Extending the Russia Ukraine Grain Deal

The strategic options and why Russia has extended it thus far

Note:

Originally posted as a serious of threads, this is an article regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the “Grain Deal” between Russia and Ukraine made with Turkey and the UN.

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1613157390211338241

I argued that Russia was deceived into the deal, and yet again in extending it. Perhaps coming to this realization currently, Russia is indicating that it may not extend the deal any further if certain export and import restrictions (which are nominally not the intent of the formal sanctions) are not removed. Even achieving this, is in essence as I argued earlier, extending the grain deal (to the benefit of the Ukrainian government and the Western ones), in exchange for facts already previously agreed upon.

Giving Russia greater leverage is the resistance to Ukrainian (cheap) grain that has developed in Poland, Romania and eastern Europe due the perception that it is flooding the market and driving down prices. If the Black Sea is closed to Ukraine, the only outlet is through the Eastern European countries.

Poland recently even temporarily banned Ukrainian grain. Undoubtedly, the move was probably in part meant to pressure Russia and all parties to make sure the deal is extended (which is good for the Ukrainian government, bad for Russia), because otherwise there won’t be alternate outlets. The grain deal allows western countries to continue to support Ukraine for a longer period of time.

We shall see if the Russian government once again caves to pressure, mostly Turkish, as it asks of its men to not cave to the cold, strain and fear as they battle in the steppe.

Grain.

Jan 10 2023

Intro

After too long of an absence, let us get back to the next piece; Grain. I originally wanted to post regarding these very ideas before the Black Sea grain deal came into effect. I thought it was poor strategy from Russia (and good strategically for her opponents).

Now that it has been recently renewed for another 120 days, it is just as relevant and in my view just as poor strategically for Russia. First, let us clear something up. Previous to the announcement of a deal, I recall a conversation with certain pro-Russia folks who vigorously denied that Russia was blockading Ukraine in the Black Sea. Specifically regarding grain and other food exports. There were excuses about Ukraine mining its own ports, causing an auto(self)-blockade and the like.

To me, it was very evident that Russia was indeed blockading Ukraine, as would be logical given the state of war (in all but name) between the two states. RU forces had not fired at cargo ships trying to come in to or out of UA ports, nor had it clearly boasted such a blockade, but there was an effective blockade nonetheless.

Hopefully you will pardon a small digression.

I digress

The existence of this argument is due to a phenomena in the modern world, where very often the side backed by mainstream western media (often the leftist side, the post modernist side, the baser and less noble side, certainly the whinier side) seems to be able to set certain fundamental lines, thresholds and goal posts that nearly everyone takes for granted and few if any argue against. The "opposing" side is left trying to argue the opposite view while chained to the same assumptions, the debate thus already a loss. [I can add today that even the new Chat GPT has these fundamental assumptions and values hard coded]

This is not the post to get into this in detail, but an example is for instance the debate in the US regarding immigration and the border. While the left, vaguely supports (never with actual laws to the effect of course) essentially erasing the border, and urging the non enforcement of long-standing obvious rules which prohibit breaking through a border (ie jumping the fence etc), the "right" is left arguing the obvious (and absurd to oppose) position that the long standing national border and long existing laws on the books (from CNN, you'dthink Trump invented the concept that crossing the border illegally was in fact illegal) should be enforced. That POTUS should in fact perform his constitutional duty and enforce existing laws, that he, the executive and its agencies should act as if illegally breaking through the border was in fact illegal and protect the sovereignty and rule of law of their republic.

The "right" then shouts proudly, that it is not LEGAL immigration that they are against, but only illegal one. The argument is stuck way out there in left field, and it is already a loss for those who think that they are pushing it back. Obviously, if a state wants to exist, to stay sovereign and to stay as in the case of the US, a constitutional republic under the rule of law, it must protect its border and enforce its laws, especially those regarding its borders.

That both major parties would not agree with that is shocking. Debating the laws is one thing, but debating that they should be enforced is quite another. Obviously if you try to jump over the fence illegally you should be stopped and/or deported. At the bare minimum.

The real argument IS or ought to be about LEGAL immigration. There should not be any debate about illegal immigration. It's illegal. And a state interested in existing should try to stop it. The question is whether there should there be any legal immigration? If so, how much, of what kind of folks and from where?

