Saudi Prince might see it). A conservative Muslim opens up the Koran and reads about the Jews… he may not be their friend, but he sees them as part of his world, and the neighborhood. A revolutionary communist foams at the mouth, enraged with vile and jealousy at the European colonial enterprise.

   4. If one actually reads their constitution or hears their speeches, from Hamas to Hezbollah and the Ayatollahs themselves, the Revolutionary Shia axis is often more woke than most could imagine. It is one of the reasons conservatives are sometimes baffled by the far left’s support of certain supposedly fundamentalist Muslim regimes. We all hear the line of “Don’t these gays know that they would be killed there!”. The truth is that while ignorance is not lacking in these circles, these leftists an naturally sense the leftism in their counterparts, and it is actually often the befuddled conservative who is blind to this reality. This is why the gay parade will not often be seen marching in support ISIS, or the Saudi Kingdom… definitely not for the UAE. They have no sympathy for these conservative hardcore Muslims. But give them a Hamas, Hezbollah or Ayatollah any day… all they see is a Che Guevarra picture. I think you will find I am rather unique in trying to point this out in the West.

   5. Iran is thus overwhelmingly Shite and leftist socialist (only a very socialist country, (think Venezuela, Iran) can pull off having that much oil and still be so poor). Some sectors of the population are more Shia and less socialist or vice versa, but they are overwhelmingly at least one and in the large majority both. Thus the regime is not their enemy. They may topple it eventually due to dire economic conditions or internal politics, but the regime and the people are much closer than folks in the West understand.

2. So regime change is not a goal I would chose. But if you do opt for it, know that you are picking a difficult task. As I wrote during the 12 day war, the people will not rise up in Iran while the Jews are bombing them. Yes… enemies of Iran, the Kurds, the Balochis, of course. At any opportune time. But not the bulk of the population. The regime can fall as I wrote, afterwards, be it weeks, months or longer, after a hard and successful strike (and because of it), but not during it. Not in the short term at least. The fact that widespread protests began months after the war is evidence to my typical prescience. Of course if you maintain a prolonged air campaign against the regime for moths, that is another story, and anything is possible (or if you literally take out enough leadership that whomever takes over can pass itself as “regime change”) . But I maintain that regime change during a hard short term strike is unlikely, as it unites the people.

   1. Additionally, if regime change is is the goal nonetheless, there are two most important targets that I discussed before. Since it is economics that can actually topple the regime, then removing the last critical resource the regime control and relies on is key. Knock out the major fuel refineries (that largest alone produces 40% of Iran’s gasoline). I spoke at length about the interplay between economics and military operations when it comes to refineries in an article on the Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, in this piece:
      

      
      and there also pointed out how the situation in this regard in Iran is much more different than in Russia. The subsidized fuel in Iran is critical and all that the state has left to provide (as it can’t even provide water).

   2. The second critical target would be the prisons. Especially those housing a large amount of political prisoners. You see, one thing is to be afraid of the consequences the regime can dish out, and opt to stay safe inside your home; and quite another to find yourself an escapee already. An escapee is desperate to never again return to the torture, squalor and even death that awaits him in an Iranian prison. Once freed, desperate to not return, he is an avowed do-or-die enemy of the regime. Thousands of such escapes, who to begin with are imprisoned for being the more politically active and outspoken, can form the nucleus of a much larger movement as they bring in their families, friends and clansmen to aid in their cause. Having been imprisoned together, they also will have widened and improved their networks.

   3. Evin Prison reportedly was hit by Israel during the 12 day War. Cannot confirm if this is true or fake news, but if it was real, it was more of a symbolic strike and not executed with the level of precision and planning that accompanied other parts of the Rising Lion. Prisoners cannot escape simply because the front gate was blown up. Freeing them requires a more involved operation.

   4. Lastly, if regime change is the goal, I would not target the old Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Like I said, the Iranians are in large part supporters, however discontent they are at the current dire economic situation, and lionizing the old leader serves no real purpose. My readers know I am not a fan of targeted killings as it is, and when they happen there has to be a very good reason for them. Letting the man be toppled, lose, abdicate, surrender, etc is much better. In order for taking him out to succeed in anything resembling a regime change in short order, the US or Israel would have to also take out many other figures, including most if not all of the members of the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts (which elects the Supreme Leader), and perhaps sons of the top leadership.

3. Iran and Israel both learned lessons from the 12 day war. For Iran, it was namely that fixed site launchers are pretty worthless and easily taken out. Their bottleneck was mobile launchers. They need more mobile launchers and the forces capable of (and willing, under fire) fielding them in war. They also learned the value of solid fuel missiles rather than liquid fuel, which drastically cuts down on the time needed for launch (and the window for Israeli Air forces to take them out). They also learned that their masses of drone and lower quality missiles are useless against Israeli AD. Only their most advanced ballistic missiles could penetrate as we discussed. So a second round would l likely see Iran sending less but more advanced missiles, rather than the nightly hundreds that were fired in the early days of the war.

   1. Israel for its part knows that Iran learnt this and will prepare accordingly. Specifically it needs much larger stockpiles of ammunitions for high altitude ballistic interceptors that can handle the advanced Iranian ballistic missiles. It means much more exo-atmospheric Arrow 3, and more Arrow 2, rather than only large volumes of David’s Sling and Iron Dome. Obviously, it needs to be ready to take out the mobile launchers faster and more efficiently. If regime change is the goal, more involved and intelligent operations are needed, especially getting proxies, agents and other forces ready on the ground. Or if they care to read my articles, operations to free prisoners (and strike the refineries). I would be content, if the operation goes on to the point where Iran cannot fire back anymore, the IAF flies freely over Iran and picks its targets at its leisure, and the Israeli airspace is open for business while the Iranian is closed. This is winning the Air War and is what I hope is aimed for (along with the original aim of crippling the nuclear program and advanced ballistic program). I like winning wars much more and killing people much less than most of my higher command.

So why has the strike been delayed?

I believe there are several key reasons, and they are interrelated.

Firstly, I believe Trump has come increasingly come to view Bibi Netanyahu not only as a wise and intelligent man, but also one Trump can trust and rely on. Israel has ben likely pushing for a delay for various reasoning including:

• Let the winter pass. This is especially important if there are plans (for us ground forces) in the north, Lebanon and Syria. It is also better for Air operations.

• Israel needs more time to stockpile the AD munitions (and other munitions) it requires to be ready for Iranian retaliatory strikes. It wants to be sure it has enough to maintain the war long term if need be.

• Israel wants the US to have an intelligent and well planned operation ready to go. This involves work on the ground, that is meant to facilitate regime change.

The Saudis, for similar reasons, but mostly the latter one, are also pressing for a delayed but more decisive strike.

Trump for his part, I think has become receptive to this line of reasoning for one major reason.

The lessons from the operation to capture Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro.

You see, Trump likes to shoot from the hip. He doesn’t necessarily plan or even think things through many steps ahead. He believes in his good instincts and that often, all you need to do is shake things up, rattle the cage as it were, and then seize a good opportunity or path as it arises, opens up or becomes clear.

However, the Maduro operation may have taught Trump something when it comes to complex geopolitical operations. While the part of the operation that was meticulously, and remarkably intelligently planned out was a total and complete success (that is, the actual capture of the Venezuelan President), let’s call it the tactical part, the wider strategic operation has been less so.

Now what? Who will run Venezuela? There is perhaps a vague notion of what to do, likely less detailed in post-Maduro Venezuela thinking and more driven by the intelligent Secretary of State’s vision to take out Cuba (by taking out its source of subsidized oil), but it certainly was not a specific or concrete plan. The tactical part was the showstopper and the whole point. The strategic part was left in the realm of rattling cages, shock and awe, and then we’ll see who breaks.

I think the contrast is not lost on Trump. The part that was very well planned out was a huge success. The part that wasn’t, not so much. Likewise the 12 day war did not result in regime change. so I believe Trump has been convinced by this l line of thinking, influenced by the spectacular success of the Maduro capture operation, and has ordered the men with vast resources under his command, to likewise come out with a comprehensive plan on knocking out the Iranian regime for good, rather than another round of ineffective strikes. Trump perhaps is considering ordering a real victory, rather than a media one.

Posted my intention to write about this a few days in this X post.

https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1998570938380530091

The mainstream narrative in the West of late has included three often repeated claims, all implying the near collapse of Russia, or at least its capacity to wage war in Ukraine. For those who like to check, verify, learn, analyze and (even!) think, rather than be “educated” by headlines… a deeper look at these three claims.

In this article:

• Russia running out of fuel?

• Russia running out of tanks?

• Are Tomahawks the gamechanger?

1. Russia’s war machine and war economy are being brought to their knees due to Ukrainian strikes on its oil refineries.

Here we will not explore Russia’s overall economy under the unprecedented sanctions (hope to get a chance to do that at a later point), but only address the claim that these recent oil refinery strikes will collapse the Russian economy.

Such headlines and videos have been everywhere in the last few months.

Here just a small sample from a quick search:

A closer look at some popular examples:

The above recent “Radio Free Europe” video included this (following) map of hit oil refining sites this year; over 100, and it reports half of Russia’s major oil refineries have been attacked (some, dozens of times).

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/12/07/frontline-report-2025-12-06/

The video goes on to report that 10% of Russia’s oil refining capacity has been taken out.

More dramatically, a recent Euromaidan report, which was quoted very widely, reported over 180 strikes on refineries (and ports), heading towards 200 by year’s end. It claims the refining capacity has been cut by a much more significant 25%, and to indicate the imminent collapse, reported that Russia’s Rosneft’s net income was slashed by 70%.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/12/07/frontline-report-2025-12-06/

They provided the following map of major strikes.

Additionally, the Euromaidan report says Russian refining capacity is down to only 5 million barrels per day. These numbers are for the first 9 months of 2025, in a YoY comparison.

So is all this true?

Many of the facts are true (or close enough), but not the implications. First let’s understand why oil refining specifically is being targeted.

Oil refineries are prime targets (I discussed them earlier this year as targets for Israel in the Israel-Iran war). They make for dramatic images and raging fires. Refining capacity tends to be concentrated in large facilities with all too attractive targets; columns, hydrocrackers, desulfurization units, and pipe-racks are vulnerable to small warheads and burn magnificently. A few well-placed hits can idle a plant for weeks if not more.

Fires at refineries, can also range for days until contained. And theoretically, they produce the finished products (such as diesel and jet fuel) that the armed forces and economy actually need. Raw extracted oil (crude) is not directly used by the economy so in this respect, this makes the refineries better targets as well. Finally, many refineries are closer to the markets where their products are needed, and (as the earlier maps show), closer to the front line.

Upstream production on the other hand is very far (from the front line) and dispersed. We are looking at 1,500 to 2,500 km from Ukraine (West Siberia, the Urals), and thousands of wells and gathering lines. Crude terminals are more concentrated but tough targets. Strikes thus far has shown Ukraine can pause operations at some terminals, but Russia has restored loadings rather quickly. Ports and large oil hubs are also heavily defended. Pipelines and terminals are part of a more redundant system, harder to damage, and easier to patch.

For these and other reasons, the refineries were seen as the softer and more worthwhile target for Ukraine. This means that Russia’s overall oil production and transportation networks have remained fairly untouched.

Now, as mentioned previously, it is true that the refined products are the lifeblood of the economy (and armed forces), and so depriving Russia of refined hydrocarbons would be a very significant blow. But the crux of the matter is that such a deprivation has not occurred (other than perhaps due to temporary shocks before market participants adjust) and cannot occur by the method employed by Ukraine (long range drone strikes on Oil Refineries).

We need not look far for an example. Ukraine has long been deprived of its refining capacity by Russian strikes (since early in the war back in 2022). Ukrainian gas stations throughout the country sell to the public largely without issue. Ukraine simply switched to importing all of its refined products (even before the war, Ukraine was a big importer, but it did have significant petrol, LPG and diesel, in that order, production capacity).

Russia of course is a well known vast producer of oil and net exporter of refined end products. The Ukrainian strikes caused a Russian ban on exporting certain type of refined products. Back in the end of September, Russia implemented a full gasoline export ban, and a partial ban on diesel and other fuels/oils (it targets resellers and non-producers only).

The effect of this is that while indeed domestic gasoline production volumes have dropped, Russia’s oil production has not. This has simply triggered a redistribution in the oil network as far sales, imports and exports. Most specifically and importantly, Russia has exported more of its oil (that was not refined domestically) than previously, and imported more gasoline, that was refined elsewhere, to make up the shortfall.

This of course has economic consequences. Russia’s companies processed oil into refined products in part to export in order to profit. This is a value added process, and exporting the crude oil instead, is normally of lesser value. There is obviously an economic cost in having many of your refineries attacked and heavily damaged; but it alone will neither cripple the Russian economy nor deprive it of gasoline and diesel. These products were simply imported in greater volumes than previously from countries such as Belarus and China, which can take Russian oil freely and refine it without worrying about Ukrainian drones (to date that is).

Now that we have laid out that fundamental dynamic, let us consider how much of Russia’s domestic refining has been crippled, and what the implications may be. Let us begin by digging into Rosneft’s released numbers that were so widely reported to glean some understanding from it. The strikes and the release have certainly affected the stock.

The most dramatic part of the headlines refer to the 70% drop in Net Income. We should understand that this refers to a bottom line profit, and is not necessarily correlated with volumes of production nor revenues. Let us dive in and find out.

In its release, Rosneft said its revenue dropped by 17.8% in the first nine months of the year to 6.29 trillion rubles (vs 7,645 in the same period of 2024). This is certainly a significant drop, but it is very far from the 70% collapse reported.

The company stated that “The Company’s revenue in 9M 2025 decreased by 17.8% year-on-year, amounting to RUB 6,288 bln, due to declining oil prices and a stronger ruble”.

The company specifically sites the stronger rouble as key in the decline. So while the company received 6.29 trillion rubles vs 7,645 trillion in 2024, their value in dollars is a much smaller decline.

For a back of the envelope calculation, let us estimate the average exchange rate in the 2024 period as 95 RUB to the dollar, and in the corresponding 2025 period as 82 RUB to the dollar.

This relatively small drop in USD corresponds to a 4.7% drop, rather than the 17.8% drop in Roubles, and certainly very far either way from a 70% drop blasted in the headlines.

The second factor the company mentioned is the obvious one, oil prices. Oil prices in 2024 ranged roughly from $75 - $80 per barrel and were only $60 - $67 thus far in 2025. That right there is a 20% decline in oil prices, without any drone strikes in the mix.

Gasoline prices dropped even more sharply, from about $90 - $110 in 2024 to $70 - $90 thus far in 2025.

If oil and gasoline prices were equivalent to that many Less dollars per barrel in 2025 than in 2024, and each dollar would buy you even Less roubles as well, it is not surprising that Rosneft’s revenue would drop by 17.8% in terms of roubles, but rather surprising that it did not drop by more! That is before we consider any drone strikes at all!

Therefore, despite the widely quoted headlines, the Roseneft November 28 Press Release does not indicate a collapse in production volumes, much to the contrary.

This leaves us with explaining the 70% drop in Net Income.

If everything is more or less the same in terms of sales and revenues (given oil prices and currency exchanges), one is left wondering about that massive net income drop. We are not satisfied leaving the matter unexplored of course, nor does it suffice to at this point leap to one conclusion or another either arbitrarily or through prejudice, but rather will dig for the answers. As it turns out, getting a rough idea of what is going on is straightforward enough.

While revenue dropped 17.8%, Operating Expenses increased 110 trillion RUB, about 15.6%, and Depreciation, amortization & impairment (D&A), or as the company reported it “Depreciation, depletion, amortization and impairment”, increased 97 billion RUB (15.6%).

With revenue going down and these two items going up, each just as much, net profit is obviously squeezed. An amplification effect. We thus end up with our 70% Net Income Loss. But it is useful here to notice the difference between EBITDA, EBIT, and Net income:

The revenue drop of 17.8% is mostly explained by lower oil prices and a stronger Ruble. A small part of it is due to volume drops (more on that later). EBITDA is down 29% which is explained by the revenue drop and a 15.6% increase in Operating Expenses. This is likely increased security measures, rerouting, heavier and less efficient logistics, increased maintenance and repair and other factors caused by the increasing drone strikes. As the refineries got hit, the network rerouted and adjusted, and this was not free.

Once we include the impairments and depreciation, that is our YoY EBIT change, we get to the a 51.3% drop (a drop of 859 billion RUB). Over half of that difference is in the additional 97 billion RUB of increased DA in the press release, and then we are still missing another 82 billion (859 billion - 680 billion = 179 billion) that appear to be missing. In other words, the difference between EBIT and EBITDA should only be the “DA”. So where is the rest?

Well, the press release as is often the case is showing an Adjusted-EBITDA. First let use a table without adjustments as we would get from the full release, that is IFRS-consistent.

The only thing that changes is the 9M 2025 number for EBITDA from 1,641 to 1,527 billion RUB (and the 9M 2024 number slightly as well). Then our initial drop is of 33.3% rather than only 29.3%. I will address why this is further evidence to our conclusion, but first let us continue.

So, after considering a 33.3% drop in EBITDA, we move on to see a 51.5% drop in EBIT. That difference is made up precisely by the 97 billion RUB in DA. In the adjusted EBITDA number in the press release, the company was also deducting expenses outside the strict “DA” expenses that it considered “DA-like”. These additional 82 billion RUB are a large part of the Operating expenses (OPEX) increase of 105 billion RUB.

The fact that about 80% of the increase in those expenses could be seen by the company as “DA-like”, is further indication that they were damage-related, or at least “disruption-related”. Emergency repairs, logistic inefficiencies, one-time operational disruptions, inventory write-downs, are all likely examples. They were not strictly depreciation or impairments, to be placed within the DA, but similar enough (and management hopes “one-time enough”), to be included in the expenses deducted (not counted) from the Adjusted EBITDA.

An additional clue is that even while EBITDA is dropping over 30%, and strict DA increasing 16%, CAPEX increased 6.3%. That is consistent with hardening and/or rebuilding. In a normal oil-cycle downturn, companies tend to cut or defer CAPEX. You would expect a 10 to 30 percent cut in CAPEX when EBITDA is down over 30%, especially since that previous 9M 2024 period itself had a large 15.7% increase in CAPEX.

Most of the CAPEX is being spent in Upstream development as the company has been reporting, but infrastructure hardening, repair and replacement of damaged assets has been part of the equation. Due to accounting practices, normally such CAPEX increases would not offset impairments and write-downs until the work was more advanced or completed and capitalized. Impairments are recognized when the damage occurs. CAPEX is capitalized when the rebuilding takes place. So you can have both be increasing in the same year.

