Russia, the Clock & the Upcoming Trump Administration
A few moments off in our own war, so I can comment on events in another (which I always find a very quaint modernism).
Article version of (my typically prophetic!) original post on November 14 2024
A few moments off in our own war, so I can comment on events in another (which I always find a very quaint modernism). First let us recall that we previously discussed how it may behoove Russia to take advantage of its current upper hand, as the longer wars go, the more unpredictable they get. In this post summary, point #10 specifically was regarding this issue.
https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1838376417546879285
Very soon thereafter, we can already discuss a clear example of this situation. Russia is not only racing against the clock due to weather, but also against the change in administrations. Perhaps counterintuitively to many, a Trump presidency is much more challenging for Russia than a second Biden/Harris one. A Harris win would be more of the same. While the current VP would poorly handle the continuing decay of the US and the western world, The Russian Federation could go on ignoring a Harris White House. Aid to Ukraine would continue to gradually decline and Russia could, carefully marshalling its resources, attrition rates and contract manpower, continue to take ever increasing pieces of territory until it was satisfied.
A Trump Presidency is a much more complex geopolitical challenge. The leverage Trump would wield against the Zelensky regime is straightforward enough. You either play ball (negotiate an end to the war along these lines), or you're on your own. No more aid, no more help. Ukraine would then be left to suffer a complete defeat within months if not weeks at the hands of the Russians. The Europeans are unlikely to fill in the gap, and even if they did (for a while), then at worse you have no situation not more difficult than the current one.
A Ukrainian refusal to follow Trump's lead would be the best scenario for Russia at this point. Much like in Blackjack, it matters very much who is asked first (who gets the chance to bust first; from this alone stems the dealer's advantage), and who will refuse first.
On the other hand, if Kiev is willing to end the war along the current front lines, it would be Russia that would face very difficult decisions. It could agree and take the partial victory of course (a more desperate Russia would), but if it doesn't, what leverage Trump and the US would hold against Russia is much less clear. On the face of it, not much. Russia is already sanctioned to the hilt, and its enemy amply funded and supported by the west. But Trump as an adversary is not the same as the woke circus as an adversary.. Trump's only move, in the face of Russian intransigence, is to say "Ok so you refuse our understanding and accommodating stance, you will learn that a Trump opponent is not the same as a Biden opponent. If you won't take the win, then you will certainly lose."
The Trump administration, filled with much more formidable people than its predecessor, would then be willing to go the distance to ensure a Russian defeat. Things could get very complicated, difficult, and dangerous.
On the other hand, this is a path Trump is unlikely to wish to take, and so potentially, Russia would have some (but not much) time. Trump has emphasized his ability to end the war even within 24 hours of being in power. Does Putin wish to call the bluff, if indeed it is one?
In short, the problem is that while any Trump-backed negotiation may include various principles that are open to negotiation (does Ukraine pledge to not join NATO for 10 years, 20, or to never do so, what kind of international force if any patrol a demilitarized buffer zone, etc), the part that is hard to imagine as flexible is the territory gained by Russia, at least in the direction of increasing it. That is, while Ukraine might have to accept the then-current front lines, accepting the loss of territory it has in fact physically lost, it is hard to imagine it would be forced to give up additional territories. And Russia has not yet reached its stated goals. Not all the historically Russian areas have been taken, and the entirety of the oblasts incorporated into Russia are not yet in her hands. Strategic geopolitical gems, such as Odessa, and the rail-bridge to Transnistria and Moldova still lie even further from the current fronts.
So while these complex issues lie in the near future, there are a couple of months now for non-stop gain. Russia has pushed the pedal to the metal, in order to hold the best possible lines when the above questions need to be answered. In addition to changing the map, the push has the possibility of finally collapsing Ukrainian resistance.
No regime on earth was as desperate to see an electoral victory by Harris and Trump defeated than that of Ukraine, Undoubtedly, Zelensky, the Europeans and the outgoing Biden administration will explore every way possible to ensure funding and support for Ukraine into and past 2025, in the few weeks remaining to them. With the magnitude of the GOP sweep (House, Senate, White House, and SCOTUS), this will prove difficult if not impossible. Trump will dictate policy going forward.
In any event, the Ukrainian army, from its high command to more importantly the conscript on the ground, realizes (or believes he realizes) that the war is on its last legs. Less and less of them will be willing to fight as stubbornly and potentially to the death for a war, so long and hard fought until now, that is about to end. Human nature tells them all that these are the weeks to simply survive, it's almost over. The Ukrainian resistance, stubborn and impressive until now, may increasingly fade, as we are already witnessing.
Higher officers too, will be less willing to issue near suicidal orders for this or that piece of territory, as their judgement day is likely approaching (and likely under a new government).
For the Russian soldier, this sentiment, though present, is much less pronounced. Much stronger is the understanding that this is the time to win. There is a race against the clock, it is against the weather, the limit of Russia's economic sustainability of the war effort (the edge of run-away inflation at the massive gov't expenditures fueled by new Rubles), and changing administration. Historic and grandiose victories are within their grasp, yet by no means guaranteed. It is their resolve and courage alone that can realize them. The Russian soldier, so much more frequently a volunteer, realizes this and faces the fire ever more willingly than his Ukrainian opponent, who instead sees the light at the end of the tunnel ever closer... if he just survives another few weeks.