These are legitimate questions for a nation to ask and answer. What immigration if any will be deemed legal, leaving the rest of it illegal and to be stopped. In the US at least, this discussion is impossible to even fathom, the GOP thinks it's real “hardcore” when it argues that the illegal jumping of a fence should be illegal. The large majority of the demographic changes in the US are from LEGAL immigration. Being stuck arguing the obvious with the left, means in effect that they already won the debate.

Anyway, even though I think I may have used this example before, I am amazed at how often issues fall under this strange phenomena. The blockade was one of them. The media decided it was "bad", "evil" and "mean" to assert a naval blockade against your enemy during a war (we will soon explore how frequently the US engages in this "meanness").

Therefore, pro-Russia supporters reflexively began to state RU was not doing that. Not only was that incorrect, but they were giving their opponents the victory on the issue. It is particularly ironic in the face of the massive and unprecedented sanctions including huge asset seizures by the Western world on Russia by countries who keep saying that they are not at war nor open conflict with it. Russia was blockading a country in which it was in open conflict with (who obviously is blockading it back to the extent that it can).

So let's begin.

It is true that Russia early on urged all international vessels to leave the war zone, and provided help for them to do so. Note this formal letter distributed by the IMO at Russia's request, and addressed to all IMO members. It established a 3 miles wide (139 miles long) "blue safe maritime corridor" to allow for evacuation of neutral ships (as per common sense and the laws and customs of naval warfare).

Ukraine on the other hand, on many occasions forcefully held foreign ships and their crews in Ukrainian ports, & we commented on that many times as was the case in Mariupol. In fact, it officially declared all ports closed to any inbound or outbound ships (civilian and/or foreign). This act rendered Russia's blue safe maritime corridor moot in many instances as ships could not leave.

Ukraine's breach of international law, western norms of war and violations of the sovereignty of neutral and even allied states (and in some instances outright hostage taking) went of course unreported in western media. In any event, any of these outbound ships that managed to leave the area & had cargo, likely would be left unmolested by Russia as they exited the conflict zone, and you can call this a sort of one time export that RU was potentially allowing.

Russia did not specifically ban exports from Ukraine's ports. But commercial shipping traffic could not come IN to the conflict zone, & so sustained export was not possible (regardless of Ukraine's closed ports. They were closed & mined in response to Russia's blockade & invasion, not independent of them). Not only was Russia not allowing it due to an exclusion zone, but obviously, commercial freighters and crews not being combat units nor interested in being combat units, will not typically dare enter a war zone without clear indications of safe passage (as you have now with the deal which is the subject of this very long post).

Goes without saying that insurance companies will not cover ships that would try to run the gauntlet. Russia did not physically stop commercial ships from entering and exiting Ukrainian ports, and it certainly did not fire at them (at least not intentionally and in general), but it didn't have to, the blockade was not only implied, but in effect stated by the exclusion zone that Russia officially declared. Naval traffic websites quickly showed how effective this was, as commercial shipping quickly cleared the northern Black Sea.

Even now, with the Grain corridor deal in effect, we can sea shipping is largely going to Russia via the Sea of Azov, while the northern Black sea, and specifically the Ukrainian coast is still largely devoid of sea traffic.

In short, Russia certainly was effecting a naval blockade on Ukraine in the Black Sea (The Sea of Azov is now a Russian lake, and open to traffic). It was put into effect by a Russian declared MEZ, and physically enforced by the Black Sea Fleet and the RU Air Force. On Feb 24 2022, the a Russian maritime agency, Rosmorrechflot, announced the navigation in the Sea of Azov was suspended until further notice. The following day, Russia declared and formally defined a Maritime Exclusion Zone that prohibited navigation in the northwest portion of the Black Sea.

The MEZ is still in effect, but an export corridor is available for Ukrainian grain, through a deal involving RU, UA, Turkey and the UN. The so-called Black Sea Grain Initiative signed July 22 2022.

First let's take a look at these MEZs.

A Maritime Exclusion Zone is not against the norms of war. It is basically an order or warning for ships (and aircraft), military or otherwise to stay out of a certain zone. Typically this would be a conflict zone but they have been used, with various terminology, for many purposes including training exercises and terror interdictions.

Famously, the British declared a huge MEZ (later upgraded to a TEZ, or Total Exclusion Zone) during the Falkland Islands war. The Argentines did likewise, and famously or infamously, the Argentine cruiser Belgrano was sunk by the British just outside the MEZ. The sinking amounted to nearly half of Argentina's combat deaths during the war, and the Belgrano was the first vessel sunk in combat by a nuclear submarine in history, and the second since WWII sunk in combat by a submarine in general.