In other words, the statements support a picture where:

OPEX is increasing (immediate expenses):

• Emergency Repairs

• Security Costs

• Temporary Fixes

• Disruptions

• Rerouting & Increased logistic costs

• Inventory write-downs

DA is increasing as asset values are reduced:

• Damaged facilities & Equipment

• Derated Refineries

• Shortened useful lives

CAPEX is increasing:

• Equipment Replacement

• Reinforced infrastructure

• New routing infrastructure

• Security and Hardening-related capital works

All happening at the same time.

OK, so we are at a 51.3% drop Year-over-Year. How do we get to the reported bottom line drop of 70%.

Basically what remains to get us there are taxes and non-controlling (minority) interests. Taxes dropped by 174 billion RUB:

• 9M 2024: 379 billion RUB

• 9M 2025: 205 billion RUB

Lower prices (and lower still in RUB) means less revenue, less profit and less taxes; but not proportionally and not linearly. This happens for many reasons including that the oil industry includes many taxes not directly on profit. Extraction fees for example are standard. The state receives its share for natural resources extracted from the ground.

• 2024: 379 / 1,519 = 24.9% effective tax rate

• 2025: 205 / 684 = 30.0% effective tax rate

The effective tax rate increases by about 5 percent.

Looking at PBT (profit before taxes) and taxes increases the YoY drop to 58%. Significantly over 51% but still not at the reported 70% drop in income.

We get to the final amplifier in terms of the year over year percent change. Non-controlling (minority) interests. They get a share of profit (and/or fixed claim) before shareholder profits can be distributed.

As we can see, the NCI barely dropped, 12 billion RUB YoY, a mere 5.61% when overall profitability was 58% lower. These minority interests behave somewhat more like fixed claims when profits drop. They may include entities such as regional JVs, refining & upstream partnership, subsidiaries with fixed minority claims, and other JVs which allocate profits before parent-level consolidation. They may also include other state-linked entities or partnerships. That (the NCI payment) is the final amplifier and it leaves the shareholders with the total 70.1% drop in shareholder Net Income.

In summary, we are seeing that lower world oil prices, and a more expensive Ruble, decreased revenues (in Rubles). Strikes did not significantly decrease output volumes, but did change operations. The company adapted the network. While overall volumes were not very different, the type of products that were made and to whom they were sold did in fact change. This, together with increased anti-drone & security measures plus repairs and infrastructure hardening, significantly increased costs and impairments (which may or may not be “real” to a large extent). The outcome was a large net income drop, but in no way did it translate to an equal production drop.

The company’s release includes language that points to our conclusions. In terms of strikes (ie “security measures”), the high RUB price (ie “key interest rate”), and the fact that the company considered many of these expenses “non-monetary” (ie impairments) and “one-off factors” (ie the expenses not in DA that were still excluded in the Adjusted EBITDA by virtue of being “DA-like”).

Now let us take a look at production volumes to verify the theory.

Indeed, total production volumes (upstream production) was flat and unaffected. The Refinery production, as would be expected, experienced a significant drop of 7.8%, but nowhere near catastrophic. When we look at the additional breakdowns, we see that Diesel fuel volumes took the largest hit, with a 9% reduction. Gasoline had a smaller drop of 4%, and “Other” (which includes jet fuel), actually increased. As diesel production is a more serialized process (starting with and dependent on tall high pressure DHT / ULSD units) whereas gasoline has more parallel processes available (blending options etc), it is not surprising that diesel production was harder hit.

We postulated that since oil production upstream was not affected, the refining shortfall would simply be imported while more oil could simply be exported. We also discussed how certain established routes and contracts could be disrupted so sales would shift to the spot and international markets.

We can see evidence for this fact by looking at the SPIMEX (Market Exchange) Sales:

SPIMEX sales for gasoline and diesel were up a whopping 75%, which was 1.8 times the mandated volumes. Russia mandates certain minimum volumes of refined products that must be sold on SPIMEX in order to encourage the growth of that market and provide it with enough inventory and liquidity. Apparently, the oil companies prefer fixed contracts, which tends to command higher average prices. Here, ROSNEFT went far above the minimum, nearly doubling it. In the same period in 2024 as we can see, the company just barely met the minimum requirement.

As certain refineries went off line and could not supply their traditional customers, other refineries further east (or facilities with imported fuel) could supply the SPIMEX market extra amounts, not having the established regional customers who could take the volume. Independent market players, could take the capacity and pay for the logistics to transport it to where they could use, blend, store or sell it.

Rosneft is highly integrated, from crude to refining capacity to depots, wholesale and export. If this vertical coordination is disrupted and under stress due to strike damage, repairs and security upgrades, outages and bottlenecks can result. Sales on SIMPEX is the easy outlet for that disrupted supply chain. It shifts logistics to the buyer, and plenty of different contracts exist. SIMPEX contracts exist by the hundreds and vary not only by product and grade, but also delivery point. There are dozens if not hundreds of delivery points typically used in the market. A few examples:

• Moscow region depots

• Volga region depots

• Ural terminals

• Siberian terminals

• Far East ports

• Specific refinery racks (e.g., Ryazan, Tuapse, Angarsk)

Once you put product available on the market, individual traders may be buy and hedge for any number of reasons. Export bans for example, can encourage traders to buy and store, waiting for their window to export at a profit.

The Rosneft statements gives us a picture of a resilient network adapting, not collapsing. Yes profit for the individual company, specifically for the shareholders at the end of the waterfall did collapse dramatically, but much of that reduced profit is either in one-time improvements that reduce the threat for further strikes, or in the form of non-cash accounting entities. Just like assets were impaired and written down, some may be capitalized later on. Russia’s oil & fuel infrastructure is not collapsing, but rather paid for its increased security, resilience & immunity from further strikes.

Finally, in the long term the company will enjoy some form of insurance relief on much of the damage. This will take time, and negotiations but some form of assistance will come from the state in this regard (though this is still a loss for Russia as a whole, even if not for the specific company).

So is Russia’s oil infrastructure collapsing due to Ukrainian drone strikes? No. Overall production is untouched, and the network will simply adapt, though not without cost.

Refineries make the most appealing targets, as they are a soft target bottleneck, but for similar reasons even in the worse of refining capacity declines, the gap can simply be made up by importing the refined products, while the fact that overall crude production is untouched allows for its export. Economic cost, yes, but the end of gasoline and diesel supply, no.

It is important to note that there are scenarios where destroying the refining capacity of a country can be devastating. It typically requires some of the following factors to be at play:

• Highly concentrated refining bottlenecks. Not hundreds of refineries but a few key sites.

• Highly concentrated import / export routes. A few (or less) reachable gateways; port terminals, pipelines, railways.

• Highly subsidized domestic consumption of refined products.

If you can’t completely block off a country from international trade (and thus diesel & gasoline imports), then the last item on the list is crucial in terms of having a real catastrophic economic impact. For example, in Iran’s case, a single refinancing facility at Setareh Khalij Fars provides ~45% of the total domestic gasoline supply (additionally, ~15% of total refining output). Pre-12-day-war (with Israel) Iran was in terrible economic shape (much worse now). There is little money, productivity, or even water. The one thing Iranian citizens were used to is very cheap gasoline, as the government heavily subsidizes domestic gasoline consumption. What exists of the Iranian economy is highly dependent on this sub-market price source of energy. You are talking about customers often paying a tenth or less of real market prices for a liter of gasoline. And that is about the only benefit they can expect from their government and what helps them offset rampant inflation (which is caused by the massive government spending, which includes the massive fuel subsidies). If you take out that single refinery, the fragile Iranian economy would collapse, because it is as is very fragile and highly dependent on the heavily subsidized fuel.

Russia on the other hand, does not subsidize domestic consumption of gasoline and so importing it rather than producing it for some time does not have a catastrophic economic effect for the state as a whole.

Looking beyond refineries, as we saw earlier Russia’s production is too far east and too spread out for Ukraine to significantly hurt by long range strikes. The next best bottleneck would be export infrastructure. Major pipelines, oil terminals in ports, railway oil depots; difficult for Ukraine to really dent but possible. The only place where large volumes of oil are really unprotected and vulnerable is onboard oil tankers, sanctioned (“shadow fleet”) or not. We already are seeing early signs that a desperate Ukraine, noticing that neither sanctions nor its refinery bombing campaign are having the desired effect (odd since as I mentioned, Ukraine had its refining capacity blown to bits early in the war without causing any major issue) may increasingly try to attack Russian oil tankers on the high seas.

I will leave discussion on that subject for a later piece, as it is rather interesting. I will just point out that Ukrainian imports of gasoline and diesel mostly come from the Danube river ports from Romania. That is a partial logistic bottleneck that can also be targeted by Russia in retaliation. The river ports, terminals and highway/railway bridges over the Black Sea and the Dnister River are key chokepoints.

Routes through Moldova are not developed and are partially blocked by (Russian ally) Transnistria. Russia could significantly reduce Ukrainian fuel imports from this corridor, making Ukraine have to rely only on the more expensive and logistically prohibitive Polish alternative. The Polish Ukrainian border is plagued with heavily congested crossings with long queues as it is, not to mention political tension. The Romanian refineries on the other hand, are export oriented and have access to marine Black Sea crude.

Thus, indeed despite all the sensationalist headlines, Ukraine’s massive investment in long range strikes against Russian refineries, at least in the short and medium term (anything can happen long term), is not likely to lead to any significant results; the Russian network will gradually continue to adapt, without losing much of its refining capacity while it moves further east, air-defense improves and local facilities upgrade and harden (nets, cages/heavy mesh, fortifications, earth berms, dummy pipes & structures, close area anti-air defenses, moving underground) against potential strikes.

2. Russia is out of tanks & other armored vehicles (hence resorted to infantry attacks).

This one is particularly funny because many of the same folks also claim that tanks and armored vehicles are now obsolete (so who cares if you are all out?). On this second question, I am pleased to say that @DelwinStrategy on X (Substack is ) let me know he beat me to the punch on this, and he did a great job on this important question:

He provides the article on substack as well.

In general, the issue is tackled very well and thoroughly in this report and the conclusion reached is broadly correct. I can only highlight and add that most folks are confusing the disappearance of long idle (and decaying) armored vehicles in huge known storage bases in Russia, and their disappearance from Russia.

Quite on the contrary, a tank previously rotting away in a long term storage site for decades disappearing from the site does not signify a destroyed tank by Ukraine and thus its deletion from the order of battle, but rather the Re-Activation of the tank into the Russian armed forces. Tanks were refurbished and re-activated in massive volumes. We have to keep in mind that the Russian armed forces grew massively since 2022.

Divisions have more than doubled. The reason brigades have grown by a lesser factor is because it is not an apples-to-apples comparison. Prior to the war, brigades were really BTGs (if that), which are hollowed out brigades, really just reinforced battalions. Today’s Russian brigades are closer to full fledged brigades. As an example, 10 to 14 additional divisions would alone require anywhere from 1,800 (10 per division) to 3,100 (14 per division) tanks. Restrengthening existing understrength and BTG-style stripped brigades would also entail anywhere from 400 to 1,200 tanks. When we add other brigades and reserves, the unit growth alone would require anywhere from 2,500 to 5,100 tanks (very rough approximations for illustrative purposes).

Estimates for the main battle tanks removed from storage range from 4,000 to 6,000 (Delwin’s “Reactivated” number stands at 4,083), which is very much in line with what would be needed only for the army’s growth, plus some replacement losses. Armor is needed not only for each unit, but for training of new (and existing) units. All units, training, fighting and otherwise require levels of reserves and replacements as well.

Russia turned its long depreciating assets (economic output of the Soviet era and through the 90s), into useful battle stocks1. It re-armed and grew its army, not ran out of armour.

To do this, it massively expanded its reactivation, repair and refurbishing capacity. Since Russia is generally advancing in the war, while Ukraine gives territory, many abandoned and damaged armored vehicles (from both sides), are eventually recovered by Russia. The difficult battlespace and kill zones rarely allow either side to retrieve damaged or abandoned vehicles while they are near the front line or grey zones. As Russian forces slowly advance, eventually logistic units are able to salvage many of these vehicles. Anti-drone additions such as cages and porcupine armour also reduce the actual damage sustained by the vehicles themselves and assist in refurbishing.

As the deep reservoir of old Russian armour is exhausted, Russia’s refurbishing capacity can be transitioned to production capacity. Production capacity has exploded since the start of the war, and that is despite the fact that the powerful incentives to prefer refurbishing capacity. Refurbishing and even updating an old tank is drastically faster and cheaper than producing a new modern one. As such vast refurbishing capacity continues to become less needed, much of its potential is transferred to additional new production capacity.

And it is regarding new production that I can comment on Delwin’s report. He (knowingly I believe) used very conservative new production numbers, and he himself reminds us:

For simplicity, to look again at main battle tanks only, he estimates 2022 T-90 production at 40 per year and doubles it to 80 for the 2025 estimate. Indeed the pre-war number is likely to be within the ballpark range. The 2025 number however is likely to be significantly underestimated.

Actual numbers are highly debated, and there are both Russian-sourced claims and Western estimates to look at. One useful indicator is trying to figure out the proportions of modern models such as the T-90M seen in the battlefield compared to earlier in the war (when they were mostly absent). It is not perfect of course, especially since tanks are rarely seen in action today and so it would be easy to “cherry-pick” the best tanks when in fact they are to be used.

We are not going to get bogged down in these calculations but will be satisfied in quoting a few sources who attempted this:

Defense Express reports that the world famous Janes estimates T90M production at 250 per year in late 2025, up from 50 per year pre-war (very close to Delwin’s 40).

With a lot more detail, and using different (but ultimately supporting) methodology. Front Intelligence estimates 240 T-190 production already in 2024 (though importantly including new production, capital overhauls and modernization), and being sustained in 2025. Since pre-war production had little economic incentives to cover more than export sales, it is quite reasonable to understand today’s Russian war economy is producing weapons at vastly different scales.

Indeed Russia is still far from running out of armor of all types, and since lately less armor has been used and lost, it is likely that its reserves are actually growing and being modernized. The average tank being used in early 2026 is likely to be far newer than the average tank used in early 2023 as reactivations and growth were in full swing.

We can also expect that new models, and/or upgrade kits, with drones specifically in mind, are being developed. Has all this been easy for Russia? No, not at all… but it is not easy Russia is looking for, but victory.

3. Tomahawk missiles will be (or would be) the game changer!

This third claim is of a frequently repeating type... the next “wunderwaffe” is alone the key to victory; going back to my favorite and original wonder weapon claim back in 2022.

Since then, we have discussed the phenomena many times as the mainstream western media told us each time that if Ukraine only get this or that weapon from the US, it would quickly dispatch the Russian bear.

Specifically, we discussed the HIMARS systems in detail, which common reporting had as certainly turning the tide. Nearly a year after our discussion, western media started to admit the HIMAR’s effect had been overhyped;

and included this piece:

So, the NLAW, Bayraktar, the HIMARS ATACMS, the Leopard 2 main battle tank, and more recently the F-16 were all game changers that came and went. Now, with only slightly diminished enthusiasm we have been told that all which holds back a Ukrainian victory is the (absence of) US Tomahawk missile.

This claim does not need much analysis to debunk. In fact, back in our 2022 analysis of the similar situation regarding HIMARS systems, the key aspect remains the same:

…is of no doubt that having the HIMARS is helpful to Ukraine, especially if it has enough high quality ammunition and the supply lines to get it to launchers, it certainly beats not having any long range artillery, but being able to strike positions behind the front line alone does not victory ensure, because if so Russia would have ended this war long ago. Even more ironically, Ukraine had much of these capabilities as well, being an army that heavily relied on MRLS systems, like Russia.

Russia has a vast arsenal and ongoing production capacity of weapons with similar capabilities to Tomahawk missiles. It also uses them in large volumes (which Ukraine would not be able to duplicate with Tomahawks, as the quantities delivered by the US would be limited) against Ukraine. This alone, in no way quickly crumbles the Ukrainian armed forces or its capacity to keep on fighting. Admittedly, the effects on its economic and industrial capacity are less critical than in the case with Russia, because Ukrainian weapons and treasure to continue the fighting are created outside the country by its backers (a luxury Russia does not share).

However, Russia’s massive and frequent aerial attacks (by cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles as well as massive waves of long range drones) have not even been able to stop Ukrainian domestic production of weapons, such as short range and long range drones and missiles, from growing significantly (let alone destroying it). From long range ballistic missiles such as the Iskander, the quasi-ballistic hypersonic Kinzhal, to cruise missiles such as the Iskander-K, Kalibr, and Kh family (such as the Kh-101 and Kh-102), and huge volumes of long range drones, Russia has and utilizes one of the largest (if not the largest) arsenals of long range munitions (cruise missile & otherwise) ever seen. Yet the war continues…

Simply put, the Tomahawk missile, though certainly an impressive, mature and tried cruise missile, does not bring any capability to the Ukrainian armed forces that they already do not have.

Let’s take a look.

This table is meant only to get a very rough idea of the situation. Every one of those parameters can be researched and debated at length. I only quote here what is easily available and reported. Much of the information is classified so these are ranges and estimates. What we can easily see however is that the Tomahawk is a long range cruise missile, that is highly accurate, expensive and difficult to intercept.

Ukraine already possesses and routinely uses weapons with similar and sometimes superior capabilities that are also less expensive and available in higher numbers.

For example, while the Tomahawk’s main attraction is its 1,600 km range (in order to reach deeper into Russia), its payload is relatively small, about 310 kgs. It certainly cannot take on hardened or dug in targets. It also, can be intercepted, and increasingly so as any AA system learns and adapts to the new weapon.

Ukraine’ domestically produced Flamingo, is a cruise missile that has ranges of nearly double the Tomahawk and a much larger payload at over one ton. It is likely less accurate and easier to intercept, but would be available in greater numbers and is cheaper than a Tomahawk. In the previous section on refinery strikes, we see that Ukraine, without Tomahawks, has successfully struck refineries and other facilities deep within Russia2.

Ukraine’s growing arsenal of long range drones are an order of magnitude less expensive, available in much larger quantities and have equally long ranges; such as the FP-1 at 1,600 kms as well.

You can get up to 36 FP-1s for the cost of one Tomahawk cruise missile. Even if only 10% get through, that would still be 3.6 strikes for every one Tomahawk launched, which is not the same as every Tomahawk hitting its target. Even at a 70% success rate (which is exceedingly generous), leaves us at ratio of 3.6 drone strikes to .7 of a Tomahawk strike (or 36 to 7). Even considering payload, the FP-1 doubles efficiency since it carries about half the payload of the Tomahawk. Additionally, 36 cheap drones, require at the very least 36 anti-air munitions to intercept (often much more), and typically many more than one Tomahawk missile would. Thus the drones exact additional costs on the enemy and further help exhaust his air defense systems.

