Israel & Iran at War - What Next?
The Tightrope Israel must Negotiate. Regime Change is no substitute for Victory
Earlier we discussed Operation Rising Lion. In fact, Iran’s ballistic salvos were drastically reduced as we discussed and predicted (though the launching being the bottleneck, their best missiles, of more limited number, were used and penetration percentages did increase).
(Article Version of an earlier post: https://x.com/ZimermanErik/status/1937270294932001270)
Now regarding an end game, from Israel's perspective. It is clear that the Israeli government hoped for a regime change. The main objectives of course have been achieved or are being achieved; the destruction of all or large part of Iran's nuclear (and missile) program. However, you have to look down the road. If Israel abruptly ended its campaign AND the regime was able to hold on to power, it is likely that it would redouble its efforts.
Of course it would have been set behind perhaps years, but it would be all the more convinced that nukes are its only chance at long term survival. It would, depending on its capability and available resources, endeavor to make the new program even harder to destroy, deeper, further east, more highly distributed. If a new government takes over, it would be natural for it to reach out to world powers such as the US, renounce its nuclear ambitions and get rid of sanctions against it.
Since the outset of the operation I have been skeptical on the regime change, at least in the short term while strikes are taking place. People don't like to be seen as traitors & people don't like traitors. War with another country is a very unifying force. Julani recently for example, only launched his attack on a weakened Shia axis (and took over Syria) after Hezbollah declared a ceasefire with Israel.
Attacking the Shia, while they were fighting Israel, was not an option (for the Sunni), but attacking them after they "surrendered" to Israel (and conveniently were greatly weakened if not shattered) was A-OK. At that point what is left is not that “you are fighting the foreign enemy”, but rather that “you are useless and lost/surrendered to it”.
The war & strikes also helps the regime constrain movement, gatherings and communications. Most importantly the internet in Iran is basically shut down for regular citizens. With this in mind, I am not sure pushing for regime change is the smart move from Israel's perspective; especially if it is seen to be doing so. Rather Israel should satisfy itself with & prepare for one of 3 options.
If the strikes bring about the regime's collapse, and this brings a negotiated end to the nuclear (and ballistic missile) programs then so be it.
If it doesn't, the existing regime can also negotiate & make such a deal. Israel should not be interested in who rules Iran & how it is ruled but only on what it does or doesn't do; specifically regarding nukes. As long as the deal has real teeth and a real verification mechanism that ensures their program ends then that is fine.
If neither 1 or 2 occur, Israel should prepare for long term dominance without being dragged into a war of attrition. That means that, the required objectives neutralized, Israel can be satisfied without a deal if need be. But since there was no deal or enforcement mechanism, then any action by the enemy regime (still in power) that threatens to change the new status quo (its nuclear & ballistic program in tatters) needs to nipped at the bud. So if the Iranians start building a new enrichment plant, it gets bombed. If they attempt to re-establish ballistic missile factories deep underground, these get hit. If anti-air systems are re-positioned that would make the previous difficult, then those must go. In short Israel would be forced to maintain an air and intelligence superiority over Iran for the long term (while the regime stands).
Governments (especially struggling dirt poor ones) don't like to lose face, don't like to get their stuff blown up and don't like to waste billions in facilities that simply explode. We have the examples of Saddam's nuclear program in Iraq (after Israel destroyed it in 1981) never having restarted (nor even any WMD of any type after the first Gulf War) as well the 2007 Israeli strike of Syria's Al-Kibar reactor. Syria likewise, never tried again.
On the contrary, it is the belief that such sites will not be attacked and destroyed that encourages their construction; as has been the case with Iran for over 20 years. So, as long as Israel maintains a zero tolerance policy towards Iran, it can wind down the active phase of the campaign and the Iranians will adjust their behavior as to stop getting bombed as well.
The inherent risk with that strategy is that Israel is a democracy, and the governments that can and will follow the current one under Bibi Netanyahu, cannot be relied upon to maintain this hard-won superiority. Israel's recent past is rife with the consequences of letting sworn enemies arm (and break previous ceasefire deals, ie Hezbollah 2005). It is the mistake of trying to guess intentions rather than capabilities. The worse scenario I believe for Israel is a long drawn out war of attrition.
Given the distances involved, the countries in between the two states, and the vast size of Iran, a long term state of low (to mid) intensity conflict can benefit Iran. Long term conflicts tend to equalize the parties. The incompetent bureaucracy of armies is replaced by the dynamism of new leaders who rise to the top by Darwinian forces.
Soldiers and commander go from state workers, inefficient, corrupt and lazy compared to private sector counterparts, to outclass them since the competitive drive fueled by life and death easily beats that driven by the urge to make a bit more money or the fear of losing a job (and looking for another one). Safe production lines are established, methods and tactics improved.
Nothing could be worse than maintaining the Iranian missile and other forces under low intensity attacks for a long period of time. A war of attrition is definitely not in Israel's interest. The cost of active sorties over such a vast are at such a distance is prohibitive for Israel and difficult to maintain (in terms of equipment, pilots etc).