WWI & WWII are full of all sorts of naval and maritime exclusion zones. During WWI, both the Allies (Entente Powers) and the Central Powers made frequent use of these exclusion zones. The British started by establishing "danger zones", the Americans "defensive sea areas" and on it went from there. Germany declared a "war zone" around the British isles and a "barred" area of over a million square miles of sea. The resulting collective exclusion zones amounted to long distance blockade which hurt both sides but specifically ravaged the central powers with economic disaster and famine.

WWII saw more of the same, with the US declaring an exclusion zone covering the entire Pacific Ocean where all non-allied shipping was attacked. The exclusion zone the US declared was so vast (the Pacific is around 69 million square miles), that it was not enforced to the extent it was declared. US Naval forces were not numerous enough, and it was enforced where they were present, and where they were sent, largely where Japanese shipping and shipping lanes were to be found in concentration.

Iran and Iraq used MEZs during their long 1980's war, as did the US in both First and Second Gulf Wars. As already mentioned, they were also used by the United Kingdom and Argentina during the 1982 Falklands War. MEZs have certain requirements, which Russia had met upon its imposition. They should be clearly declared and defined. Most importantly, they should not impede neutral shipping (though many historically have) from neutral to neutral ports, especially that of lanes with no alternative routes.

Only belligerent vessels and/or vessels going to or from the belligerent ports may be blocked, seized and fired upon if necessary. With the MEZ at hand, these were followed as Russia only impeded shipping to and from Ukrainian ports in the north Black Sea, while shipping to all (supposedly) neutral countries remained unhindered. This includes shipping lanes to and from Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania and Georgia.

Shipping to Russia itself through the Black Sea has also remained open, at least according to Russia that is... since the western sanctions have greatly impeded neutral shipping to and from Russia.

But technical MEZs aside, let us take a brief look at the use of naval blockade itself. Looking only since the 20th century, it has been frequent and sometimes devastating. As we already stated, WWI and WWII are the scenes of massive naval blockades, global in scope. During the Korean War, the US and her allies declared a blockade where all merchant ships were barred from North Korean ports.

Ironically, war ships (other than North Korean ones of course), were allowed safe passage. This was simply to appease the Soviets (and to a lesser extent the Chinese) and hope that their navies would not challenge the blockade. Though both the USSR and China protested the blockade, they observed it and did not challenge it for the duration of the war.

By September 1950, a few months after its establishment, the US led blockade started to enforce the restriction even to North Korean fishing boats, despite the fact that fish were the main staple of the Korean diet. In less than one year, 213 North Korean fishing vessels were destroyed, 147 damaged and 9 captured. The Korean blockade included the Blockade of Wonsan, which amounts to the longest naval blockade in modern history lasting an incredible 861 days. Similarly during America's next war, North Vietnam was similarly blockaded through the use of mines though a formal blockade was not announced. Nixon did however, announce the following in a televised address:

All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies.

During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, India gained naval superiority and blockaded the coast of East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh). During the decade long "Tanker War", Iran blockaded Iraq in 1986 when they captured the Al-Faw peninsula. This allowed them to blockade all shipping in and out of the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the famous Tigris and Euphrates rivers that empties into the Persian Gulf. Iraq became virtually landlocked and required access to the sea through Kuwait and Jordan.

By 1988, Iraq had pushed the rapidly collapsing Iranians back and regained access (though still somewhat restricted) to the sea.

Since then, the US has used ever more frequent exclusion zones, including "Anti-Terror" Zones, "Defensive Sea Bubbles" which move along with her forces, and more. In fact, for the US, Naval blockade (to say nothing of No-Fly Zones) during its wars and conflicts has been the norm rather than the exception.

From the strategically vital (for the North) and economically catastrophic (for the South) blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War to the world wars, Korea, Vietnam & Iraq it has been the default. The US has blockaded Cuba on two separate occasions (not to be confused with the separate and long standing sanctions on the island state), as well as Puerto Rico and Mexico (blockade of the port of Veracruz, Tampico, Alvarado & Matamoros, effectively the entire east-coast of Mexico).