Of course when you consider the benefits of different weapon systems working in tandem, including long range drones, Ukraine’s Flamingoes and European high quality cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow ATACMS for somewhat shorter (but still long) ranges, as well as the optimization of air attack tactics needed to confuse/overwhelm the enemy’s air defense layers, the Tomahawk capability is far from a game changer or magic bullet missing in Ukraine’s arsenal.

Is there any advantage to it at all? If this is so, why does Ukraine want them so badly?

For two main reasons. Firstly as always it is money. It is not that the Tomahawk missile’s capabilities would somehow be the secret for victory, it is just that a missile is a missile. And 1 or 2 million dollars (a Tomahawk’s cost) is 1 or 2 million dollars. Ukraine does not need the Tomahawk specifically, it needs lots and lots of weapons that cost lots and lots of money. Getting Tomahawks from the US is simply another way to get more money. They would be happy in this regard to get cash and produce Flamingos themselves instead (for one, more graft to go around!). The Tomahawk commitment is likely to come as a net total increase in US support.

In this regard, what is more important than getting Tomahawks, is the number of them! And in this regard the number the US would provide (as well as the systems, infrastructure and teams to launch them (who would themselves become targets)), would be far too little to make a significant and strategic difference in the war. Theoretically, very large numbers of tomahawks and the capacity to launch them, would indeed have a very big impact on Russia’s ability to wage war, its economy and industrial base… but these are not the numbers that we are likely speaking about.

Secondly and more importantly I believe, Ukraine desperately wants the US Tomahawk supply because it signals an additional and increasing US commitment. It keeps the US as an active and increasingly aggressive ally. It further invests the US in Ukraine’s success (and how successful its weapons are perceived to be). Ultimately, as an additional escalation, it puts Russia and the US one step closer to direct conflict which has always been Ukraine’s only strategy (to get the West and Russia in a direct conflict), and simply hold on and buy time until this happens (we have discussed that aspect of this war since its earliest days). It has rarely if ever had a realistic plan to actually win on its own.

So Ukraine’s desire for Tomahawk missiles go far beyond the missile’s particular capabilities, which contrary to what we are told by the famously incorrect mainstream media, are no magic bullet in the quest for Russia’s defeat.

The US, for its part, is now finally aware of these dynamics (unlike previously and with previous “wonder weapon” requests), and is reluctant to make another one of its weapon systems and the scale at which it can provide them, seem impotent against Russia (not to mention provide Russia with the opportunity to learn to defeat it). It also is aware of the reasons behind Ukraine’s demands, and is weary to oblige. We shall see.

Let me know your thoughts on these three commonly held fallacies and any others you are interested in.

The Pokrovsk pocket (Myrnohrad) is closed. A fateful cauldron that we have discussed for years is at hand. Anywhere from 500 to 2000 Ukrainian soldiers are surrounded.

As things have thus far developed pretty much as we have discussed earlier, it is a good time for another strategic update.

Meanwhile, despite Ukrainian claims to the contrary, large parts of Pokrovsk is under Russian control and the pocket encircled (Military Summary map).

We have been discussing this potentially crucial event for years. We were likely the earliest in understanding the significance of the fall of Popasna, and likewise presciently foretold the impending fall of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Ocheretyne (the last one quite uniquely) and their consequence on the battlefield.

Prokrovsk is next on that list, and has been subject to our discussions from the outset, here in an early 2022 post as an example:

More recently , in a (quite prescient ) strategic update (link below) we analyzed its importance strategically, and postulated that due to the Ukrainian government’s lack of strategic wisdom, we would likely see its fall and aftermath, even while an early Trump administration made most experts think the war was at an end.

The above piece, posted back in Feb of 2025, ends with the following:

Indeed Kiev, urged on by Euro wokes, played for time when time was all Russian forces needed. Even today, though this is finally realized in some corners of the West (including within the Ukrainian government), it remains the Ukrainian overall strategy. We will analyze why this may be so in the upcoming strategic update.

For now, sufficed to note 3 key aspects of the situation on the ground around Pokrovsk.

1. Significant elements of the Ukrainian:

   1. 35th Marine Brigade

   2. 79th Air Assault Brigade

   3. 25th Airborne Brigade

   4. 68th Jaeger Brigade

   are encircled and cut off from supply and evacuation lines within the Myrnohrad pocket. The total manpower within the pocket may range between 500 and 2000 men. Obviously, this figure figure changes daily as men surrender, are unfortunately killed, or are able to escape the pocket (mostly in small groups during the night).

2. The Russian forces level of control of Pokrovsk city is somewhat reminiscent of Toretsk, where Russian forces captured the city but thereafter kept suffering major incursions from UA forces for months. I believed that the well prepared Ukrainian fortifications in Toretsk may have included underground tunnels. These either allowed UA troops to hide for extended periods and/or connected them to UA lines.

   It is possible that they simply were incursions that took advantage of the broad, low lying thickly wooded suburbs on its northern & western ends that the Russians had difficulty completely sealing (and that my recent experiences facing Hezbollah & hamas have made me susceptible to imagining tunnels abound!). The extent of the incursions in terms of depth and time, as well as the repeated nature of the locations increasingly indicated underground access lines.

   We see early signs of something similar in Pokrovsk (which also shares the wide suburban edge allowing for many covered routes for incursion. The homes and the wooded spaces between, and the many small streets, make excellent territory for quality units to infiltrate behind enemy lines. Such territory also require a surprisingly large amount of forces to secure, hold and seal against an enemy compared to more open ground. A unit’s range of fire and visibility is heavily reduced and thus more are needed.

3. The encirclement is still thin. It is possible for UA forces to break out of the encirclement and for outside forces to lift their siege. Each passing day this is less likely as Russian forces tighten the noose and widen the thin western flank of the cauldron. But it is still possible.

4. As we previously discussed and predicted recently, cauldrons are now more likely once again largely due to the political and strategic situation the Zelensky regime finds itself in. In this type of modern warfare, slow moving, static lines, deep entrenchment and massive aerial surveillance, encircling large forces is extremely difficult; nearly impossible. Movement of forces is too easily and quickly detected by both sides, and the actual movements (during advance) very slow. One almost has to allow himself to be surrounded. Zelensky loves to order such actions, and as we discussed recently, despite the difficulty of actually closing a cauldron, I predicted we would start to see them again (not really seen since early in the war). Not only the mere threat of encirclement, which triggers a withdrawal (which happens a lot in this war), but actual closing of the pincers.

   I also discussed how once they start happening, if significant number of forces are captured, the phenomena can snowball as Ukraine’s thinly manned front line would shrink to the point of collapse if whole brigades start to be taken out of the order of battle (after being surrounded and surrendering). So we shall see.

5. If the pincers hold, relatively hermetically, and there is no underground access to the pocket for the Ukrainians, we will inevitably see a large surrender event. It is possible that the Ukrainian high command and Zelensky believe that now the garrison can simply be supplied by air (drones) and hold out indefinitely. On the contrary, we are likely to see the garrison surrender quite quickly as soon as it is clear to it that the gates are shut tight. Supply by drone for such a large contingent is expensive (in the large drones you constantly lose), slow, inefficient, complex and insufficient.

   Additionally, supply within the large pocket still requires further distribution by ground. It will become increasingly impossible. So either the garrison keeps collapsing on itself, making its position unattainable or continues to hold positions with units it cannot supply. To further aggravate this possibility, Russian forces are likely to continue to attempt to cut the pocket into smaller pieces. For these and other reasons, if the forces don’t break out or their siege lifted soon, and the Russian lines consolidate and widen westward, the garrison will shortly surrender.

   That is if it doesn’t collapse even sooner. As it is, a strong motivating factor for not surrendering at the moment is that Ukrainian drone operators are as likely to attack UA soldiers walking towards Russian lines as Russian soldiers advancing towards UA ones. The very saturation of drones in the air and weak infantry control of the territory on the ground keeps everyone, including surrounded Ukrainian soldiers, in the basements. As this starts to change, the surrender becomes not only easier, but inevitable.

To Zelensky’s great frustration, the world will see the images, and he will have no one but himself to blame.

In the previous piece we discussed what led to the then imminent plan, and of course what may happen next.

Now after the official agreement only to phase A (hostage and prisoner exchange plus partial Israeli withdrawal), the subsequent failure of Hamas to return all the hostage bodies (not even close thus far), not to mention show no sign of their willingness to disarm or give up power, is one of the most powerful tools Israel can use to restart the war, with the enemy no longer possessing human shields, and swiftly win it.

I mentioned this immediately upon the news of only 4 bodies released by the end of the 72 hour deadline.

In fact, Hamas clearly violated the deal by lying about how many bodies they could return by the deadline and/or far worse and more likely, did not return all the bodies they had by the deadline. This was a clear violation of the very first phase of the Trump brokered deal, and the only part thus far agreed upon by the parties. The rest was dependent on this critical first part.

Now, though of course my preference is to win a war (something Trump correctly rubbed in our faces as what he would do, in his Knesset address - I will point that out later) and very much hoped, as my readers know all too well, that Israel would impose territorial consequences on the Gazans and at the very least occupy a (then) very empty northern strip, Bibi has orchestrated leverage in the opposite geographic direction.

Though Israel does not have half the strip from north to south (which includes the coastline), it does hold about half the strip from west to east, leaving the Strip… much more of a strip. Failure of Hamas to disarm and/or return the bodies, will at least freeze Israeli lines as they are. No fighting is necessary for Israel to simply and easily hold that line. Additionally, Israel will use leverage regarding the entry of aid and reconstruction funds. Now controlling the Philadelphia corridor and Rafah in the south, smuggling will be much more difficult for Gazans (though not impossible). Rearming will also become much more difficult, mostly limited to domestic production.

While I long ago feared, at the very outset of the conflict 2 years ago, that smuggling concerns would end up with the IDF holding Rafah and thus deter the population from moving out of Gaza through Egypt, and preferred pressuring from north to south to encourage it, the situation is not as bad as it could be.

Note this Nov 2023 post for example which included:

and this:

Today, territory is still in Israel’s hands, as is the main smuggling corridor, and in order to proceed with the brokered peace plan, Gaza needs to be demilitarized (w Hamas disarmed), and all Israeli bodies returned. Even if the war cannot be restarted for total victory, a complete defeat can also be avoided.

As I have written for years (better part of 2 decades), the endless rounds of Gaza wars & clashes continue because:

1. Israel imposes no territorial consequence (ie Gazans are immune from defeat).

2. The post conflict billions in aid and reconstruction are an economic boon (completely controlled & distributed by Hamas) for otherwise productivity-less Gaza. Israel bulldozes structures via very expensive missiles at the expense of its taxpayer, and then Gazans rebuild them with huge Gulf, US & international aid.
   

For those interested, you can see a summary of some of my unfortunately prophetic writings throughout the years regarding the conflict and Gaza specifically in this piece:

It includes for example, this striking piece written back in 2012!

Far from the genocide widely reported, the Gazans know IDF incursions are largely consequence-less (within their ability and desire for “struggle” and overcome inconvenience), and temporary.

After the Oct 7 massacres and 2 years of fighting, we find ourselves in danger of repeating this formula. The Trump plan, if actually implemented would be a version of this on steroids (even more money, make them even richer), & includes further promises of additional territory and statehood. If Israel finds itself with an identical Gaza on its SW corner of the map (let alone even bigger!), and billions upon billions of money flowing into it, then total defeat has been achieved at the cost of blood, treasure and the heroic efforts & sacrifice of our brave fighters.

Of course, the plan differs in theory in that in its demilitarization & disarmament, Gazans (& whatever its ruling political party calls itself) would find it harder to unleash another round. But firstly, this is irrelevant and the source of the political sickness in Israel (will comment on it hopefully later in more detail), and secondly only a matter of time.

Since Egypt cracked down on smuggling around 2013, much of Hamas’ weaponry is domestically produced. And maritime smuggling, as well as smuggling in regular commercial trade is always possible.

I will make the following prediction.

If Hamas (or whatever Gazans rulers call themselves) will fail to release the hostage bodies over a longer period of time, we will begin to see a break in Israel’s leftist camp (the protest pros). Many, who genuinely believed the slogans and cared for the hostages and their families will continue to demand the government act to ensure their return.

But many others, fearful of Israel potentially restarting the war and winning (and thus Bibi winning), or expanding Israeli territory by holding what we have, and not clearly losing, will start to devalue the dead bodies. They will continue to pressure for Israeli concessions and surrender. You see, live hostages work as human shields, and freeing them still alive lends certain logic to surrender and appeasement of the enemy.

Dead hostages alone do not.

Even by leftist logic, they cannot be killed again. Therefore, the logic leads to turning the pressure on its head. There could be pressure now from well meaning leftists for the army to go in, squash our terrorist enemy & recoup our bodies. The right of course is happy to agree.

But many on the left will then (I am sure creatively) weave messages and stage protests against this. They will continue to demand surrender, and ultimately start to devalue the previously infinite value of dead hostages. The lives of our troops for example, will suddenly be worth more.

Once again, the transparent hypocrisy and falseness of their arguments will be on display. Relatively few will note it.

We of course hope that Trump will take the violations as violations, and not pressure Israel to endlessly acquiesce in order to save the headline existence of his peace deal.

I write this piece a day or less before the long awaited hostage release, under a recent Trump brokered deal. As pressure built up for Israel to accept the deal, I penned this previous piece with the greatest trepidation.

Unfortunately, the piece correctly saw that unlike under a hundred similar headlines prior, this time Bibi was heading towards agreement. Indeed, while Bibi accepted Trump’s plan in principal (which for Israel, if executed, is horrendous, and may cover that later), Hamas did not and instead “counter-offered”.

The counteroffer was indeed phrased as an acceptance and Trump immediately and publicly (in social media) pressured Israel to accept the revised counter offer.

The statement that the President was referring to, contradicting many core points of his plan. In reads in part:

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

In an effort to halt the aggression and war of extermination being waged against our steadfast people in the Gaza Strip, and based on national responsibility and concern for the fundamentals, rights, and supreme interests of our people, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has held in-depth consultations within its leadership institutions…

In this context, and in order to achieve a cessation of hostilities and a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the movement announces its agreement to release all Israeli prisoners, both living and dead, according to the exchange formula contained in President Trump’s proposal, provided the field conditions for the exchange are met. In this context, the movement affirms its readiness to immediately enter into negotiations through the mediators to discuss the details of this agreement.

The movement also renews its agreement to hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independents (technocrats), based on Palestinian national consensus and Arab and Islamic support.

The other issues mentioned in President Trump’s proposal regarding the future of the Gaza Strip and the inherent rights of the Palestinian people are linked to a comprehensive national position and based on relevant international laws and resolutions. They are to be discussed within a comprehensive Palestinian national framework. Hamas will be part of it and will contribute to it with full responsibility.

Firstly, even the “immediate release of all hostages” is qualified, and requires “field conditions” which means Israeli withdrawals. This directly contradicted Trump’s final offer/ultimatum. More importantly, the statement merely “affirms its readiness to immediately enter into negotiations..”.

It importantly does not mention disarming, which is the arguably the most important Israeli demand in the plan along with the release of the hostages. It vaguely alludes to being willing to “hand over the administration of the Gaza strip to a Palestinian body of independents (technocrats), based on Palestinian national consensus and Arab and Islamic support”.

Of note here first is of course that this handover (to “independents”, meaning not to any rival political factions), is based on “Palestinian national consensus…” etc. Hamas overwhelmingly won the strip’s last election and at least until recently was massively popular among the population (despite Israel’s endless and misguided efforts to speak about Hamas as if it was an alien group that somehow descended among the Gazan population and implemented a tyranny over them. Much like how the US never understood that the Taliban ARE the Afghanis (the majority Pashtuns anyway)). So here Hamas (or whatever they rebrand to) will remain in power as long as the population wishes it to.

Much more interestingly though, this second part of the so called agreement is not an agreement at all. It simply notes that the movement “renews” its agreement to the above referenced handover to independent technocrats. Hamas is saying, as we said before, we said before. This echoes a couple of things. Firstly, on August 2025 statement which read in part:

Hamas said today it was still awaiting a response “to the proposal presented to the movement by mediators on August 18, which was accepted by Hamas and the Palestinian factions.

“In this context, the movement reaffirms its readiness to move toward a comprehensive deal under which all enemy prisoners held by the resistance would be released in exchange for an agreed number of Palestinian prisoners held by the occupation, within an agreement that ends the war on the Gaza Strip, guarantees the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the entire Strip, reopens the crossings for the entry of all essential needs and launches the reconstruction process.”

Hamas added that it had agreed to “the formation of an independent national administration composed of technocrats to immediately assume responsibility for managing all affairs of the Gaza Strip across every sector.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected Hamas’ statement, calling it “spin”, and added through his office that:

So we see that not too long ago, Netanyahu was quite willing and able to reject a very similar arrangement with Hamas, and instead ordered the IDF to complete the conquest of the northern strip including Gaza city. What changed? Keep that in mind as we will return to this shortly.

For now, what it means is that clearly Hamas simply reiterated its previous offer of handing over administration to technocrats, and certainly does not mention nor include disarming. Furthermore, even this is tied to complete withdrawal from the strip, reopening of the crossings and so forth. This framework echoes periodic Hamas statements going back to the 2012 Fatah–Hamas Doha / Cairo agreements which included the same independent technocrat language, but in no way do they include the disarmament of Hamas.

So, the Hamas official statement was certainly not an acceptance of the Trump ultimatum. It was a cleverly worded repudiation of it in fact. And yet, as we discussed previously and I feared, Trump took it as an acceptance on successfully pressured Israel to accept it?

How? What changed that allowed the US to do this?

Much like I have written for a long time, and as we discussed above, Hamas was and would be willing to release all the hostages for the end of the war along with a complete Israeli withdrawal (ie Israeli defeat). At this dire point, they were even willing to entertain some sort of technocrat administration, that at least nominally runs Gaza. But until now, Bibi, not wishing for an Israeli defeat, had been able to deftly avoid any such deal. I have described this since the outset of the war 2 years ago as the virtually unbridgeable fundamental par between the two positions that made a deal very difficult.

On the Gazan side however, a subtle but very important shift occurred as well. Hamas was previously willing to to tie the release of the remaining hostages to the physical steps in ending the war. It meant a slow, painful and uncertain process (for Israelis desperately wanting the hostages released). Since all Hamas wanted was the end of the war and full Israeli withdrawal, it hardly would serve its purposes to release all the hostages (all of it leverage), and then simply have Israel restart the war at its leisure. Netanyahu showed twice before that he could and would, restart hostilities.

Netanyahu had previously rebuffed this very similar framework, and Hamas would never agree to a full and immediate release of hostages (alive and dead) before all sorts of withdrawals and guarantees are facts on the ground. A pivotal event changed the situation, put both parties off balance, and gave the US administration the fulcrum it needed to bend the parties to its will and bridge the gap.

Who was bent more?