Reality might shake these perceptions completely, as a Trump administration may actually end up presiding over a long war, just like the Biden one did, but if and until that point comes, the feeling is logically and ever increasingly... we just have until late January; to either win and/or survive!
How is this increased Russian pace manifesting?
Well as we discussed previously, the specter of cauldrons were once again a real possibility. Indeed we have already seen smaller ones take shape and an increasing number of Ukrainian battalions and brigades withdraw, with or without orders, to avoid them. There are ever more UA soldiers surrendering to Russian forces as well.
https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1840317359589867884
Something that has not been widely observed nor reported, is a major factor in enabling the new cauldrons.
First we must understand, that in this difficult peer on peer war, where technology all but ensures that if you are seen, you are destroyed, advance, even now, is typically slow. At the same time, real time awareness of enemy forces is very high. Therefore, escaping developing cauldrons even at a very late hour is relatively easy, if with significant losses, and successfully surrounding large enemy forces is extremely difficult. However, what must be appreciated (and as we discussed from the outset of the war), the power of the pincers is not simply that that they can envelop and thus defeat (force the surrender of) large number of enemy forces, but rather that they carry this potential.
Though it might be relatively easy for the bulk of several brigades to escape the gradually closing pincers around a stubbornly held salient, escaping it necessarily means abandoning its territory. That means, the pincers, even if closing slowly as long also surely, dictate what chunk of territory will be captured, with or without enemy units surrounded within it.
This is an extremely powerful leverage in such a slow moving defense-advantaged war. The pincers can enable a force to capture territory in days which may have otherwise taken months if not years to capture.
So why has this phenomena not been as noticeable until now you may ask? Excellent question.
Until now, relatively narrow pincers, basically anything other than a very wide front (10km at the least even until recently), was not sustainable as an axis of advance. Time and again, Russian columns (such as during the early war), including those composed of elite units, were cut to pieces when penetrating deep within enemy territory. The same occurred with narrow axis of advance. This slowed the war to positional fighting, with very gradual and small position improvements along a very wide front.
Russian tactics have continued to successfully improve, and the innovations of successful units have spread among the wider army (something difficult to do in bulky bureaucratic organizations even in the easiest of times). A phenomena which we discussed in the past as it first appeared, in which open territory previously thought ideal for advance of large forces counting on high firepower, became kill zones and previously thought difficult or impassable terrain such as forests and ravines became axis of advance.
We discussed the frequently changing dynamics often including here:
https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1688880509961547776 (Article version link in post)
This has continued to develop. At the current stage, Russian forces are able to use densely foliaged railway lines, ridges, ravines, forests and urban terrain as axis of advance. Even when narrow, they are not necessarily immediately defeated nor cut off by Ukrainian forces. This finally enables the deeply penetrating pincers.
From motorbikes, underground tunnels, turtle tanks and behind enemy lines helicopter landings, Russia continues to innovate with methods of advance in different terrains and circumstances. This is of note because something that we discussed all along, from the outset of this war, which was missed by all mainstream reporting, is that capability of advance. Only Russia thus far in this war has proven the ability to advance consistently against a well defended front maned by a stubborn enemy.
In this war, advance has been very difficult for both sides but virtually impossible for the Ukrainian Army. This was never appreciated from the outset. Ukrainian moves tended to be either PR in nature (often near suicidal missions for many units) for dramatic and sensationalist purposes, or territorial gains against a nearly non existing enemy. That is, UA forces mostly advanced significantly only against very lightly defended sections of the front. Typical pundits never were able to tell the difference. We of course, noted this crucial difference from the outset. Western training in large "combined arms" advances for the newly established UA brigades did not improve upon this issue but rather worsen it, which often led to catastrophic losses.
In any event, with very little time to develop this update further, let me illustrate where some of these cauldrons or would-be cauldrons which cause withdrawal and/or collapse will be happening. Here we are focusing on a bit larger operational theatre and not the smaller tactical level where many more situations are rapidly developing.
On our next break, hope to explain these further, but at least I will post them here. I created these a few days ago when I first meant to posit this analysis, so the map may be a few days behind at this point (the fact that this is significant shows how much the pace is changing), but overall should be pretty relevant. Using the suryakmaps as a base.
The long northern Lugansk / Kharkhov front will be cut to pieces and captures up to the Oskil river Thicker lines are major thrusts of advance and thinner lines indicate ongoing pressure, which can result in advance if the UA forces withdraw from, mostly due to the looming encirclement.
The situation in the southern Lugansk / Siversk front is very interesting and complex. UA forces hold a key large forest but face encirclement within it. The key cities of Yampil and Izium (previously RU held) are key to the advance behind the Slovyansk line and full capture of the Donbass which Russia aspires to.
Hope we can comment on this developing picture with more detail shortly. Remember, the pincers can now be bigger and longer. Not so since the earliest days of the war.
For now, off to more days of operations. While RU forces advance in the slowly freezing muddy steppe, threatening the encirclement and capture of strategic parts of the Donbass, my gallant friends and I must partake in our, less dramatic but for our respective nation, perhaps even more significant and important maneuvers. With Gd's help will discuss with all of you shortly on this and many other noteworthy issues and events.