The UK with its longer history, naval power tradition and far flung empire has had opportunity for many more blockades. Without even referencing any instances in cooperation with the USA, the UK has at one time or another used naval blockade against the union of Denmark and Norway, the United States, Argentina (even long before the Falklands War), Venezuela, and Rhodesia just to name a few; not to forget Russia for good measure during the Crimean War.

The US has used naval blockades and/or MEZs in nearly every conflict it has been involved in. The exceptions are few, and limited to those where it could not achieve them or they were not needed. For example, one cannot speak of a naval blockade against Afghanistan because the country is landlocked.

Though the US has imposed heavy sanctions on the Taliban and thus Afghanistan since their rise to power (ever strengthened from time to time). Flying over Afghanistan is barred by the US, as is any form of trade (including food) or financial transfer without special licenses (often given to NGOs for food/medicine and the like).

It is hard to say whether there was a Naval Blockade during the US's Invasion of Panama in 1989/90 or during the invasion of Grenada in October 1983. De facto there most likely were in both these cases (what civilian vessels would approach these

ongoing conflict zones?) but they were so short in duration that they were not noticeably enforced for any period of time. Once the US ran the show, and the enemy regime was removed, it obviously would not blockade itself.

Though even under Bill Clinton's "Operation Uphold Democracy", another invasion for the purposes of regime change, this time in Haiti, a 12-mile exclusion zone was declared around Port-au-Prince, enforced in part by the US Coast Guard and Navy seal gunboats.

War and Blockade

The point is clear, the US, like any state in its position, likes to blockade an enemy during war if it deems it strategically beneficial and has the capability to do so. Blockade, whether on land or sea (and more recently air) has a long history in conflict. Like on land, naval blockades can be small, such as siege on land, or larger in scope and scale to cut off whole sections of a front, country or the entire state(s).

Therefore one would expect that the Russian Navy would not let commercial shipping in and out of Ukraine, as long as it had the ability to stop it. Especially since a naval blockade of Ukraine does not constitute a total blockade of the country, since it is wide open on its western borders. Most of its imports, including weapons, are coming by road and rail through the Polish border. So while a naval blockade is an economic hit on Ukraine, it can in no way starve its civilian population.

Weapons can often be heavy and needed in large volumes, especially ammunition. Costs are significantly increased by relying on long terrestrial supply lines as opposed to sea lanes. Receiving weapons and ammunition around Lvov at the western border itself increases the length of the eastern front supply lines by hundreds of kilometers within Ukraine as opposed to sea imports at Nikolaev or Odessa. These longer supply lines are not the same as commercial mostly rail based ones within Europe leading up to Ukraine. These fall within a war zone and are subject to Russian interdiction.

The Ukrainian rail network has rapidly deteriorated in recent months as Russia steps up infrastructure strikes. Supply trucks in UA are lacking, dependent on likewise lacking gasoline, and subject to attacks on every mile of their journey, to the front and back. Likewise Ukraine's critical grain export sector relies on cheap maritime shipping for its exports. These are low cost (by weight) goods that rely on cheap sea break bulk freight.

The infrastructure to export through alternate routes is not sufficient, and raises the cost nearly prohibitively on these bulk exports. Making UA rely on land imports on everything from food to ammunition obviously diminishes its fighting power and increases pressure on Kiev to resolve the conflict, as does curbing its critical export economy by restricting its access to the sea.

Importantly, armed conflict makes de facto blockades wherever the fronts are. Obviously in general there is no trade permitted by either party across the front lines. The long Belarus-Russia border/front with Ukraine is closed. Ukraine in this

respect blockades Russia (and Belarus) in the same manner as vice versa. If one force is able to surround the other, be it a small unit or large forces that are holding whole cities, the latter will find itself completely blockaded/sieged. The force is therefore pressured to surrender without supply of water, food or munitions. We have seen this occur, despite the fact that civilians within the pocket will also be under complete siege. The constant targeting of bridges by both sides aims to cut off whole areas of the front from supply.

Did we not see Ukraine's targeting of bridges and dams across (with advanced western weapons such as the HIMARS) the Dnieper threaten to completely cut off the Russian troops and civilians west of the river, forcing a famous Russian retreat from Kherson? In this instance, the siege would not be complete only by the destruction of the bridges across the river towards Russian held territory. That part cuts off the rear, but the front is cut off by the mere presence of the Ukrainian armed forces across the front line.