Well when it comes to the 20 point peace plan that Israel (or at least Netanyahu) vaguely has accepted in principal as something to negotiate towards, it is Israel that has been badly bent. The plan, which I may briefly cover later, if actually implemented significantly or fully is a nightmare scenario for Israel as the ending for the war that began with the savage and murderous Oct 7th (2023) invasion. It would also indicate a complete Israel defeat, and vindicate as correct, intelligent and courageous the surprise invasion and associated barbarism as what is needed to achieve national goals vis-à-vis Israel.

For Hamas, it also entails a few painful conditions, but mostly no more than cosmetic… it is really no more than the movement or political party’s name that need change. They lose 0 territory, gain the promise of increased territory, the path and promise to a state, and guarantees of massive aid, wealth transfers and special trade deals.

But all of that is in yet to be negotiated let alone agreed upon subsequent parts of the deal. In the only agreed upon parts of the deal, the immediate release of hostages in exchange for a partial Israeli withdrawal and release of about Arab 2,000 prisoners, 250 of which are nearly all terrorists convicted of heinous crimes serving life sentences, it is Hamas that bent the most by far.

Hamas has at least agreed to do what it previously would never have considered. Giving up all its remaining human shields, dead or alive, immediately and in one phase.

The Kissinger Moment.

The leverage that allowed the Trump administration to achieve this was born the instant Israel’s jetfighters released their missiles over the Red Sea aimed at Doha Qatar.

Since the outset of the war I have written about how Hamas’ Oct 7 invasion reminded me in so many ways to Sadat’s surprise Egyptian invasion of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Won’t rehash it here, but sufficed to say that the strategic and political motivations were very similar as was the execution in many ways (the two were of course not similar in terms the acts of murder, acts of terror and atrocities against women, children and the elderly that the Oct 7 invasion included of course).

Sadat knew that he need only not lose the war. Unlike his predecessor Nasser, he did not have delusions of driving his tank divisions up to Tel-Aviv; he knew that was beyond his reach. Rather than bravado and bluster followed by defeat, an often favored Arab tactic, under General Shazly’s (the Chief-of-Staff) excellently organized plan, Egypt would cross the Suez and hold a piece of Israeli territory under their anti-air and anti-tank missile umbrella.

Sadat figured, correctly as it turned out, that merely doing that would unleash a political process that would end with his reclaiming of the Sinai. Ultimately, he succeeded, and was murdered by Egyptian Salafi Jihadis for his efforts. But before that political process, he needed his victory, or at least his non-defeat in the war as we explained.

The IDF, surprised, bruised, battered but certainly not defeated, regained its confidence and IDF forces (under General Ariel Sharon) crossed the Suez canal (through the gap between the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian armies), opened a corridor and allowed 2 additional Armored divisions to cross into “Africa” from Sinai. These forces, through heroic efforts (racing against the clock of a UN Security Council imposed Ceasefire) surrounded the third army from its rear. Sharon’s Division, moved north and partially cut off the Second Army. Egypt’s exhausted and battered 3rd army was a day or two (if not hours) from surrender without water, food or supply, and subsequent to that, with the Israeli divisions unleashed in the south, the fate of the second army would be no different. Fully surrounded and forced to surrender.

The catastrophe that the war would have been for Egypt, and Sadat in particular, is hard to overstate. The destruction of the Egyptian Armed Forces would have been much greater and more complete than during the Six Day War (where Amer, Egypt’s Minister of Defense) after all gave his infamous order to retreat from the Sinai (which caused a panicked route), in order to save the Egyptian army from destruction.

The fact that such a complete defeat would follow such a successful surprise attack on Yom Kippur (Note that in the Six Day War, it was Israel who surprised the Arabs) would have been psychologically catastrophic. It would show that Israel simply could and would not be defeated militarily, surprise attack or not, and that the Israeli soldier was simply far superior to the Arab (or Egyptian) one, under any conditions. Arab honor, rather than restored, during the Yom Kippur War, would have been obliterated.

Enter Henry Kissinger

One very intelligent man happened to realize that he alone in the entire world could stop this from happening. Egypt’s Soviet backers, already sending tanks and equipment to the point of exhaustion, could not save the Third Army. Only the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger could. He saw that America had huge leverage on Egypt here, due to its leverage over Israel. Kissinger knew it could forever pull Egypt from the Soviet sphere of influence and onto the Western one. The long ruling and deposed Mubarak, was the head of the Air force in this war and as ruler of Egypt loyal to the West that saved them (the loyalty wasn’t mutual of course, and it didn’t save him from the Obama administration throwing him under the bus of course), and even today, General Sisi, is a direct descendent of this arrangement. The US saved the Egyptian Army and supports it, and it in turn rules Egypt to this day.

Kissinger famously told Dayan and Golda Meir that the “destruction of the Third Army is an option that does not exist.” Unfortunately, neither Dayan nor Golda had the same mettle as the men who heroically surrounded the Third Army against all odds and sheepishly acquiesced to the SOS’ demands.

Israeli soldiers who fought, bled saw their friends fall in the frantic race to complete the encirclement were then told to let endless convoys of supply-laden trucks through their own lines for the rapidly crumbing Third Army. It was saved just in time. The brilliant encirclement, of not use whatsoever. On the map, Egypt still held a piece of Sinai, even though that piece was at the mercy of Israeli forces behind it on the other side of the canal who could cut off and destroy the enlace at will (the 2nd Army in a similar situation). No matter, on the map, Egyptian forces had advanced into Sinai as the ceasefire went into effect.

Forcing Qatar’s Hand

Someone in the Trump administration realized there was a Kissinger moment at hand. The Sept 9 2025 airstrike Qatar’s capital Doha, targeting the Hamas leadership shocked the wealthy Gulf state to its core. I discussed the attack in more detail elsewhere and some of its interesting implications, but for our purposes here, it is enough to understand that the oil rich Kingdom was deeply concerned.

Qatar long enjoys outsized influence and power throughout the Arab and Muslim world from the comfort of its own home. The wealthy and protected bubble is never pierced. Qatar supports this or that militia, terrorist group or proxy in a dozen wars but the wars are always distant. They never hit home, and its King remains all-knowing and all powerful to his subjects. The helplessness of the country in the face of the attack concerned its rulers deeply. Having just witnessed the Israeli Air Force’s work over 12 days in Iran, it knew it had absolutely no possible answer to the Israeli attack. Furthermore, since Qatar prides itself as a refuge of all sorts of unwanted people, including many terrorists, there could be continuous reasons for Israel to keep striking it. If Qatar ever tried to respond directly in whatever way it could, it would be quickly overwhelmed by Israel’s military might.

The entire point of the Gulf State is to be safe and wealthy. Its status as a financial center with modern skylines where all sorts of factions can meet would be significantly undermined if the country is routinely or even periodically bombed. It figured its close alliance with the US was enough to deter direct Israeli strikes, but apparently it was not. At least not by this new post Oct 7 Israel. The Trump’s administration muted response after the attack, whether intentional or not, was also key. Israel obviously could and would attack Qatar (if it harbored terrorist enemies of Israel), and the US would not do anything about it. And the US was the only who could do something about it.

This led to Qatar desperately seeking help and assurances from the US so that this would not happen again. And this moment was the key that led to the current plan which will begin to see executed shortly (and then either unravel or not). The US realized that, just like the during Kissinger’s time, only it could help Qatar and so it could extract its price.

The Trump administration one presumes, told the Qataris that indeed it will take action to make sure such actions do not happen in the future, in fact, the Israeli Prime Minister will call the Prime Minister to apologize for the attack. But in exchange, it had to make Hamas accept the deal with an immediate and full hostage release.

Why would Qatar be able to force Hamas’ hand? Very simply because its leaders live there. This is why this deal has already opened up a huge rift between the millionaire leadership in fancy Hotels in Qatar and the Hamas leadership inside Gaza. For those in Gaza, nothing is more precious than its kidnapped human shields. Giving them all up at once before all sorts of preconditions are met is against every instinct they have.

But the Qatari’s leverage of the leadership in Qatar is total. It can expel them at will, to a place where the Mossad’s or IAF’s long arm will easily reach them, it can seize all their assets and wealth, and it can even arrest them, try them or extradite them to any place it choses. At the end of the day, the Hamas leadership like their Hotels and their millions.

Forcing Bibi on the other hand still took work. But the unimaginative, leftist and institutionalized IDF generals finished the job for Trump. With the Operations of Gideon’s Chariots (and its sequel), at the very least Gaza city was to be fully conquered. In the last few months, IDF forces have been very close to this goal, with relatively few casualties (especially compared to earlier in the war), showing Hamas’ diminishing ability to cause casualties even in dense urban territory (small unit ambushes, IEDs’ etc). Hamas also attempted a counteroffensive which was largely a failure with fighters trying to take small IDF outposts to capture additional troops (dead, wounded or alive). These firefights all ended with heavy Hamas casualties.

To get a very rough idea of where the IDF was we can simply point to mainstream media.

Above the BB and below Yahoo news.

These overstate IDF presence because they are based on evacuation orders (ie where the IDF planned it may go or was ordered to go) for civilians and not actual army presence, but it gives you a rough idea. An Israeli blogger even posted the following, showing how little of Gaza City was left to take.

After so long, the political climate in Israel had finally allowed the government to order the army to win, at least in the north. As we have long discussed, in this war, when the IDF advances, Hamas forces simply largely retreat. There is no real front or line of contact. Hamas attempts to inflict casualties by IEDs, booby traps and small unit ambushes (as well as long range artillery, rocket and anti-tank fire) but does not actually hold any ground. It cannot do so and does not attempt it. So other than the few that sacrifice themselves to inflict some casualties, the vast majority simply retreat. There are always Israeli declared humanitarian zones where the enemy forces are largely free from danger (though Deif was obviously hiding and killed within one).

We discussed previously how seriously foolish by Israel it has been to declare humanitarian zones in the enemy-held territory rather than behind your own lines (effectively declaring that you cannot win the war), but will not rehash that here. I do wish to revisit that in the future because I think I may have found out the reason, or excuse, that the Generals had for this absurd policy. When we last discussed it I could not fathom why, as leftist as they are, they would insist in such a policy.

In any event, when you finally surround them and finish the pockets, or advance until the end of the relatively tiny strip, then what you get are pictures of victory. Hundreds, and thousands of the enemy surrendering because now there is no simply retreating back. Here and there we have seen such pictures when Israeli forces successfully surrendered certain areas and enemy units, but largely the public is unaware of what images would be seen and what impact it would have to simply advance until you actually win; rather than advance and retreat 50 times over the same territory suffering casualties each time.

Why was this tiny pocket of central Gaza city not finally cleared and taken? Well, the IDF stopped, its generals telling the government that to go any further would endanger the hostages. Throughout the war, Israeli intelligence has marked large areas of the battlefield off limits whenever there was a probability of hostages being held in the area. Hamas slowly learned this and rather than failing at fooling the intelligence, started to strategically move them to places they wished protected. In this last instance, Hamas released a public statement stating that hostages would be moved to the northern strip and Gaza city to be used as human shields against the IDF offensive.

Once again, we discussed the frustrating debate regarding the hostages elsewhere recently, so we will not do so here again, but the net effect of this situation was that the senior security establishment, largely at odds with the rank and file soldier (especially the reservists), together with Trump, check mated Bibi. They simply said they would not be responsible for advancing any further and endangering the hostages, as well as Arab civilian population still in the pocket who refused to evacuate. At this point Bibi realized he had to accept the deal to get the hostages out, even if it endangered the continuation of the war.

Trump’s leverage of Qatar, allowed for an immediate release and so the deal was made.

The Deal is not the Trump Deal

Now, there is great hope in Israel in some circles that the agreement will quickly break down after the hostage release (if it indeed occurs, since as I mentioned, there is great reluctance on the ground in Gaza to free all the hostages)1. The Israeli cabinet approved only this part of the deal which was a partial Israeli withdrawal and this exchange of hostages and prisoners.

Israel after that, has only simply committed itself to negotiate the rest of the deal with Hamas, who as we discussed has accepted even less. But herein lies the problem.

The common assumption is that the Trump Deal was in fact approved by both sides, and is to be executed in phases. The first phase is the hostage and prisoner exchange, while the second phase would include most importantly the disarmament of Hamas.

Then (as I wrote in the previous piece quoted at top of this article), Bibi would be able to claim that Hamas is violating the deal, and now, free of human shields the IDF could finish the job (not to worry the leftist protesters, they will be able to quickly change their chants from “free the hostages now at any price” to some other random phrase to express their hatred of Bibi and their fear that Israel (under his leadership of course) might win the war).

The problem is that this cannot be the chain of events. There is no agreed upon phase B of this agreement. Phase B will be entering into negotiations regarding any subsequent phases. So for example, if Hamas says anything like “Ok we agree to disarm”, Israel will respond that it wants mechanisms in place to verify that. Hamas can then respond, “Sure, Turkey our friend and NATO country can verify it for you”. Israel responds that this would be insufficient and unacceptable… so then what?

Trump is likely to pressure Bibi to stop being obtuse and go with the plan. It’s such a great plan anyways and he is just obstructing it. One can see how this can get complicated. Before we can claim that Hamas is not abiding by the plan, we have to agree on the plan. Or at the very least say they are not willing to agree in good faith to the plan, but those are very different things. And in order to have a deal that we can say that they are breaking, we may feel pressured to accept such a deal.

And the deal under the Trump plan, after the phase A of hostages release, gets real bad real quick for Israel. It is only phase A which is by itself somewhat acceptable. So, it will be a trickier thing than many think I am afraid, for this deal to break down. Only some obvious and clear Hamas obstruction will make that easy, which we can always hope for.

So while Hamas is very concerned its Qatar based leadership agreed to a deal that leaves it unprotected (without human shields) and Netanyahu free to restart the war after the exchange, which is why they repeated often that they have promises and guarantees from every party involved that the war is over for good, I fear that it may not be as simple as that. We have the unusual situation that on the one hand Hamas seems to have agreed to something it would have never done so previously, a fact caused by a chain of events precipitated by Israel’s daring airstrike on Doha, which terrified not only the immune feeling Hamas leadership counsel but also their Qatari hosts; and it would not otherwise have agreed to this because of the obvious fear that Israel would happily collect its kidnapped hostages back, and then proceed to pound Hamas into dust. On the other hand, this fear (and hope from the Israeli side) is not as certain, at least in the short term, as one may think. Untangling ourselves from this Trump peace plan that we are now supposed to negotiate may prove frustrating.

Bibi has, since the outset of the war, surprised time and again and thus far refused to break to both internal and external pressures. In the past, he was able to expertly negotiate the release of around 200 hostages and successfully restart the war. Hopefully, he can pull it one last time, that we may be allowed to once again start, and then finally victoriously finish the war.

Much better than to promise our invaders that for their troubles, they will be richer than the Qataris who forced there leaders to accept the release of our long suffering hostages.

https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1974746475625160816

Regarding the apparently imminent Trump peace plan.

Near the end of another long rotation of duty, I was looking to discuss several of the current ongoings . With Yom Kippur and Shabbat just behind us, I have not even updated myself on the latest news (terrifying as they likely are), but will relate some of our Shabbat dinner conversation.

Some were of the view that Trump’s plan is excellent (those tend to be of the “blue team” / “red team” persuasion ie whatever my team does is good, whatever the other team does is bad), and others thought that Bibi (Netanyahu) and Trump were hoping to either trick Hamas and/or hope that Hamas will reject the plan. Thus then allow for a final Israeli military push.

I thought unfortunately, the situation much worse. There is no “Bibi and Trump”, but only Bibi trying to appease Trump and out-strategize Hamas. He has thus far, despite immense domestic and foreign pressure, been able to release some 200 hostages while continuing the war... no mean achievement where Hamas’ (of fabled Arab negotiation prowess) only constant demand and immediate goal, is to stop the war.

My view was that Bibi, negotiated (more like tweaked) a plan with Trump that he could accept, knowing that Hamas would reject it as presented.

My concern was that Hamas will undoubtedly indeed reject it, but not phrase it as such. It will counteroffer, and if intelligent, will phrase the counteroffer as an acceptance. Appeasing Trump’s ego is very easy indeed, and including words to the effect of “accepting President’s Trump plan” is quite good enough for him.

At that point I figured, Trump will then pressure Israel to accept the counteroffer, as opposed to deem Hamas’ counteroffer as the rejection of the accepted (Israeli and US) terms that it is. What is then of utmost importance, is Bibi’s ability to say “No”. Israel accepted the offer as it was; and no more.

With Mr. Trump and his bulldozer diplomatic style that we have discussed in the past, having been thus far unable to bully or bend Zelensky, Putin or Hamas (all have cared little for his threats thus far), it would be truly sad... no pathetic indeed, if Bibi was the first and only one to acquiesce to being bullied and bent.

Trump is obviously and transparently desperate seeking any agreement with anyone anywhere... eager to announce his status as the peacemaker and king maker (not to mention wishing for his Nobel peace price). He will pressure any side he thinks can be pressured, and has no qualms about switching, trying and re-trying different sides back and forth.

Bibi, who has thus far, since the outbreak of the war nearly 2 years ago, shown a legendary ability to refuse to break, I worry might be reaching the limit. He may rationalize to himself and the inner cabinet that this is no more than a stratagem to get the last living hostages (20 we are told) back (Is this how he will convince Ben Gvir and Smotrich?).

Israel will agree, Hamas will release them, then obviously delay, obstruct and renegotiate various other terms of the plan, especially regarding disarming and giving up power, and then Israel can finish the operation with the IDF finally unfettered facing an enemy now without human shields (at least the Jewish ones, the Gazan population is another story).

If this is the stratagem and it works, we will be very happy, few more than I... but I fear it is an incredibly dangerous path. Trump’s plan is no more than an Israeli defeat in the war (and I say that not as a criticism of Trump, who cares little for what the plan is as long as its accepted, but as a criticism of Israel should we accept it), and it will be much harder to get out of than previous temporary ceasefires.

Netanyahu showed that he could restart the war (much to our surprise and relief!) after previous ceasefires, but this will be another story altogether. For one thing, the US ire that Israelis are so terrified of will be much worse at that point then simply not accepted the bad plan now.

The government has had much time, but it has been unable to force the IDF generals to simply win. We are literally days away from complete conquest of Gaza city, and pictures of thousands of enemy surrendering. We have a virtually empty north of the strip. To give up now is a historic sin, and an insult to Israel’s fighters who have not rested since Oct 7 2023, and a desecration to the memory of those who have fallen, in the quest for what the Israeli political and military elite refuse to allow let alone order; victory.

When I wish to catch up on the war in Ukraine, I know I am liable to find many things and even surprises: advances, reverses, both successful and failed operations by either side, but I know what I won’t find: a broken Russia and a broken Putin, betraying their soldiers and ordering a defeat. I always will find a leader trying to win, despite the massive stakes and vast forces rallied against him.