When it acts, it must be with overwhelming force, and when it's not acting, its enemies should be allowed the convenience of acting subpar. It is also the lull, the cessation of strikes, that can allow the magnitude of the defeat of the regime to be noted by the population, and give it the legitimate moment to act (not while under enemy attack).
Furthermore, if the campaign seems to require a more extended time, Israel should begin focusing ever more on potential separatists rather than national opposition forces. Nationalism is far stronger than "you make women wear veils according to our traditions". The Kurds are now autonomous in Iraq and Syria, while quite active in Turkey.
Iran is the missing piece, for the emergence of an oil rich (and land locked) Kurdistan which Israel would be (or should be) happy to be an ally of. There are Balochis, Azeris, Arabs and others as well. Iran is not nearly as Persian nor Shia as many people think. It definitely is not as "revolutionary" Shia as people think.
In short, it is not in Israel's interest to press (nor to be seen to be pressing) for a regime change at the moment. It is far more important that it maintain the eye on the ball. Who rules Iran, within its current borders or otherwise, is Iran’s business. It is Israel's business that they not have Nukes to destroy her.
To this end, the government must be strong enough to persevere & not break, despite internal & external pressures, but nimble & intelligent enough to stop the campaign cold when continuing it is heading to the benefit of the enemy.
Update:
Morning June 24 2025
Soon after this post, President Trump announced a ceasefire. It showed that the Israel leadership was thinking along the terms I outlined, a quick end of the war was desired. It was meant to take effect (at least for the Iranian side) at 7 AM at the latest. Iran fired ballistic missiles towards Israel from sometime after 5 AM to a few minutes before 7. Those were a total of 5 salvos (very few missiles per salvo). There was a direct hit on a Beersheba apartment that has left 5 dead so far.
Then there was a 6th (or 7th) salvo well passed 7 AM (nearly at 7:30). This was easily predictable (as I told those around me in the early morning hours), as a typical Iranian move. They would start the ceasefire by breaking it, to attempt to show (to those who were keeping very accurate track of time apparently) that they had the upper hand and won.
Israel ignored the violation and the ceasefire was declared. This troubled me, but was to be expected. Then at sometime before noon (between 10 and 11:15 AM), Iranian forces fired another salvo of at least two ballistic missiles. They were clearly seen and heard by many people and were intercepted.
Israel immediately ordered renewed strikes in Tehran and the ceasefire breached. It is possible that this latter salvo was not ordered at the highest levels (or at least not THE highest) in Iran, and could show that the Iranian forces are not fully under control. If Iran absorbs these latest hits and does not retaliate, the ceasefire will be on much better ground (from an Israeli perspective), and the end of the war a much better one; rather than ending with an Iranian ceasefire violation that Israel ignored.
On the other hand, the violation could have been intentional, and Iran may continue to shoot sporadic volleys and salvos, trying to lower the intensity of strikes it suffers, but drag Israel into a longer term war of attrition.
We discussed this possibility in this piece earlier. Something we did not address in this piece for the sake of brevity but discussed in earlier posts, was the Iranian infrastructure. Israel generally tried to avoid destroying the oil, natural gas, and gasoline infrastructure of Iran, on which its economy is nearly entirely dependent. the idea was mostly to not endanger the potential new incoming government and the civilian population that would suffer the consequences of shortages.
Israel must note that, at least if the war continues, and especially if Iran continues to target (solely) civilians; it is a big mistake. Ironically, though I am skeptical of the goal of regime change for Israel, the easiest way to achieve it exactly to strike those very targets. Widespread protests in Iran in recent years have almost exclusively started when there are energy shortages and painful (more than usual) economic realities.
Without its oil and export infrastructure, Iran could not sustain a war of attrition, and with it, it may possibly be able to fund it. The status quo that Israel has accepted thus far in teh conflict is that all of her citizens are targets of ballistic missiles and drones, thus spending their nights in shelters and bunkers with babies and young children, while the Iranian citizens are immune to strikes (at least as long as they are not close to regime targets). It is most definitely too imbecilic, to also declare their vital and strategic infrastructure immune.
Not only would incapacitating it, further precipitate the fall of the regime, but also be of little consequence to a new government who, if not anti-western and willing to end the nuclear and missile programs, would quickly find itself with lifted sanctions and even international aid and investment to rebuild and upgrade the energy infrastructure. The damage would be of little consequence in that different reality. But it would be of great consequence in the current one.
The ceasefire having been broken, it would be nice to see Israel persist until Iran can no longer fire at its civilians on a daily basis. This would in effect be a 1 way ceasefire and full victory. We have little chance of seeing that, even though I believe the Iranians are very close to that threshold. They are firing their very best missiles from the furthest possible ranges, given the launcher (and launcher forces) bottleneck, and are quickly running out of these, even without taking into account stocks that may have been destroyed.
Though I have no particular interest in how the Iranians want to rule themselves, it is the clarify of the regime’s defeat alone that can precipitate its fall.
What I am interested in, if it insists on attacking Israel (especially Israeli women and children), is its defeat.