Ukraine's goal was a complete blockade of the Kherson region, including the cutting off of all civilians in the city of Kherson and its surroundings from all supply. It largely achieved its goal, Russia could not manage to keep the civilians and RU forces on the west bank supplied and had to withdraw. In war, blockade is the de facto state along belligerent fronts, & where one side can apply it on the other, be it by air, land or sea, it is the norm rather than the exception.

Russia was foolish to let her foes define it as illegitimate or even unusual, and worse yet to act is if convinced of it.

Battle of Attrition, and of Will

This war, like any other, is a battle of wills, and it is more specifically at this point a war of attrition and of sustainability. Who can sustain the war effort longer. I would like to address some issues regarding this and the sanctions further in another piece, but for our purposes here, suffice to say that the naval blockade of Ukraine in the Black Sea would be very important for Russia, and detrimental to Ukraine. Undoubtedly, even weapons and munitions have been or will be imported by sea. The Turkish dominated inspection regime is obviously not impermeable.

So why would Russia allow these grain exports? Why has it entered into, and now extended this Turkish brokered deal??

Earlier on in the war, I believe the answer was in effect that Russia was misjudging sentiments. Think back to backlogged ports, high prices and scarcities due to government lockdowns (which people often strangely call "covid") and rampant money printing. Quite a bit of panic going around, and the ongoing war was adding more. There was a world food crisis aura in the air and Russia felt that its Black Sea Fleet, and Air Force, were in a weak position to stand in the way of the desperation.

The western democracies, very sensitive to their voters, Russia feared, who until now shied away from direct conflict and imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine, could easily send in a task force to deblock Ukraine in the Black Sea. Turkey had declared that no additional Russian warships would be allowed into the Black Sea.

Only those who are normally registered as part of the Black Sea Fleet could enter (to their "home" ports).

Russia therefore could not augment its fleet with forces from its larger and more powerful Northern and/or Pacific Fleets (nor from its Baltic Fleet). The Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet had been sunk recently on April 14 2022, which further weakened the fleet, specifically its anti-air capabilities. The Russian Air Force meanwhile was struggling, sustaining losses and being held back by Ukraine's anti-air forces, and seemed like it would be no match for modern western forces. I suspected that Putin and the RU leadership thought it likely that the western forces would forcefully lift the naval blockade, and potentially destroy much of the Black Sea Fleet to do so.

On the one hand such an action stayed far enough away from direct conflict with Russia and within the Donbass (and Ukraine altogether), while potentially enjoying a very legitimate sounding reason of lifting a food blockade for Ukraine and the whole world. Take a look at Wheat Prices during the last 5 years. Russia announced its willingness to negotiate on the matter and let Ukrainian grain exports through during the peak of the unprecedented prices. This plus the subsequent negotiations themselves helped calm the market and drop prices.

The Grain Initiative was signed on July 22, immediately after the peak prices (subsequently prices rose again before coming down as substantial shiploads from Ukraine started to have an effect). Charts for oats, sunflower and rapeseed oil, and to a lesser extent corn and soybeans look very similar.

The West's heavy sanctions on Russia were exasperating the problem because the region's (if not the world's) only exporter of these commodities larger than Ukraine is Russia, now even further augmented by vast agricultural lands it had seized from Ukraine.

Though technically food exports from Russia were not sanctioned, in practice they were. Shipping companies were finding it difficult to ship to or from Russian ports, and many customers could not transact with Russian companies. In fact, no one can send a wire transfer (on SWIFT) to most Russian companies and most Russian banks to pay for any goods. Russia did know what the prices would or could do, and how quickly hungry or angry western citizens would demand the black sea be opened by force.

Secondly, and I believe less importantly for Russia, the blockade was seemingly hurting neutral and friendly countries. The third world, which had largely stayed out of the Western-led sanctions on Russia, was to be hurt the most by the rising food prices. Arab countries particularly, relied on grain exports from the Black Sea and could turn on Russia due the blockade.

It would at the least, hurt Russia's standing and public opinion in those regions. Particularly since the high food prices could mean angry western citizens, but starving third world citizens. These two factors I believe pushed Russia into the deal. While later on, perhaps coming to see some of the points which I will discuss here, it tried to withdraw from the deal, this half hearted attempt only served to show weakness, and Turkey's strength in the situation, by having to quickly backtrack. Russia then went on to honor the full 120 day term of the deal, and renew it for another 120 days on Nov 17 2022.