I wish I had 10% the certainty of that, when browsing Israeli news. One is forced to peruse the current events in terrifying fear of seeing more of our surrenders, withdrawals, appeasement to terror, and endless willingness to “pay a heavy price for peace”.

For once I would like to see the lads exacting from our a foes a heavy price for war.

(Article Version of an earlier post: https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1937270294932001270)

Now regarding an end game, from Israel's perspective. It is clear that the Israeli government hoped for a regime change. The main objectives of course have been achieved or are being achieved; the destruction of all or large part of Iran's nuclear (and missile) program. However, you have to look down the road. If Israel abruptly ended its campaign AND the regime was able to hold on to power, it is likely that it would redouble its efforts.

Of course it would have been set behind perhaps years, but it would be all the more convinced that nukes are its only chance at long term survival. It would, depending on its capability and available resources, endeavor to make the new program even harder to destroy, deeper, further east, more highly distributed. If a new government takes over, it would be natural for it to reach out to world powers such as the US, renounce its nuclear ambitions and get rid of sanctions against it.

Since the outset of the operation I have been skeptical on the regime change, at least in the short term while strikes are taking place. People don't like to be seen as traitors & people don't like traitors. War with another country is a very unifying force. Julani recently for example, only launched his attack on a weakened Shia axis (and took over Syria) after Hezbollah declared a ceasefire with Israel.

Attacking the Shia, while they were fighting Israel, was not an option (for the Sunni), but attacking them after they "surrendered" to Israel (and conveniently were greatly weakened if not shattered) was A-OK. At that point what is left is not that “you are fighting the foreign enemy”, but rather that “you are useless and lost/surrendered to it”.

The war & strikes also helps the regime constrain movement, gatherings and communications. Most importantly the internet in Iran is basically shut down for regular citizens. With this in mind, I am not sure pushing for regime change is the smart move from Israel's perspective; especially if it is seen to be doing so. Rather Israel should satisfy itself with & prepare for one of 3 options.

1. If the strikes bring about the regime's collapse, and this brings a negotiated end to the nuclear (and ballistic missile) programs then so be it.

2. If it doesn't, the existing regime can also negotiate & make such a deal. Israel should not be interested in who rules Iran & how it is ruled but only on what it does or doesn't do; specifically regarding nukes. As long as the deal has real teeth and a real verification mechanism that ensures their program ends then that is fine.

3. If neither 1 or 2 occur, Israel should prepare for long term dominance without being dragged into a war of attrition. That means that, the required objectives neutralized, Israel can be satisfied without a deal if need be. But since there was no deal or enforcement mechanism, then any action by the enemy regime (still in power) that threatens to change the new status quo (its nuclear & ballistic program in tatters) needs to nipped at the bud. So if the Iranians start building a new enrichment plant, it gets bombed. If they attempt to re-establish ballistic missile factories deep underground, these get hit. If anti-air systems are re-positioned that would make the previous difficult, then those must go. In short Israel would be forced to maintain an air and intelligence superiority over Iran for the long term (while the regime stands).

Governments (especially struggling dirt poor ones) don't like to lose face, don't like to get their stuff blown up and don't like to waste billions in facilities that simply explode. We have the examples of Saddam's nuclear program in Iraq (after Israel destroyed it in 1981) never having restarted (nor even any WMD of any type after the first Gulf War) as well the 2007 Israeli strike of Syria's Al-Kibar reactor. Syria likewise, never tried again.

On the contrary, it is the belief that such sites will not be attacked and destroyed that encourages their construction; as has been the case with Iran for over 20 years. So, as long as Israel maintains a zero tolerance policy towards Iran, it can wind down the active phase of the campaign and the Iranians will adjust their behavior as to stop getting bombed as well.

The inherent risk with that strategy is that Israel is a democracy, and the governments that can and will follow the current one under Bibi Netanyahu, cannot be relied upon to maintain this hard-won superiority. Israel's recent past is rife with the consequences of letting sworn enemies arm (and break previous ceasefire deals, ie Hezbollah 2005). It is the mistake of trying to guess intentions rather than capabilities. The worse scenario I believe for Israel is a long drawn out war of attrition.

Given the distances involved, the countries in between the two states, and the vast size of Iran, a long term state of low (to mid) intensity conflict can benefit Iran. Long term conflicts tend to equalize the parties. The incompetent bureaucracy of armies is replaced by the dynamism of new leaders who rise to the top by Darwinian forces.

Soldiers and commander go from state workers, inefficient, corrupt and lazy compared to private sector counterparts, to outclass them since the competitive drive fueled by life and death easily beats that driven by the urge to make a bit more money or the fear of losing a job (and looking for another one). Safe production lines are established, methods and tactics improved.

Nothing could be worse than maintaining the Iranian missile and other forces under low intensity attacks for a long period of time. A war of attrition is definitely not in Israel's interest. The cost of active sorties over such a vast are at such a distance is prohibitive for Israel and difficult to maintain (in terms of equipment, pilots etc).

When it acts, it must be with overwhelming force, and when it's not acting, its enemies should be allowed the convenience of acting subpar. It is also the lull, the cessation of strikes, that can allow the magnitude of the defeat of the regime to be noted by the population, and give it the legitimate moment to act (not while under enemy attack).

Furthermore, if the campaign seems to require a more extended time, Israel should begin focusing ever more on potential separatists rather than national opposition forces. Nationalism is far stronger than "you make women wear veils according to our traditions". The Kurds are now autonomous in Iraq and Syria, while quite active in Turkey.

Iran is the missing piece, for the emergence of an oil rich (and land locked) Kurdistan which Israel would be (or should be) happy to be an ally of. There are Balochis, Azeris, Arabs and others as well. Iran is not nearly as Persian nor Shia as many people think. It definitely is not as "revolutionary" Shia as people think.

In short, it is not in Israel's interest to press (nor to be seen to be pressing) for a regime change at the moment. It is far more important that it maintain the eye on the ball. Who rules Iran, within its current borders or otherwise, is Iran’s business. It is Israel's business that they not have Nukes to destroy her.

To this end, the government must be strong enough to persevere & not break, despite internal & external pressures, but nimble & intelligent enough to stop the campaign cold when continuing it is heading to the benefit of the enemy.

Update:

Morning June 24 2025

Soon after this post, President Trump announced a ceasefire. It showed that the Israel leadership was thinking along the terms I outlined, a quick end of the war was desired. It was meant to take effect (at least for the Iranian side) at 7 AM at the latest. Iran fired ballistic missiles towards Israel from sometime after 5 AM to a few minutes before 7. Those were a total of 5 salvos (very few missiles per salvo). There was a direct hit on a Beersheba apartment that has left 5 dead so far.

Then there was a 6th (or 7th) salvo well passed 7 AM (nearly at 7:30). This was easily predictable (as I told those around me in the early morning hours), as a typical Iranian move. They would start the ceasefire by breaking it, to attempt to show (to those who were keeping very accurate track of time apparently) that they had the upper hand and won.

Israel ignored the violation and the ceasefire was declared. This troubled me, but was to be expected. Then at sometime before noon (between 10 and 11:15 AM), Iranian forces fired another salvo of at least two ballistic missiles. They were clearly seen and heard by many people and were intercepted.

Israel immediately ordered renewed strikes in Tehran and the ceasefire breached. It is possible that this latter salvo was not ordered at the highest levels (or at least not THE highest) in Iran, and could show that the Iranian forces are not fully under control. If Iran absorbs these latest hits and does not retaliate, the ceasefire will be on much better ground (from an Israeli perspective), and the end of the war a much better one; rather than ending with an Iranian ceasefire violation that Israel ignored.

On the other hand, the violation could have been intentional, and Iran may continue to shoot sporadic volleys and salvos, trying to lower the intensity of strikes it suffers, but drag Israel into a longer term war of attrition.

We discussed this possibility in this piece earlier. Something we did not address in this piece for the sake of brevity but discussed in earlier posts, was the Iranian infrastructure. Israel generally tried to avoid destroying the oil, natural gas, and gasoline infrastructure of Iran, on which its economy is nearly entirely dependent. the idea was mostly to not endanger the potential new incoming government and the civilian population that would suffer the consequences of shortages.

Israel must note that, at least if the war continues, and especially if Iran continues to target (solely) civilians; it is a big mistake. Ironically, though I am skeptical of the goal of regime change for Israel, the easiest way to achieve it exactly to strike those very targets. Widespread protests in Iran in recent years have almost exclusively started when there are energy shortages and painful (more than usual) economic realities.

Without its oil and export infrastructure, Iran could not sustain a war of attrition, and with it, it may possibly be able to fund it. The status quo that Israel has accepted thus far in teh conflict is that all of her citizens are targets of ballistic missiles and drones, thus spending their nights in shelters and bunkers with babies and young children, while the Iranian citizens are immune to strikes (at least as long as they are not close to regime targets). It is most definitely too imbecilic, to also declare their vital and strategic infrastructure immune.

Not only would incapacitating it, further precipitate the fall of the regime, but also be of little consequence to a new government who, if not anti-western and willing to end the nuclear and missile programs, would quickly find itself with lifted sanctions and even international aid and investment to rebuild and upgrade the energy infrastructure. The damage would be of little consequence in that different reality. But it would be of great consequence in the current one.

The ceasefire having been broken, it would be nice to see Israel persist until Iran can no longer fire at its civilians on a daily basis. This would in effect be a 1 way ceasefire and full victory. We have little chance of seeing that, even though I believe the Iranians are very close to that threshold. They are firing their very best missiles from the furthest possible ranges, given the launcher (and launcher forces) bottleneck, and are quickly running out of these, even without taking into account stocks that may have been destroyed.

Though I have no particular interest in how the Iranians want to rule themselves, it is the clarify of the regime’s defeat alone that can precipitate its fall.

What I am interested in, if it insists on attacking Israel (especially Israeli women and children), is its defeat.

Article Version of this June 14 piece and its updates.
https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1933975680813068480

Everyone thinks massive Iranian strike incoming tonight... I wouldn't be too sure.

As we have discussed earlier, the fall of the Assad regime, extended the reach of the IAF by 700 or 800 kms eastwards. While the advanced fighters had no problem defying the Syrian anti-air network, big bulky refueling planes did.

This meant that Israeli jets could hit Iran (as they did a few months ago), but really at the edge of their range. The opening of the Syrian airspace after the fall of Assad significantly extended this range. This was a game changer.

Anyway I have discussed the Iranian paper tiger for many years. The slower and expensive long range drones in their arsenal are easy prey for Israel's defenses. Only a quite a massive ballistic missile barrage is a threat.

After first launching around 100 drones that failed to even get noticed, Iran made a great effort to launch over 100 ballistic missiles last night. A couple got through, and hit urban civilian areas.

The regime is at a loss of what to do. If they simply tonight send 60, and tomorrow 30, and after a few more days pretty much none... that isn't much of a plan. The impotence is plain to see.

They cannot sustain the pace of around 100 ballistic missiles a day. Because of launcher limitations firstly, and even long range missile stocks secondly (both of which are being diminished by the hour courtesy of Israel's forces).

They are likely to either attempt a hail-mary to see if they can intimidate Israel to halt its campaign; this would mean hundreds of drones and 100 to 200 ballistic missiles on the same night in an attempt to overwhelm the anti-air network...

or more likely not to much at all. They can resort to threats, negotiations and manipulations to somehow try to let go of the tiger's tail. People may not realize that the regime does not have many good options and they are likely quite unsure of how to proceed.

Unlike a guerilla-type force such as Hezbollah or an urban terrorist force like hamas, we are not talking about thousands of short range small rockets, drones and missiles. The distances here are significant and so only large, expensive and advanced weapons can even reach Israel.

So while dug in forces, and those launching small rockets cannot typically be defeated from the air (a point I hark on for years!), and usually their return fire cannot be stopped by air power alone, Iranian capabilities in respect to Israel are another story.

This is a regime which fancies itself, and more importantly tells its domestic population that it is a, regional power. It is industrialized and possesses complex if not advanced weaponry. This is the kind of force, that indeed can be stymied from the air. As long as Israel presses its advantage, perseveres and sustains its campaign, return fire from Iran will diminish quite rapidly.

The number of capable launchers (and their associated manpower) alone, mobile and otherwise, will seriously limit what Iran can do on any given day. And the more launchers are used, the more likely they are to be detected and destroyed.

Stocks as well, are in the few thousand (of long range), as opposed to hundreds of thousands for example when speaking of Hezbollah's and hamas' previously touted shorter range stocks.

One of Iran's few plays is an attempt at intimidation of the population. I can inform them that the part of the population that would be intimidated, was already pre-emptively intimidated long ago and dead on Israel's defeat, especially if an Israeli victory means a Bibi Netanyahu victory. That segment of the population cannot be any more "anti" and any more intimidated. And the remaining part, will not be intimidated.

The regime wants nothing more then to figure out how it can spin this situation so that its own citizens, will still fear it and believe that Iran does not wipe out Israel on a daily basis, due to its kindness, restraint, and commitment to peace goodwill among men. Of course, a mere command from Khomeni and the button would be pressed; the zionist entity no more. But it will give us just one more chance.

So, let us see what the night brings.

Tomorrow... well the Sha's family is certainly viewing tomorrow with great interest. Of more significance will be the thoughts and actions of the Kurds in the North West. Perhaps for once Israel will change its shameful, pathetic and unsuccessful policy of appeasing the Turkey at any cost (the allure of a Muslim country tolerating Israel), and back a friendly and honorable Kurdistan instead.

First Update:

And the beginning answers to my questions...

In two posts. much as we expected so far.

1. A few mins ago heading towards Haifa:

https://x.com/EitanZimerman/status/1933983268598079699

2. Attempting to "let go of the tiger's tail".

https://x.com/Osint613/status/1933977010621272498?s=19

Second Update after Second Night of War:

The second night of the Israel Iran war looked as we thought likely (and hoped).

Iranian volleys the first night were of around 100 ballistic missiles (not drones). The second night reports indicate up to 75.

The name of the game was always the launchers (and not the missiles).

Quoting my first night's post:

"The regime is at a loss of what to do. If they simply tonight send 60, and tomorrow 30, and after a few more days pretty much none... that isn't much of a plan. The impotence is plain to see."

So so far they were able to neither think outside the box nor figure out how to let safely release the tiger's tail. The second night, which should have show an increased intensity of attack (as most everyone seemed to have expected (we knew better of course), as Iran was surprised on the first day, instead slackened.

A third night of this decrease, and many more people other than me would notice. The regime must have been trying to figure out what to do. So far, our expectation held.

This third night will really be telling. If the number of ballistic missiles, especially the simultaneous volley number (volleys are needed to overwhelm air defense), then Iran's chance of intimidating Israel's leadership and population into a premature cessation of the campaign is greatly diminished.

Yes there has been damage and even deaths in Israel, but as I wrote after the first night, it is very different if it was sustainable or a maximum effort.

The Iranians have already made fairly clear that they can't launch volleys during the day. Israel's increasing air superiority over western Iran does not allow the launchers to dare operate in the daytime.

Drones, easily intercepted, of course.. those are easily and quickly launched, but the ballistic missiles are something else. The launchers are large and prep time is significant. Israel meanwhile has continued to hunt them down in the day while improving its ability to find & strike them at night as well.

To try to show that the daylight hours are not completely safe in Israel, and out of Iran's reach, the regime ordered an ineffective assault earlier today. These were likely largely drones, and of little use.

As the night continues, thus far, we haven't seen much this third night. Perhaps in the ballpark of 30 ballistic missiles in total. Here is exclusive primary source footage (started filming before the sirens even started, and the first interceptor launched) from Jerusalem at a smaller volley of incoming Iranian missiles.

Iran's shot was really on the second night. A massive effort could have had a chance of intimidating the Israeli public, at least potentially.

It was found wanting, and my expectation is that if the third night turns out to be significant smaller then folks will finally notice the pattern. Two nights of strikes and what dominates coverage are the images of damage... there is little focus on the numbers at play here.

But weather 100 missiles launched hit 1 building and 50 manage by chance to hit 2 buildings later, the strategic difference is the halved number of missiles launched rather than the doubling of the casualties (unless it is due to a 4x decrease in interception rate & not chance).

Three nights and folks will notice. Then Israel will hopefully realize that it may persevere and succeed as the incoming barrages will only continue to diminish.

The longer term game can only be changed by Iran by changing its very limited capabilities. That's a whole other ballgame, attrition, strategic & economic calculations. To this end, Israel must either ensure that each day the par grows to her benefit and not against (and must hit economic, infrastructure and production related targets to do so), or execute a quick end of the fighting on its terms.

But first thing is simply a matter of protecting its civilian population so that it may continue the campaign through to success.

Civilian urban dwellers across Iran do not have to race for cover all night, it is clear to them (even if not to the media), that Israel isn't indiscriminately bombing cities but striking specific sites. Iran, barely capable of hitting anything at all, is simply launching missile volleys as large as possible at Israel hoping specifically that some get through and hit any target, civilian or otherwise. The idea is here being to not to try to defeat the opposing army but rather have a strong deterrence by having a gun pointing at the public.

A strategy to a large extent that dominated Hezbollah's military spending (vast majority of weaponry meant to be lobbed at cities in general and not fight the opposing troops on the ground), which we discussed (don't have time to find the link at the moment) a few times at least, and ultimately failed in our latest round.

Whether the media admits and reports this or not, it is what this war hinges on. Iran's deterrence is its ability to terrorize the population in general, not to defeat the IDF in any way.

Israelis tonight are asking themselves how many nights can they spend in shelters? How long can they really hold out like this... while I am looking at the number of ballistic missiles Iran is launching per night, and per volley...

Post 3rd Night Update:

Indeed, we have confirmation. Even according to Grok 3. Iran is losing. Reporting is on damage, strikes & deaths, but the volleys are diminishing.

Fourth night could bring us clarity to the trend.

IDF is rapidly eliminating the launchers. You saw it here first (on day 1), the name of the game were the launchers (and their troops).

So far pretty quiet. The night started with Iranian state media reporting that Iran was

preparing for the "largest and most intense missile attack in history" (on Israeli soil), which I believe is Persian for "we are almost out of launchers & are getting beaten, please by afraid and stop".

They may switch to more frequent and smaller volleys. We shall see.

We have discussed the Tariff issue with more detail in an earlier post, but a brief note on the subject is timely with the Fed announcement upon us.

The consensus, supported by Fed member’s own statements, is that they will hold rates steady and not “pre-emptively” lower them (though they may surprise everyone of course and end up doing it). The issue is that an increasing amount of data is showing that a drop would be wise, as the private sector is reeling from high rates (and the government spending cares not what rates are… prints money away, and simply pays the higher rates in a vicious cycle).

As always first a look at common knowledge (narrative as is much said today), gives us a good place to start. For our constantly misleading headlines, we can always turn to CBS and pals.

The media reported inflation at 2.4% in March, weather some reported it as “rose” like CBS or slightly “cooled” as some others. The truth is the report for March is of course, for March, and it was -0.1%. Negative inflation.

The “core” number (minus food and energy) was 0.1%, annualized at 1.2% (well below arbitrary target rate of 2%).

Interestingly, commodities other than food and energy (energy was a big negative of course) was also a negative at -0.1%.

In any event, the month’s release only tells us this new data point. And folks (and especially the Fed folks) are supposed to care where inflation is now, and where it will be (if they take no action, to then consider what action to take to influence that future rate); not where it has been (which they may have already taken actions to influence). To this end, the most recent month’s data is most important, though of course cannot alone be taken as a trend, as month data can vary significantly. A few months in one direction usually is good evidence of what is happening.

Therefore, the latest month is of most importance and the last few months are of key importance. Reporting the 12 month average, as the media does, is useless in a time of change (such as now). Everyone knows inflation had been high, which is why rates were raised. Constantly reporting the same months’ data nearly a year ago over and over is not actually reporting news, but reporting history as news.

Here are the recent numbers:

What ends up happening of course, is that the 12 month average is influenced just as much as the month being dropped (now 13 months ago) as the one being added. This adds a randomness and volatility to the headlines which obscure trends easily seen in the actual recent numbers. In periods where inflation was very high therefore, and rate increases have lowered it, you (the Fed) end up not waiting so much as to see that indeed the rate has dropped as much as simply waiting for the high rate months (or at least enough of them) to have now occurred more than 1 year ago and thus no longer influencing the 12 month average widely reported.

The CPI data itself is significantly lagged (note the latest we have is for March and we will soon to be in mid may before any new data is released), and then a much larger lag is introduced by looking at the last 12 month data (as opposed to annualizing the current or recent rates). This is one of the reasons why the Fed is consistently late.

Looking at our friends over at CNN for some misinformation, note that the headline does indicate inflation “cooling” in March (though in fact it was a negative inflation, so not cooled but non-existent and in fact reversed), but quickly warns us of the doom to come by (Trump) tariffs.

We have the image of the consumer facing empty (for US standards!) shelves for good measure. If we read on, we see that the 2.4% rate is not only reported, but importantly as a drop from 2.8% in February, a completely meaningless statistic. Obviously the impression it gives any reader is that the (annualized) inflation rate in Feb was 2.8% (though it was 2.4%), and in March was 2.4% though it was -0.12%!.

Reading on, we see no mention of the actual negative March number (let alone any further detail or analysis of it in detail).

Furthermore, the difference between the Feb and the March numbers, which are massive (a 150% reduction), from a number that was basically on target (2.4% in Feb) to a deflationary one, is masked as a much smaller change from 2.8 to 2.4 percent. And even this magnitude of a change reported was lucky, since the month that March’s negative data point replaced, was the previous March’s (2024) 0.4 percent, increasing the effect on the 12 month figure. If by chance it had replaced a month with a lower rate, its effect (in the reporting) would have been much lessened (if not reversed as often happens).

Similarly, the next month’s data will be replacing April 2024 which was also quite high at 0.3 percent, and will indicate a similarly reported drop. The Fed will look foolish by then; not having dropped rates.

Inflationary Tariffs?

Twelve month aggregations aside, clearly CNN’s reporting is mostly about the impending inflationary doom inbound, courtesy of Trump’s tariffs.

Again, we have discussed the tariffs elsewhere in more detail, but here we want to address this persistence reporting. Tariffs are not inflationary! That does not mean they are good or bad (all taxes are bad), but simply that they do not print money. Inflation is not the change of price of certain goods relative to to others, it is the rate at which the national currency diminishes in value. It is always understated because productivity increases and real price drops, mask its magnitude. This is what inflation really means or ought to mean as commonly used (or rather misused) but it is certainly what it means from the perspective of the Fed.

The Fed controls the price of money (interest rates) and the money supply. It has or should have no interest in specific price changes due to millions of variables (ie a new Ag-tech drops the price of food, but increases the demand on transport (importing more fertilizer and exporting more food for example), and raises the price of oil (& its dependencies) and travel). It should take fiscal policy into account, only in regards to its deficit spending which triggers an increase in money supply as the Fed monetizes the government’s debt.

Most importantly, even if considering the effect of tariffs as inflation (as all price changes in the defined basket of goods & services, regardless of cause are reported in the CPI), they do not constitute a “rate”. The reason these month over month numbers in the CPI are important is because they indicate a velocity, or rate of increase. The price changes overall invariably increases as the government prints more money. The value of the dollar keeps decreasing. It is not a particular month’s tiny .2 or .3 percent change that is the issue, but that it indicates a rate of change that continues… which is why it is annualized.

Inflation is ongoing and thus debilitating. The relatively low 0.2% month over month change, which is only slightly above target at 2.4% annualized, translates into a a 21.27% loss of value in 10 years. Your 100 dollars are now only worth $78.73, and in 20 years only $61.92!

The Fed’s Thinking

So what is happening here? Well, as tariffs start to be implemented broadly (if they ultimately are), they may increase the price of a significant number of goods and services in the CPI basket. When we are speaking of changes of a tenth of a percent in any direction being large variations in your typical CPI report, imagine what that may mean when compared to a sudden change in thousands of goods by much more significant percentages such as 10, 20, 40 and more percent?!

The tariffs effect on prices is yet to be determined because of many unknowns, most importantly what tariffs will in fact end up applied where as negotiations continue. Additionally, the resilient and versatile US economy will shift and maneuver to avoid a significant part of the increases (as an overly simplified example, if a country now is facing a 40% tariff for a widely imported good, and domestic production cost of it was only 15% higher than the pre-tariff price, than no one should expect to see a 40% increase in the price of the good, since it will be acquired domestically).

However, depending on how they are ultimately implemented, they may in fact cause one-time measurable increases in many goods and services. These changes have the potential to completely overwhelm CPI reporting in the short term (a few months of data). If reported as annualized rates (for a change), they could indicate unfathomable inflation. All it takes is for a CPI month over month to show a 5% increase in prices across the board (due to high tariffs implemented across the board), to be reported as a 5 x 12 = 60% inflation rate!

The meek folks at the Fed know this.

They are in no way afraid of tariffs as a source of inflation because as explained, they are one-time price change events, and in fact potentially reversible in longer term. As alternative suppliers are found (in non or less tariffed countries) and/or domestic production increases together much of the price change can be reversed over time. Not only are alternative suppliers found, but so are alternative goods. This is without even taking into account the negotiations that can lead to the lessening or removal of certain tariffs over time. Finally, consumption choices change with prices, so even though certain goods and services are in the CPI basket, it doesn’t mean Americans consume them at those rates regardless of the price.

It doesn’t matter that the price of a specific imported good went up 100x, if the result is simply that no one will then buy it. The economic acrobatics that would take place are impossible to calculate, and guided by Adam Smith’s invisible hand, will rebalance the economy accordingly to minimize the cost to consumers.

So if the Fed knows all of this, why are they so intimidated by the tariff inflation problem? Why do they want to wait until after seeing its effects to drop rates? Simple enough. We just discussed how one or more monthly CPI reports can contain unprecedently large price increases.. stuff the media will run with in glee. What would the Fed chairman explain at this point? That this is “transitory”? He won’t do that again you can be sure!

The Fed chairman, having been mocked by calling price increases fueled by inflationary money printing (by very few if any others, without hindsight as I happily did), will now call one-time tariff price increases inflationary (and thus non transitory) in fear of being mocked again. Therefore, the Fed is loath to drop rates ahead of CPI reports that may report unrelated (to inflation) price increases. So much for the independence and wisdom of the Fed.

The result? The Fed will be even tardier than usual in dropping rates to avoid a recession caused by their sharp and sustained rate increases. Meanwhile they remain powerless to curtail the actual cause of inflation, the endless and ever increasing monster of government spending (which cares not for the interest rate) and the corresponding deficit. This, as I hope to discuss with you further in another piece, remains the US’ most imminent threat (demographics aside) and the most important and historic problem the Trump administration is tasked with tackling1.

What to do?

For us, it at least may mean further opportunities in the market as people incorrectly (over)react to the media hype. We already did very nicely purchasing certain securities (should I publish the list we used?) at the tariff doomsday crash, already well along the road to recovery. Any unusually high CPI report if and after tariffs haven taken hold will probably cause all sorts of havoc to be enjoyed.

Zelensky visited the White House.

The event speaks for itself and it was obviously a disaster for Zelensky and his administration. There is no need to revisit it in detail. But it is important to put it in perspective and see how it might play out going forward.

We discussed the situation prior to his visit in detail in this previous article:

The premises have all proven to be correct.

Perhaps most importantly (other than the overall realization that Trump would find himself in a much more complicated situation than he thought vis-à-vis Russia, who also would face a much more complex geopolitical & diplomatic challenge in front of it than under a hapless Biden 2 administration under Harris; all contrary to the common knowledge & commentary at the time) that firstly, all Ukraine had to do was accept the notion of a ceasefire along present lines, which then Russia would not accept (because it would like to achieve victory in this hard-fought war), and precipitate a Russia - US split; at least for a while until they figure out this obviousness out.

Secondly, that Zelensky was too foolish, self righteous and unaccustomed to real diplomacy (as opposed to western Western & woke silk glove handling) to understand this and would miss that opportunity. Instead, by not accepting an immediate ceasefire, would simply play into Russian hands to gain additional time to complete their goal of victory.

Additionally, I criticized Zelensky for (knowingly) going to sign a deal that was obviously a detriment to Ukraine in exchange for nothing really (though it wasn’t much good for the US either ironically), in order to sit in front of the cameras with the new POTUS.

All of that has proven very correct.

What I did not expect, as a consequence of underestimating Zelensky’s ability to be Surreptitious (if not plain weaselly), and actually come to the signing without any intention to sign the deal at all.

One must remember, that these occasions are largely scripted, especially what amounts to a signing ceremony. The statesmen’s staffs go over a myriad of details, down to choreography and wardrobe (in Zelensky’s case quite important), let alone the actual key points of negotiations. They tend to be mere photo opportunities to display the fruits of negotiations that have already occurred, not an actual forum to negotiate. This is true even for events nominally intended to be for negotiations (summits and the like), and much more so for what amounts to a signing visit.

So while it looked that Trump had fooled Zelensky into signing a worthless (to both sides) and detrimental (to Ukraine) deal in exchange for being seen shaking hands with him, Zelensky, flaunting the rules of diplomacy, was fooling Trump by coming to be seen shaking hands without intending to sign the deal (unless it was drastically renegotiated in the event).

I must say that we were not completely surprised by that turn of events, as the above cited article ends with the following:

It was clear to me at least, that Zelensky was “not coming in good faith”, and that he would attempt to gain what is not in the deal in public statements during the televised parts of the talks, as well as renegotiate the deal. Though the above text can be read to mean that I basically precisely predicted the outcome, in truth my only error in thinking was not attributing a surreptitious intent on the part of Zelensky.

I understood that Zelensky did not wish to sign the deal, and that he was using the occasion to attempt to hopefully renegotiate it, and at worse make public statements demanding (as he does) everything he wanted and wasn’t getting. But I did not think that he would actually attend what was a signing ceremony without any attempt to sign at all.

As a soldier, Zelensky’s green shirt charade has always really irritated me (as any reader of my posts knows), and have often wondered how world leaders and media seem to either not notice it, or worse note it only in admiration. Trump, perhaps not surprisingly, instinctively hated this charade and it is clear that his staff made clear to the Ukrainians that Zelensky was expected to wear a suit at the White House, oceans & continents away from the front line, if the many hundreds of kilometers from it at his Kiev palace are not enough.

Trump immediately commented on Zelensky’s attire as he welcomed him at the White House. He too, was surprised at what this president was willing to say he would do and subsequently ignore.

Later, once inside a member of the press took up the case and asked Zelensky about his (missing) suit. Admittedly, Zelensky’s answer sounded much worse than he meant it. Zelensky tried to somehow mock the reporter’s own suit (as apparently very expensive/stylish?) to deflect, and said that when the war was over he would gladly wear a “costume” like him (and nearly everyone else in the room).

To Western, or at lest American ears, his reply was in essence that he is a serious man dealing with a serious war, and he cares about that and not fashion (ironic implication for the green shirt wearing PR obsessed president); after it was all over he will gladly “dress up” in “costume” like all the rest of the clowns (including POTUS). Truly shocking.

Regrettably, it is unlikely that this is exactly what Zelensky met. He probably simply meant “suit” when he said “costume” as that is the cognate used in Russian (and other languages). I am sure that many Americans, including some in the room, took it as the insult it sounded like, and this influenced the course of events at the event.

In any event, it is another sign of this man’s foolishness. Putin as I understand it, speaks fluent German and a little French as well. His English is likely at least as good as Zelensky’s (whose isn’t?) and likely significantly better. But you won’t catch him in formal events like this speaking anything but Russian and using interpreters. This is a basic rule of statesmanship. Unless your English is Bibi Netanyahu level (basically perfect & with a command of the language superior to the vast majority of native speakers), use an interpreter! It gives you a chance to consider your answers, and does not put you at an automatic and unnecessary disadvantage in relation to your foreign counterparts.

This is especially true in formal settings and televised sessions. In Zelensky’s mind, wearing a green or brown shirt (or sweater if he is chilly) makes him a commando in everyone’s eyes and speaking in his barely comprehensible English makes him “relatable” or.. “one of us [of the West]”. All true when handled by an adoring and uncritical press and painfully untrue when faced with a dose of reality.

Kudos to the Vice President, who at one point finally dispensed with the niceties and addressed the obvious tension in the room due to the lack of honor of their guest. It was VP JD Vance, that precipitated the just breakdown of the event.

Now, skipping over the exact chain of events, the precise comments, and the broader geopolitical issues, there was one major and fundamental problem with Zelensky’s attitude.

You see, in general, outside of insulting Russia and Putin, he does not have much to say other than repeating “they came to our land”. I have, since the beginning of the conflict, explained that the reason so many people across the world found being on the Ukrainian side so easy, was their ignorance of geopolitics, the region & its history, in combination with being told that the Russians had crossed the line on the map.

It doesn’t matter that the day previous, they could not have found Ukraine (or its lines) on a world map, it doesn’t matter that the sacred lines they are now looking at do not match reality since 2014 when the conflict started (nor of course any time before 1991 back to the beginning of human history), and certainly more complex arguments and realities do not matter either. Allow me a short digression to explain.

Crossing the Lines

Wars typically require someone to cross some line. In recent memory, the US and its allies tend to do the line crossing, for example, be it Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Serbia, Afghanistan, Libya, etc, we seldom see foreign forces fighting US forces on US soil. It is a testament to US strength, that we do not see this. It is US forces that cross oceans, continents, and many “lines” on maps, to attack whoever they are attacking. But the reason these actions can be supported by many (and not all of course) US & western citizens is because of knowledge of the issue at hand, however basic (and of whatever accuracy).

A US citizen might be able to tell you why the US has invaded x or y country (doesn’t matter if he is right or not). So the “line” on the map ceases to be the deciding factor; certainly not the only factor. An opponent simply pointing out to that American, that Afghanistan had a shape on the world map defined by lines, which US forces crossed, would not suddenly shock the American (nor a western audience to the discussion) onto his knees whaling for forgiveness. Obviously, Afghanistan has borders… and “we crossed them” the American will tell you… to attack his enemies, due to the reasons he stated, and to seek victory over them.

If on the other hand, CNN suddenly tells him Alephaland just invaded Betaland, then he knows only that a sacred line (whose existence he did not know of moments ago) was violated, and the bad guy is the line-crosser.

On Oct 7th, Hamas was the bad guy, because they crossed the line into Israel… every day since then Israel has been the the bad guy since we have crossed lines in retaliation. The geopolitics of the atheist is the belief that the current lines on a map (which have never stopped changing in all of history) were set by Gd. All who violate them (except them of course), are evil, and who defend them good.

Praise me, pay me, and thank me

Anyway, the media support and public ignorance have allowed Zelensky to reach unprecedented levels of support simply by stating this one fact. He seemed somewhat confused at the White House as the magic words seemed to have lost their effect. “But they came to our land!”.

Zelensky thinks that this statement allows him and his government to commit any and all acts, against their enemies, their own citizens or anyone else, at will and with impunity from judgment. Additionally he has been taught, that the West owes him infinite support without limitation. Thus, when Zelensky came to plead, if not to beg, for US support, a clear disconnect is seen.

Zelensky lectured Trump and his administration. They came to our land. Shut your mouths, sign the checks and say thank you brave green cladded man. He kept not only demanding things, but showing outrage that anyone could have any thought or opinion regarding this war or his administration.

Zelensky’s tough guy act is as irritating as his attire. He would not accept that he should consider anything else but to keep fighting Russia with endless western support. First let us put aside that “he” does not fight Russia, “he” sits in palace in Kiev or flies around the world begging.. I mean demanding, money.

But if we put that aside, and forget the hundreds of thousands his regime conscripts to do the actual fighting and go with his tough guy act for the moment… if “he” wants to fight Russia, he doesn’t need anyone’s permission. Go ahead. knock yourself out.

They came to your land. You will never compromise, you think you are Churchill (which as some may recall I predicted would happen in the first days of the conflict). No problem, fight on. You came to beg. You didn’t come to ask for permission to fight Russia. If you want to beg folks for money, then the opinion of the folks will tend to matter.

Russia gets help from no one. That is correct, no one. “North Korea”, “China” will be yelled out. Believe me, they are not big charity donors to the Russian Federation. There is a big difference between the fact that there are some countries that did not sanction Russia, and are willing to do business with it, and charity.

Ukraine isn’t sanctioned by nearly anyone. That does it virtually no good. Ukraine does not need a market to purchase goods and services from, it needs (and has received) a giant and continuous welfare check.

So what I found most distasteful was this disconnect. The man came to ask (to put it nicely) for support from the US but then was astounded that he would have to listen to their views, let alone consider them. His method of “asking” for support is to lecture and inform the donor, in terrible English of course, that they must pay, and say thank you.

It was interesting to see Trump, rather than Vance, really get annoyed when Zelensky extended his preaching in an attempt to scare the Americans, telling the room that if they don’t help him, then they will be next. Trump didn’t take kindly to the threat and told him in so many words.

Zelensky’s behavior of course is a direct consequence of how the western media has treated him and his regime for these last few years (not here though of course!). He found it very surprising to get a different treatment.

The obvious move finally understood

In any event, after this catastrophic White House visit, even the short sighted Ukrainian administration was able to convince their President of the obvious way to handle Trump. Only days later… as I have long feared… “Just say yes”. We want peace, putting the ball in Russia’s court and hoping to brew conflict between her and the US.