Why was this poor judgement on Russia's part? In short, Russia was misjudging both sets of countries (Western and neutral/third world). The West is quite keen on taxing its oblivious working class and savers (printing money) to "fight" Russia to the last Ukrainian.

However it requires Ukrainians, culturally nearly identical to their Russian foes when compared to the average westerner. This war is not a small war, not in terms of its length of front and area of operations, nor more importantly not in terms of the combat forces involved. In both capability and number of soldiers involved, this is a big fight. It requires (as Russia all too late came to acknowledge), significant mobilizations of large countries.

Small NATO combat troop potential & Weapon Stocks.

The historically puny combat units in NATO are nowhere near enough to take on a Russia that would only mobilize totally if faced with direct assault from the West. Large swaths of the western armies are not made up of men fit to fight in real combat, and the populations are no longer ones that can be mobilized to do so. Your average millennial in the west is hardly disposed to hear an opinion that he disagrees with outside of his "safe space", let alone face the onslaught of fire on a Donbass front. The West still has warriors, don't get me wrong, some among the finest on earth, but they are proportionally fewer & fewer each year & while it is possible that a of war of necessity might yet awaken a fighting spirit in western nations once again, a war of choice to help western Ukrainians rule over eastern Russian speaking ones by force will not.

The Western states, already undermanned to take on China and other threats, know this. That is to say nothing of the spiraling risk any direct intervention runs, including the use of nuclear weapons. They are also used to complete dominance in the sea and air. Americans know that their infantry and Marines can be blown up by IEDs on roads, but they comfort in the thought that their F-22s roam enemy airspaces at will, as their carrier strike groups roam the world's oceans unscathed projecting massive power on any nation of their choosing.

Direct confrontation with the Russian air force, Navy and most importantly the Russian anti-aircraft forces, all honed by a year of war, would lead to western casualties that would surprise western populations, especially given the media's portrayal of incompetent Russian armed forces.

The point being that the US and other European states will do almost anything to stay out of a head on fight with Russia. I have said this from the start, when popular opinion, riled up by an irresponsible and stupid media, thought intervention a matter of course, and even experts expected at least a No-Fly zone imposed by the west over Ukraine. Thus far those that thought as I did have been right. Russia overestimated their appetite for direct conflict. This is to say nothing of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. It is one thing for Turkey to declare, per signed treaties, all warships excluded from the Turkish Straits outside of those normally registered within (ie the Black Sea Fleet). It is another, if it wants to maintain its neutrality, to allow western ships through and block Russian ones.

Not to mention western fleet intervention in the area cannot happen without tactically neutralizing what the Northern, Baltic and Pacific fleets can do (including crossing in part into the Mediterranean) elsewhere. The Turkish declaration in fact guarantees Russian superiority in the Black Sea.

A Wiser Path

Russia would have been wiser to take advantage of this advantage, rather than appease in fear that it would be taken away. Turkey, in many ways a paper tiger, given its situation along its border in all directions and internal situation, can hardly tempt Russia. Turkey, recently nearly hyperinflating its currency, is surrounded by enemies. Kurds within and without. Syria, (northern Kurdish) Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and even Greeks on its west and in Cyprus. Israel just a bit further, but formidable in the Eastern Mediterranean theatre.

Russia itself only separated by small Georgia on land and on water, Turkey directly faces the Black Sea Fleet, which itself is comparable to Turkey's entire Navy. Russia has a very large sway in Syria (not to mention its own forces and a Naval Base), nearly as complete in Armenia, very significant influence within Iran, and important influence in Cyprus. Simply by disrupting trade to and from Turkey, and arming Kurdish fighters within and without the country, Russia could potentially collapse the current regime.

Besides the fear of direct and indirect confrontation with Russia, Turkey's semi neutral stance is largely due to its anti-western stance. Turkey wants to appear to be quasi-friendly with Russia so that it can appear quasi-unfriendly with the West. It has no wish to be pushed to dependence on the West, which would alone endanger Erdogan's regime. The same is true of much of the third world and other neutral countries. They need to support, or at least not actively oppose, Russia in order to oppose the West. This runs much deeper and more fundamental than wheat prices and would take much more to change.

We see this with countries' support of easy to hate CCP-led China, only as a counterbalance to US hegemony. On the contrary, the more dear the potential exports from Ukraine on the world market, the more dependent these nations are to the country in the same region that produces even more of them, Russia.