Zelensky, offered an apology and stated that he would accept a ceasefire. This was an obvious move, but it took them quite a while to get there. Now my concern grew…

First there was talk in early March of a partial ceasefire. This of course would play into Ukrainian hands. Striking infrastructure and other targets in the hinterland is one of Russia’s advantages, it is removed at its peril.

In general, any type of partial ceasefire tends to be a betrayal of troops. A war is a war, and either you fight it or you don’t. As First Sea Lord Fisher said “The essence of war is violence and moderation in war is imbecility”.

Allowing your men to continue to fight, kill and be killed, while holding back capabilities to appease your enemy is abhorrent to the code of the warrior. The best you can do while fighting a war, is to do your best to win it. If you want a ceasefire, peace, or to surrender, go ahead, obtain them. Partial ceasefires obviously work only to the benefit of the side which is being appeased, while shooting still goes on at his convenience.

With some twists and turns what has followed is some sparring between the Trump administration and Russia. Oddly, I have seen comments buy the US administration condemning missile strikes or the like (by Russia). This type of thinking is obtuse. The US is working on a ceasefire, fine… but until one is reached obviously there is a war ongoing. And during a war, warlike actions take place. If the US wishes to be seen as an objective broker of the peace, then absurd statements like this are counterproductive. In war, soldiers shoot.

Trump and many of the folks in his administration were not well versed in this conflict, and though they knew the Mickey Mouse MNBC version was not realistic, they still assumed some of its premises. Russia has fought a very hard war, and wishes to win it. The Trump administration, or at least many of its relevant members, do not or did not at first appreciate this fully.

Soldiers can take defeat… they don’t like it but they can accept it. What they won’t accept is betrayal. I doubt that Putin will repay the valor of the Russian soldiers by showing political cowardice in return.

Leverage

Hopefully Trump can see himself back to the very simple realities of the existing leverage he wields. We discussed it before his taking the oath of office.

Leverage over Russia is very limited. Short of direct military conflict, it is hard to sanction it any further. The only thing left is to sanction countries and companies that do business with Russia, and companies and countries in turn that do business with those that do.. and so on and so forth. Not a pretty picture to attempt this route. The US and the Trump administration have plenty of work to do and goals to achieve, without attempting to go down this dangerous and unnecessary road.

On the other hand, leverage over Ukraine is near total. The war cannot go on without huge amounts of aid given by the West to Ukraine, and specifically by the US.

Trump very briefly (few days) stopped aid to Ukraine. Then, almost inexplicably, has restarted it at virtually Biden levels. Let us explain.

With a brief look (not a deep dive), we can see that during 2024 Ukraine received some $30 billion USD worth of the $61 billion authorization. This is in addition to 2 to 5 billion received in early 2024 before the authorization. The authorization thus has another $30 billion or so left over for 2025, without Trump passing or requesting from congress any additional aid!

Additionally, though Ukraine is being supplied at record 2024 levels (under Biden), the headlines read that the the US has ceased or diminished support, prompting Europeans to up their aid significantly. This means that as of now, Ukraine is being better supplied and supported, than during 2024 under Biden.

Trump instinctively knew, while campaigning, that it was US aid that allowed the war to continue, and knew that cutting it was the leverage needed to stop it. Somehow, he has (temporarily hopefully) been led astray, and I can guess why.

This damn minerals deal. It started as a ruse against Zelensky, “sign this deal and you can take a picture with me”. The Ukrainians have managed to reverse it. Keep giving us aid and we keep alive the hope that we will sign it.

You see, Trump very much wants the optics of the minerals deal. In typical Trump ideology (a part of his ideology I like less), he is constantly seeing the US as ripped off, taken advantage of and the like. He hates the idea of the US not getting its money’s worth in any situation. To this end, he detested the unconditional aid the Biden administration provided to Ukraine, which only enabled mass death and destruction, without any US benefit. Trump was very keen on turning that Biden malinvestment into a profitable investment, or at least be see as doing so.

The minerals deal, though vague and really of not much benefit to anyone in the draft we saw (discussed it in an earlier piece for those interested) is Trump gold; or at least gold for Trump.

Trump is hard pressed to see that American investment wasted, and his attempt at saving it fail. He counted on the minerals deal as an early success; especially if reaching a ceasefire was going to take longer than he hoped. In reality, the worthless deal is being used as leverage by Ukraine over the US administration. The money given to Ukraine has indeed been (and continues to be) wasted, if there is any profitable deal to be made at all, it is more likely to be with Russia, and perhaps with Ukraine at a latter stage as it faces defeat.

You see, it was as simple as Trump thought originally. It is the cutting of aid to Ukraine which is the key to ending the war and limiting its (already massive) deathtoll. Because not only is the former a nearly total leverage over Kiev, the threat of restarting it (and perhaps even increasing it) is an actual leverage over Russia. But as long as aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, leverage over Russia is nil.

Appearing to break with Biden policy, while continuing it, is not a good way to broker peace, but it is a good way to lengthen the war and increase its toll.

Some in the administration may have been worried that the path I suggest means a Russian victory. They may have convinced the administration that a “draw” ceasefire is required. It is a mistake for Trump to inherit the goals of what he has often described as “Biden’s war”. On the contrary, allowing Russia to reach its stated (openly and privately) goals, in a war that the West (and Zelensky) unwisely shoved Ukraine into, is sobering. The world is a dangerous place, and when the clowns are in charge, all will not end well. Furthermore, it is the removal of the obstacles to this quick victory that will recreate the leverage the US has over Russia, if for example it choses to exceed its stated goals (and keeps advancing).

Hopefully Trump comes back around to seeing that it is the complete cessation of aid to Ukraine, especially for a country whose main challenge and (I’d say even existential) goal is to cut an out of control deficit (funded by money printing), which is the key for a successful navigation of that war.

Zelensky should be clearly told, that “he” and Russia can fight if they want to, but on their own dime.

While the Trump administration figures its path forward in regards to this war, I am thus far impressed, though not surprised, by Mr. Putin, who does not break nor easily sway with the political winds, despite serious hardships, lest he betray the brave men that on his orders continue to advance, in frost or heat whether on motorbikes, tanks, through underground pipes and tunnels or by air, that they be worthy of their father’s fathers.

Politically, really has played out much as we discussed previously, and now we need to look further down the road. First, let's review what occurred.

In an impressively prescient thread, we discussed the unappreciated complexities the new incoming Trump administration meant for Russia, as well as the opportunities and dangers it presented to the Zelensky regime.

https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1857058004606025929

This was further discussed in January in this article:

The short end of it is that if Trump did not fully think all options through, and Zelensky had the slightest diplomatic skill & strategic thinking, things could get much more complicated (for everyone except Zelensky) very quickly. Here was the main idea.

VP Harris would be easy to predict and defeat. Trump, different ballgame. Since Trump's leverage on Russia is is limited, if not exhausted, Trump would be wise to first "ask" Ukraine first. If Zelensky is unwilling to end the war along current ceasefire lines, then there is no reason to get into a shoving match with Russia.

I went on to explain that of course Zelensky should support Trump's proposals in such a scenario, especially since Russia is likely to decline (as I explained then). However, I doubted Zelensky and the "entitled" Kiev regime would have the diplomatic foresight and correctly predicted that he would likely oppose Trump's efforts.

So we thought it likely Zelensky would play it poorly, but again this was contingent on Trump first "pushing" against UA as good strategy would dictate. We worried he might do otherwise. This is how it went first, for a few weeks.

https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1882464164876357656

Besides the poor choice of WWII language when dealing with the Titan that bled the Wehrmacht dry, the explicit threat was concerning, and precisely how we discussed this could go. This was not lost on the observant readers!

The situation where Zelensky would realize what was happening here; that Trump wants to end the war and he would support whoever agrees and pressures whoever disagrees could be nimbly used to turn Trump and Putin head to head (Zelensky's dream). He of course, realized nothing.

This went on for a while, and it included a Trump team and cabinet argument over the direction to take on Ukraine.

Ultimately, with Trump being nobody's fool, and being surrounded with intelligent folks, he wisely disembarked from this path as we thought most likely despite the danger. Zelensky did his part to help of course. His holier-than-though entitled mindset, possible only because of blind and fanatical support by the western mainstream media could not be a worse fit for Trump.

Ultimately this ensured a highly enjoyable set of exchanges where Trump threw so many (rather accurate) negative descriptions at Zelensky that one would have thought he was a reader of our discussions. The only one I've yet to see is regarding his green & olive shirts. As a soldier, that has always infuriated me.

Regardless of this turn (& we will get to where it is now, and the "rare earths" deal), the situation is still dynamic, and could even change again. The underlying fundamental issue remains, as stated in that same, impressively accurate post. We have heard comments from the likes of Peskov, Lavrov and Nebenzia stating quite clearly and resolutely that the regions (oblasts) that are now Russia per the constitution are not subject to negotiation.

As long as Zelensky opts to keep fighting (ie keep losing territory), then he keeps the US & Russia from having to face the issue. Otherwise, the issue is realistically solved (outside a UA capitulation) by continued fighting. And that requires Trump to reduce his eagerness in ending the war quickly, and take the accompanying flak.

This is precisely the way it seems to be going however. Zelensky mostly the cause as he at all costs simply wishes to keep the war going and ever greater Western treasure supporting it. Anyone who has read my posts since the outset of this war, knows one of my harshest criticisms of Kiev has always been that that they never had nor developed a strategy for winning the war (which they had a great hand in starting) as an actual war. There only strategy was and remains to involve the western world in essentially WWIII. Short of that, they wish to keep their countrymen (and Russian cousins if not brethren) dying as long as the West keeps paying the bill.

In the interest of brevity (at least of this part), we won't recount the amusing turn of events as Trump and Zelensky sparred, while the Euro-woke leadership scramble desperately to keep the war going and their pal Zelensky in power (ironically, his resignation or removal and replacement by someone more meanable would preserve more of UA territory for UA, not to mention more of its people alive), since this has been well recorded for all see.

I will say that I was pleased in seeing it culminate with the US and Israel voting contrary to Kiev's wishes at the UN in recent days.

Part II - The Rare Earths Deal

We now have Zelensky eagerly rushing off to DC, in order to sign the agreement that just recently he railed against. First let us discuss why the parties are doing this, and then we will take a closer look at the agreement. It is important to note that the deal gives virtually nothing to Ukraine, and certainly nothing concrete. It allows (more precisely grants the right for) the US to invest in the use & exploitation of a wide range of UA's natural resources defined as:

"deposits of minerals, hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, and other extractable materials, and other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure)".

Some may indicate that this at least will provide

US money for UA to develop these resources and infrastructure which it otherwise does not have. The reality is that while the agreement does not obligate the US to invest any amounts in anything, even if it did folks are always happy to invest in these things in any event.

I am addressing its general tone. If it doesn't at least end up doing what it seems to intend to do, then it doesn't do anything at all for either party). Countries don't do that because depending on their level of socialism or free-market, they (or the private individuals & companies that own the resource rights) make many individual deals with multiple parties regarding specific properties & resources. There is no need nor advantage in granting one country exclusive rights to invest domestically in crucial areas.

The more important and in demand the commodity in question is, the more true the above is. So Ukraine gets nothing economically for this, on the contrary, it sounds like the preliminary agreement in granting exclusive rights (at least perhaps rights of first refusal) to the US and/or US companies in Ukraine.

In exchange for? Nothing. So why is Zelensky doing it? For the the same reason he does so many things. His apparent belief that UA must retain western support to fight on no matter what (or perhaps its fight on no matter what INORDER to retain western support), and that he of course should lead it doing so.

After first being blindsided by a Western leader that doesn't blindly parrot the UA propaganda line, and reacting foolishly, he now desperately craves any appearance of relevance, of closeness with the new US administration.

In a most shameful display, he cares not how much wealth of how many generations of his citizens he is giving away. He is willing to sign this absurd deal, which promises Ukraine nothing, for a picture shaking hands with President Trump. Though he has expressed reservations about the deal (his staff & even supporters are well aware of the problems with it), he is willing to come sign (or at least negotiate) face to face. We must remember, not too many days ago, he was waiting for the giant army he has begged (I mean worked) so hard to fund to burst into the Palace and kindly relieve him of his duties.

If it seems that he is the impediment to US support, the failed war leader would likely think the coup is not long due.

So why is Trump signing the deal?

This is a more complex question, but I am happy to offer my estimate. Two things are driving Mr. Trump on this. First, it is in his nature to want to seek economic advantage for the US and never to allow economic disadvantage. He abhors more than anything, the massive financial support UA has received from the US in one form of another, with absolutely nothing in return. On face value, this deal is meant to recognize that value and attempt to repay it.

This is why it offers nothing (further) in return to Ukraine... it is meant as a gesture if not an act yet, for the UA to repay some of the past support. However, it obtains no future support guarantee. This is clearly one driving factor.

Of course Zelensky hopes that the mere act of being in partnership with the US, and negotiating with it, will lead to further entanglement and support.

But I believe he is being easily had. And this leads us to the second driving force behind Trump's proposed agreement. In short, it is merely an artifice, be it profitable or not in the future, that explains the continuation of the war. Trump is basically indicating that he came to the WH with the earnest desire of stopping the bloodshed.

He butted heads with Putin and butted heads with Zelensky. But if the losing side, the begging side, so vigorously wishes the war to continue, then so be it. But the US' support will be collateralized.

Again Zelensky hopes that this means that future support is being collateralized, but the plain meeting of the agreement is that only passed support is. Investments if any, only after the full agreement has been signed, will take a while to come and if they do before there is a ceasefire, would be in areas far west of the combat line. To the extent that this gives some implied security guarantees (as partially US assets), they would not be very relevant to the war. With the possible exception of certain mid-stream hydrocarbon & transportation infrastructure.

But these would exist if ever, years down the line (existing infrastructure is not included). The appearance of being in some sort of negotiation with, but not blind support of, Ukraine will allow Trump to continue to do the same with Russia. Also on economic terms first. Minerals, trade, the Arctic, easing of sanctions, etc.

As the US veers from the Biden state of affairs and normalizes relations with both parties (which means downgrading relations with one party from Uber-ally to just another country as the UA was pre 2022 if not pre 2014, and upgrading relations with the other from arch-enemy to also another country in the world community), it disengages and allows them to battle it out as long as they stay within certain limits.

Russia for example would be expected to fight for her incorporated regions but not to dash west of the Dnipro for example or attempt to seize Kiev (again). The natural effect of this policy would be the fulfilling of Russian territorial goals, as a less supported Ukraine and/or a less sanctioned Russia would greatly speed up the Russian advance.

Once Russian territorial goals are met, it would be easier to negotiate a peace or at least ceasefire on then current lines. Russia in any event would agree, and at that point a still stubborn government in Kiev would lose all (at least US) support. Russia would be freed to completely vanquish its opponent.

As you can see, the possibilities are complex, but they seem to me to add up to buying time, for Russia. Zelensky and his administration are one trick-ponies, and they are so accustomed to want to buy time, always hoping the next month will bring either enough western support to win or better yet western intervention, that they cannot realize when time plays against them.

Unless their interests, in holding on to power, are completely detracted from the people of Ukraine's interest. And this is why part III of a Jan 2025 discussion ended with this:

Could be wrong of course, but I believe Putin is now the one playing for time, and Trump is giving it to him.

Meanwhile, I suspect the headlines will all cheer the signing photo ops where Zelensky for once wearing a suit (I imagine Trump will require it) will gleefully sign away UA's wealth for the hope of a few more months, weeks, anything, of not wearing the suit in the Presidential palace.

Part III - More detailed analysis of the legal & economic aspects of the

First Posted here.

Let us note some important details about the deal.

UA recognizes that the US has provided with them with significant support.

The US meanwhile recognizes that they did something positive by abandoning their nukes (not fighting Russia or Donbass separatists etc).

The deal goes on to say that the US and UA will establish a fund to invest in UA resources and infrastructure. Hydrocarbons and ports seem as important (if not more than) rare minerals.

The US (or US companies) will invest in UA to exploit these resources. It remains to be seen in the more detailed agreement how much exclusive rights this fund will have vs any other folks from other countries that may want to invest.

The UA will contribute to the fund 50% of future government revenues of the relevant resources. It doe snot include current revenues that already are derived from these resources and thus also doesn't extend any implicit US protection to those existing assets.

It is not clear if the "future" 50% will be on revenues that the Fund helped develop or on ALL future related revenues as long as they are not current ones.

This will be an important detail to look for because if the contributions are from all resources, then they really are selling a lot of their sovereignty for nothing here. The US will be investing money to the fund for development (though it doesn't have to).

The future detailed agreement will also provide for distributions... that is how profit eventually will be distributed for the parties. There are a few important things to note here.

Typically the US doe snot invest in things like this. US companies do (of course the US gov't taxes their profits though). So if private companies make the investments, how will the US get distributions that make up for the support it previously gave UA?

Or will it be happy just to pass the exclusive rights, to the extent they will exist according to the detailed future agreement, to its private companies?

More importantly the ownership will be according to investment amounts. So even if the UA invests vast amounts of money in the fund due to the 50% revenues, it will then simply own more of its own fund. The US here is not really getting anything here other than some undefined exclusivity or first rights of investment.

No money or resources are being given away for free. Really the US is getting influence and preferential (if not exclusive) rights to invest in certain aspects of the UA. Which perhaps translates to preferential access to resources for its markets and influence on UA policy… But it's not free money, not for either side.

Also interesting is that agreement requires the UA to ratify the agreement as a treaty, because as I have explained, the agreement does obligate Ukraine to certain things. On the other hand, the US does not have to ratify it, because it really promises nothing in return.

And the few & vague concepts it may imply, will not be ratified by the Senate and thus not US law. It is an odd one-sided agreement that doesn't really mean much at this stage, other than a certain loss of sovereignty for the UA.

These oddities, and especially the lack of any financial reward for the US that is recognized (other than future investment) indicates to me that the deal is not very serious. It's importance is more in appearance than substance. It appeases various pressures without doing much in reality.

Once the actual Fund Agreement is negotiated, it will be much clearer of course. This preliminary draft is so vague, that the final agreement could have drastically different implications; it can go any way (and thus I suspect will be difficult to negotiate, thus also taking time).

Zelensky is aware of this as is his staff, and I will expect him to try to get in statements from Trump what he isn't getting in the deal... if not any guarantee at least some indication of the US's future support to continue the war. This may also lead to the deal being heavily renegotiated and/or not even signed at all. Zelensky is not coming in good faith, but rather to see how he can twist an agreement which on its face only thanks & gives restitution to the US for past help, into guaranteeing future help. Zelensky knows he is being played, but I am not sure that he cares very much.

He is so desperate to be seen with Trump, and supported by Trump, that he might even wear a suit. We shall see.

Let us review a strategic update. Discussing the main fronts, and a look forward. Things mostly have been developing as we discussed earlier.