The blame game can go in all directions, and food cost pressure, like any other can be applied to Russia OR to Ukraine and/or to Western sanctions. Russia needs the Western powers to apply pressure on the Kiev regime to achieve its war aims. It needs them to apply this pressure to negotiate an end to the war, or for them to end military support. Ukraine cannot sustain this war at all without massive support. Russia is carrying its effort alone. It trades, but does not receive charity. Russia misjudged in thinking it needs to alleviate this pressure so that the West not directly interfere, when what it really did is allow the West to keep supplying Ukraine while getting her grain as well. In fact, much of the soaring prices had to do with the sanctions on Russia, as we mentioned previously.

Though technically food and medicine, we must realize that trade with Russia collapsed in much broader ways. All Western companies or companies that deal in or with the West fear prosecution. Shipping companies stopped calling on Russian ports. Ports stopped accepting Russian ships. The same with airlines. The vast majority of companies cannot send a wire transfer to the vast majority of Russian companies.

So how could food or any other commodity be purchased from Russia? How could Russian civilians pay for medicine which is largely imported. Russia can and did still manage to export its high value commodities, but this was increasingly possible in large state-involved deals. The private sector in most countries cannot easily deal with Russia.

Russia would have been wiser to note that there is no mercy in the current West, only weakness. The sanctions are as heavy are as possible. Whatever was not included was out of self interest. A few banks remained open to transfers so that natural gas and oil could still be purchased (Russia retaliated by gradually demanding payments in Rubles). If it truly had the stomach for hurting Russia's war making ability and lessening suffering of the world's poor it would have done quite the contrary, sanctioning oil and natural gas exports and allowing swift transactions freely.

That way, you are targeting 50-60% of Russia's exports by value in hydrocarbons, and permitting its 4-6% exports by value of grains and cereals. You can add another 2-3% for fertilizers. The third world and folks everywhere would have appreciated the more affordable food.

Even in the current sanctions regime, which claims to not target Russian food exports (nor its food or medicine imports for its own civilians) but in reality very much does, there is much to be done if the western democracies cared at all about this issue.

In fact, Russia either was fooled into believing it gained certain concessions or pretended it gained them in the recent negotiations to extend the Grain Deal by another 120 days. Russia raised some of these issues which prevent trade of unsanctioned products, most importantly food and medicine, and was promised certain fixes. Russia was given in return what it already had. The sanctions are not supposed to be targeting Russian food exports, and if they were, as they are, Russia could loudly let the world know this. Russia would have been wiser in forcing the Western leaders to either allow unsanctioned trade (food, fertilizer, medicine etc), or admit that they are sanctioning it.

Admit it to the starving populations that they pretend to care about. Russia's "renegotiation" showed weakness once again and a misunderstanding of the West and the neutral states. The West has built these sanctions regime, in fact by its own admission, to cause the greatest harm to the Russian economy and the least pain for itself. The Western democracies can stand little pressure. Russia, in a tough war must push back and not accommodate if it is to succeed. Russia would have been wiser to use the food export pressure against her foes.

You want food? Allow them buy from me. Want to buy from Ukraine again? Let them push Ukraine for a ceasefire. Kiev won't budge? Let them stop the flow of weapons and money. The Ukrainian economy is heavily dependent on its maritime exports. Its agricultural sector is very influential in its corrupt government. In 2019 for example (the last "normal" year), around 26-30% of its exports by value were grains, cereals, their oils and related products.

Another 10% or so are meats and other oils (animal/vegetable). Another 20% iron and steel. All of these are heavily dependent on maritime export. Much of the main imports such as machinery and cars are also heavily dependent on sea freight for reduced costs. Opening the sea to #Ukraine is a life-line which undoubtedly prolongs the war to Russia's detriment. It is a courtesy that neither the West nor Ukraine would give Russia in return.

Russia gets no "brownie points", no one notes its "kindness", only its weakness.

Only pressure, enough of it, on one side or the other, will end this conflict. And in my view the current state of the West makes it a weaker bearer of this pressure.

If Russia wishes to win, it needs to not only know how to tolerate more of it, but also how to apply it on her adversaries who cannot tolerate very much.

If Russia instead opts for appeasement, she will find that the West's tolerance for Ukrainian bloodshed is quite high.