Starting with the Kursk salient, we have the continued gradual shrinking of the salient. Ukrainian command continues to hold on to it for dear life, sending some of its best brigades to the front to the detriment of the deteriorating Donbass fronts. In typical fashion they are acting as if a Trump inauguration with UA forces within old Russia indicates a strategic achievement.

In fact the opposite is true. As we discussed in this and earlier posts,

(here an excerpt:)

a Trump administration before Russia has achieved it's desired territorial goals, actually potentially complicates matters for her.

In short, the problem is that when Trump proposes a ceasefire along current lines, Russia would have to reject the proposal if it wishes to yet advance further. UA forces within "old" Russia, simplifies this for Putin quite a bit. No one would expect that Russia would or could accept the current lines if they include losing parts of pre-war Russia. Now of course, if UA forces were making a strategic difference here, facing a collapsing Russian line or were a few kilometers from Moscow or at least another major city, that would be something else. But as is common for Kiev, the PR win IS the goal.

Despite the fact that the proposal on the table is likely to be a ceasefire along "current lines", the Zelensky regime still plays only for time. Despite the very obvious fact that the proposal literally gets worse for it every single day, as Ukraine loses ground every single day. With such a powerful backer (the USA), the proposal should be very attractive for Ukraine, as it promises to stop its daily shrinking, not to mention destruction and loss of life. If it did quickly grasp this option, it would complicate matters for Russia, as the ball would be on her court, and pit Putin vs Trump. It even would potentially activate a sort of territorial "put" (insurance), because as it continued to lose additional territory, while Russia rejected the plan, it could continue to argue its acceptance of the plan was at the previous lines and might even find support for this position in a Trump administration, whose overtures for peace had been rebuffed by Russia.

Strategic thinking not being a high priority in the entitled [Zelensky] regime, we instead saw a renewed offensive just days ago to deepen the UA Kursk salient. We have discussed previously that where the front agrees with the internationally recognized border, Russia tends to enjoy a strategic advantage of not having to defend it as densely as Ukraine does.

So a new surprise offensive elsewhere is not necessarily a bad idea by Ukraine. But I was surprised even at UA command when I saw them double down in the same salient. The element of surprise is virtually zero. The pocket is narrow, and supported only by one road leading to the Sumy region. Even if the advances succeeded, which of course

they didn't (that did not stop us from being told otherwise of course),

(over and over…)

what could it achieve other than placing even more brave troops (those who weren't casualties) in danger of encirclement?

Of course, the UA forces were not completely without innovation, the columns advanced with powerful new EW equipment to stop the Russian drones. We have already seen for the past few months, an increase in Russian fiber-optic drones which evade all EW countermeasures.

Rather than rely on RF communication, which is susceptible to jamming, it communicates through

a thin, flexible and very long optical fiber cable. As the UA offensive got underway, Russia nimbly rushed fiber-optic FPVs (and units) to the front, and they quickly rained down unsustainable damage on the advancing columns.

Apart for the PR achievement, I suspect the offensive also meant as a test case for this new EW equipment. It seemed to perform rather well against the older RF FPVs, but Russia was already playing a different game. Interestingly, we have not yet seen Ukrainian fiber-optic FPVs.

I assume much has been reported on the optical fiber drones' ability to evade EW countermeasures. This is certainly an advantage, while the disadvantages of the physical cable connection both in operational limitations and cost are also fairly obvious.

However, I can inform you from personal experience that the most crucial advantages these new drones posses are not related to its immunity to EW (at least in the current battlefields where complete EW dominance across the fronts does not exist).

The first underappreciated and crucial advantage is related to signal strength, but not to jamming and EW.

Invariably, FPV drones drop down to hit their targets. At these low altitudes, they often are behind (relative to their controllers and/or their antennas) buildings, trees, terrain features and the like. They lose line of sight and they lose signal.

It takes skilled controllers to be able to hit targets after having lost video connection in the final approach. Even in the relatively flat terrain of Ukraine, the advantage of calmly surveying and maneuvering over the terrain before striking, even while a few meters or less off the ground, with perfect signal strength, is a huge advantage.

Secondly, there is the video resolution. It is hard to imagine the difference of viewing the enemy-held territory in 720p+ (or even 4k), resolution (and static free), compared to the average low quality analog video feed transmitted by most FPVs.

Far from the complaint of a "spoiled" operator, it represents night and day in terms of effectiveness. It is hard for a person to imagen how difficult it is to recognize enemy positions, equipment and personnel during combat operations. You can look at the highest resolution satellite imagery available to get an idea. Despite a half meter resolution, you will not easily find even the tiniest percentage of the thousands of armored vehicles spread along the huge front, nor will you easily see any troop concentrations.

Likewise, identifying a hidden, camouflaged enemy (who wants neither to be seen nor die), from above, is rather difficult, even with good resolution. With a poor camera and RF connection, it is exponentially so. The added bandwidth the optical cables provide, is not being wasted, but rather intelligently used to accommodate higher resolution cameras on the suicide drones.

Part II - Additional Fronts

In the Kupyansk region, RU forces have crucially established a foothold on the west bank of the Oskil river. This opens up several possibilities as we have discussed before.

To begin with, this allows an advance on or flanking of the city from the north and west.

As we can see on the map (Suriyakmpas), RU forces are already at the P79 highway and can advance on the H26 highway (the Kupyansk - Kharkhov road), thereby cutting off not only the critical hub of Kupyansk, but also the entire UA salient east of the river it supports. Additional moves towards the SE can complete the encirclement and collapse the salient. Furthermore, besides threatening Kupiansk, the move puts Russian forces in the free operational space with various options.

They may advance west or NW to meet up with forces from Vovschank and cut off a large chunk of the Kharkhov oblast in eastern Ukraine. UA fortifications here are not impressive, and for the moment, the question is whether Russia can increase the number of units in the western foothold, and establish a higher capacity of logistics before UA forces can establish strong fortified lines blocking the Russian breakout before it gets started. A bit further south in the long Kupyansk (or Kharkhov) front, we have a similar situation.

Having realized that the obvious advance was banging your head against the wall (the thin arrows),

the Russian forces unexpectedly pushed westwards across the Zherebets river (& the reservoirs). By this move, Zarichne and Torske are threatened from the flank (from the north & west), and neither are now the only gate to Lyman.

This move complicates UA defenses considerably as they must be split up. This maneuver which we see twice in this front, indicates just how much the relative manpower situation has changed. Previously, Russian forces clung to river banks and reservoirs, since they eliminated a flank (to a degree at least) to have to defend. During bad times, we saw Russian forces retreat to lines of defense along rivers, canals and lakes, and in better times like to advance along their length, as they guarded one flank and allowed concentrating power forward.

Ukraine tended to ignore them and press it advantage when it could as far as possible, posseting plenty of manpower. That is how we end up with UA forces on the eastern banks of the Oskil and Zherebets rivers. Russia had attempted to hold the line along them when its Khakrhov front collapsed earlier in the war.

The fact that now RU units now leave and force these defensive lines, to advance thrusts into midst of UA held territory on every side is very telling. It also shows a much improved logistics apparatus on the Russian side. We constantly see, in all sort of weather, RU forces advance deep into UA territory far from roads, and across creeks, wadis and even rivers. They do so while maintaining the ability to advance further and expand the "bloom" in many directions.

Ultimately, we ought to remember that the long Kupyansk front is important in the battle for Yampil, Lyman and perhaps even Izyum; the gateway to reaching behind Sloviansk from the north and the final battle for the Donbass. Likewise, crucial in flanking and defeating the uncrackable expertly held UA Siversk front.

This crucial Slovyansk is the northern end of the Sloviansk - Kramatorsk - Kostyantynivka line; the final major defense line of the Donbass. In the south, two major RU offensives are pressing the line's demise.

First, the advance on Chasiv Yar continues. Here once again the UA forces face encirclement if they do not withdraw.

RU forces will quickly encircle the strongly fortified industrial zone of the city. Additional RU advances may encircle UA forces in the forests SE of the city.

Chasiv Yar is strategically important as it is well served by railway, while being relatively high, as opposed to nearby and hard fought Bakhmut, which is much lower.

This is one of the reasons the uphill battle for Chasiv Yar has been so difficult. Control of Chasiv Yar gives RU forces access to advance northwards & eastwards along the high ground controlling the Sloviansk line, as well as a railway on which to advance along (as RU forces like to do). Finally, it is a strong foothold on the west side of the canal. Of course, the defense positions on the Slovyansk line are east of the cities, and on the high ground themselves, which is why what is happening south of Chasiv Yar is much more important.

Part III - Toretsk, the Unlikely Prospect Zelensky Chooses Wisely, & More

We start with perhaps the most underrated and underreported part of the front. Toretsk. We have discussed it at length previously.

https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1643272528863850496

The line we call the Slovyansk - Kostyantynivka line, we used to refer to as the Slovyansk - Toretsk line.

It is Toretsk that represented the strongly fortified southern anchor of that line. It has taken a long time for RU forces to overwhelm it, but its capture is crucial and strategic.

In the above referenced thread back in April 2023, we discussed how the path West around or through Toretsk was of such importance, as it lay in the way of the H20 highway.

The other pincers we discussed then, have already progressed, towards Prokrovsk indeed, and it is the Toretsk pincer that is only now ready to break out. In the thread we discussed how breaking through Toretsk would be very difficult, and how perhaps going around it was possible, though perhaps too narrow a corridor to sustain.

In the end, RU forces did go through the city, and it took a very long time indeed. In the meanwhile, the changing dynamics of the war have made advance through cities, especially areas without high rises and industrial complexes, much more feasible than earlier in the war.

Not long after this analysis, I discussed this changing dynamic.

While the UA command was slower to grasp this and other dynamics, the Russian command quickly adapted. Through Toretsk it was.

Various Ukrainian brigades and units have rotated in and out of this front. Some fought extremely professionally, and a few not only held the front but were able to push RU units back at certain times. This helped to lengthen the battle for the city. Yet today it is finally in Russian hands (over 90% of it anyways).

In the April 2023 thread (referenced at the top of Part III), we referenced (via this Feb 7 thread), an even earlier post from July 2022.

Incredibly, back then we highlighted the importance of a westward thrust towards Pokrovsk through Ocheretyne.

Adding only the green to this 2022 post (at https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1546326598655295489), we can see the central advance through Ocheretyne (towards Pokrovsk), as well as the suggestions of going around, rather than going through, Avdiivka and Toretsk. In the event, there was a successful RU effort to surround Avdiivka, including cutting it off from the northern supply routes. In Toretsk, RU forces plowed through and took a very long time.

Posted the following image back in April 2023. The question mark is original, indicating the difficult choice RU forces faced for this critical advance. Would they try to force the narrow corridor between the large urban areas and/or push through Toretsk itself? In the end, they did just that.

Also back in 2023, we discussed the following image, the green newly added. The key is clearly Pokrovsk, and the main axis of advance are clearly through Ocheretyne, Khurakhove, Selydove and Toretsk.

Much as it has occurred (and some yet likely will).

Much later, starting in May 2, 2024, when the town's fall was about to occur, I predicted the imminent "bloom" to follow the capture of Ocheretyne.

Elaborated further in this thread:

https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1787012548383887752

(excerpt)

So here we are finally today. What is left to develop from those discussions and projections? The breakout west from Tortetsk.

Here are some potential major & minor RU routes of advance, but there are two main ideas at work here.

First, that a push westwards from the Toretsk - Niu-York front towards the H20 and H32 roads will collapse the UA Horlivka - N. Donetsk city fronts. Furthermore, pincers moving northwards from Toretsk can close with those southwards from Chasiv Yar.

These are both relative high-grounds and can encircle UA units defending along the strong canal line. The important thing here is not (at least not only) the potential for a very strong and fortified front to collapse, but what lies beyond.

We have discussed Russia's election to, on a strategic scale, blast through the most fortified parts of the

front, likely due to political reasons. This being the case, Russia is doing a good job trying to avoid the worse of it. Earlier on it was impossible, as it pounded lines that have been established and strengthened since 2014. Lately it is reaching operational space in certain

areas, and can start to maneuver. Beyond Toretsk and Niu York it previously was open space. But UA has been hard at work. Well not as hard as it should have been, given the dollars spent, but though far from adequate, some new lines have been built.

Let's take a look at the Military Summary map, which does a good job at mapping new UA (and RU) defensive lines. At first it might seem like an impossible mess. But if we take a closer look, we can see that the "great beyond" is still accessible to RU forces. Its armored columns may yet breakthrough "into the blue", after years of grueling and bloody trench battles.

The reason being that at this stage of the war, defense in depth is everything. Lines lacking depth, and specifically not having fully built second, third, fourth & even five fallback lines, are of little use.

As soon as RU realized it would need time to grow its army & strength to win this attritional war, and that it would face further UA counteroffensives, it set out to build the Surovikin Line, at great effort, cost and with remarkable speed. This is defense in depth, across the the front. The best of newly minted & Western trained/armed/supplied brigades smashed themselves to bits against it. What the UA command has built here is nowhere near adequate.

You see, when there is no depth to the defensive line, the problem is not just the obvious. Once the enemy forces can get on 2 or better yet 3 sides of the line, it actually serves as a highway for their advance. As we have discussed at length, advance in the open at this stage of the war is very costly if not impossible, as long as there is even a lightly entrenched foe in determined opposition. To move is to be seen, and to be seen is to be destroyed in this modern battlefield. However, a thin line of fortifications that can be flanked on several sides offers a good axis of advance.

This is similar to how RU forces like to advance along railway lines. We have already seen this play out in several places, including during the ongoing RU advance & flanking of Pokrovsk (one of 2 last fronts we still need to cover in Part IV or V).

An additional line, or fortified positions near & parallel to the first, make this maneuver a much more difficult proposition. Fire from one defensive line which faces attackers on 3 sides, can be suppressed. The line itself works as cover to advance. But flanking is much more difficult if there are additional parallel lines. And if attempted, the flanking forces could not sustain fire from nearby parallel lines. The greater the depth, the stronger the effect. It is important not only to have parallel depth but also intersecting lines and positions in order to avoid turning your costly earthworks into enemy assets.

With this in mind, we can turn to the current picture again. Notice the blue lines that represented the UA defensive network in front of Popasna, or what Russia still faces in front of the Slovyansk line.

This is a nightmare to battle through. Note however the green (teal?) lines showing the sparsely fortified positions in front of Horlivka (West of Toretsk). They are thin, far away from each other (thus more like strategic fall back lines rather than part of a defensive network), and lack complexity.

Not only is there a lack of depth, but also a lack of intersecting lines. The UA command has simply built a series of small unit strongholds mostly in single lines. Built in such a way, they will offer little resistance to RU forces and sometimes even aid in their advance. Like everything in war, this is not predetermined.

UA can still build better and more. Other developments could stop the RU advance, and of course the war could end. The Russians however stand closer to a victory than they have since very early on in the war. Chasiv Yar is a strategic capture. Toretsk I presume much more so.

And the capture and/or encirclement of Pokrovsk is of immeasurable consequence. It remains to be seen whether the RU forces can break out westwards from Toretsk, N &NW from Ocheretyne, and/or bloom after a capture/encirclement of Pokrovsk. The legendary breakout into the blue, coveted by cavalry and armor commanders for centuries, is within the grasp of the RU forces; with it the path to the Dnipropetrovsk (oblast), the soft underbelly below the Slovyansk line, and the full capture of the Donbass.

Only the bravery & gallantry of UA fighters, all much undeserved by their high command and ruling regime, stand in their way.

Will the regime in Kiev, urged on by Euro wokes, still play for time, when time is all RU forces need?

Or will it seize the opportunity of a Trump administration to finally halt the Russian Bear, that ever more rapidly tears parts of its dominion away?

Even if it for once chooses wisely, something tells me that Putin is a stranger neither to patience & steadfastness nor negotiations, and that he too, now being his turn, can play for time. Perhaps not at the level of those who dwell in palaces clad in green shirts, but then again he does not need 3 more years.

______________

Follow Up:

Quick update on developing events we discussed in the quoted thread. Turns out quite a few of the potential cauldrons we discussed are now imminent.

Ukrainian forces have stubbornly held the lines within these pockets, following orders from their high command. They are now at the critical point of withdrawing or being encircled. Already logistics lines are threatened in many areas and only muddy fields are available for not only supply but withdrawal. So here was our projections of advance, let's take a look at a couple of rapidly developing areas.

The strategic hub of Kurakove and its surroundings is in great peril. Its lines of communications about to be cut from behind (the west). In this image, borrowing military summary's map, the circles indicate key points & junctions RU forces are likely to take in the coming hours & days.

Let's zoom in on a couple of areas. Here we see that when the Russians take Stary Terny, which I believe imminent, the game for this pocket is up. Of course firstly this indicates that any reasonable support of the powerful units still within the pocket is no longer possible. UA forces will either escape through muddy fields at night, or end up being fully encircled. The pincers will be no more than 2 km away and likely less. No paved roads left open for UA forces. More importantly however, RU forces will be able to quickly advance south with the Vovcha river reservoir anchoring one flank (either along the road, either side of the 2 smaller reservoirs, or both), and taking the main Prorovske - Kurakhove road (Prospect rd). This effectively seals the fate of Kurkakhove without a costly and deadly battle for its

dense western high-rise sector as well as other highly fortified and built up areas including Hospital, industrial, and railway areas. Separately, we can see that if the UA forces cannot stop a relatively short advance of the RU forces from the suburban areas they now hold, to the SW, the highly fortified area of Pivdennyi with its dense residential complexes and strategic junction (along with the fields within the pocket currently anchored by strong UA trench network) will be in a cauldron. I expect this small pocket to be either surrounded or taken

as UA forces take their last chance to withdraw from it, within a couple of days if not less. As far as the entirety of Kurakhove, this will depend on how quickly the Russian forces can advance southwards along the Vovcha River. From there, RU forces must quickly advance westwards along unprotected fields & along the road towards the village of Dachne. Taking this small town cuts off the alternative albeit small supply line to the Uspenivka pocket. The circles show the key areas that are likely to be taken by RU forces to create the operational encirclement, and the rectangles are the areas that will be encircled (light lines in a latter stage). As usual, UA forces have the option to avoid the encirclement by ceding the territory and withdrawing, but they are cutting it close.

Finally, just as we discussed & expected, the same thing is happening on the western end in the Velyka Novosilka region. I expect advances towards the 2 north south roads to come very quickly. This will leave only the east-west road semi open. This is turning out to be one of the larger potential operational encirclements of the war.

While the Biden administration continues to either encourage chaos around the world, be it by incompetence or design, and all eyes are elsewhere, the determined RU forces continue to advance along the muddy and cold fields of the Donbass steppe. Their tactics and capabilities, as we discussed previously ever more efficient and effective.

Later we will discuss the implications of these potential captures, the possible additional offensives each side is planning, as well as the reorganizations & changes in command that occurred.