The Iran war (R-2) continues, long with my accurate Prediction Winning Streak
Where does it go from here? Air Superiority? And best of all we get to mock Yair Lapid
Happily, my readers are no strangers to seeing make some accurate predictions. But the last few days has been a real quality streak. Here is a recap, and where we may go from here.
Let’s take a look. Most importantly we discussed how both sides had at least in some ways “drank their own Kool-Aid”. The West had exaggerated the par between the Iranian people (at least the Persian Shia majority) and the regime, as well how easily it could fall.
Iran for its part believed in its own hype and so lashed out at everyone in order to sow the chaos “experts” had warned us about for decades. Because they are pin-prick attacks rather than anything approaching what is needed to sow chaos, the strategy seemed a bit absurd. You won’t hear anyone else explaining this phenomena, that only reason it baffled folks was because its weakness.
Starting with this article on March we discussed that the point of the strategy was, and how people, counterintuitively, were actually confused by it due to its weakness.
It included the following section:
Next pushed the concept even further, noting that both the West, and the Iranian regime, had incorrect preconceptions (drank their own Kool-Aid), and how each reacts to clash with reality will determine the outcome.
This March 6th article included the following:
Late March 7th we discussed in good humor indeed seeing breaking news reporting not only on the apology by the Iranian President on the attacks on neighboring countries but in quick succession signs of the internal divide on the issue.
The referenced X post reads:
In the same articled we had discussed how the US needs an armed group on the ground that it can give air support to. This group could quickly advance because of the massive close air ground support. As we warned in our previous discussions, the popular Persian uprising will not be as easy to ignite as the US mainstream believed. In leu of such a group, others can be found which more easily would take up arms against the Revolutionary Islamic regime. Most notably the Kurds and Balochs. We then discussed how while many of them would be happy to rise up in autonomy or independence of their regions, using them to advance towards Tehran would not only terrify the Persian majority but harden their resistance and unite them against such a force (pre and post their advance).
Shortly after our discussions on this, there was reporting that Trump himself had spoken to the two major Kurdish leaders in Iraq (of the left and right leaning leaders respectively) to urge them onto the offensive. This was quite extraordinary (that the sitting US President would personally call them both).
Our discussions then once gain highlighted the complexity and dangers of a Kurdish advance on Tehran. They included (in the second article referenced above):
The very next day Mr. Trump seemed aware of the complexity surrounding a Kurdish offensive (which will still likely happen in one form of another btw):
I will add that knowing Trump, he may have been daring them a bit here as well, politely wondering out loud if the Kurds could possibly be cowardly? “…We don’t want to see the Kurds get hurt or killed”. More likely it was just a reference to them being hurt before and the complex implications of their involvement on a drive to Tehran as I had explained, but for some reason I sensed a bit of sarcasm there from Trump.
Welcome partial Strategic Change & Yair Lapid
Then most importantly, Israel changed direction and finally started hitting the right type of oil infrastructure; in this case fuel depots west of Tehran in Chigrit. As my readers know, on many occasions since the outset of the first Round 7 months ago, I noted that it is firstly the oil refineries (fuel production) and prisons (referring to freeing of prisoners) that have to be hit in order to encourage an uprising down the line.
After this change had begun, our unimpressive, unwise, and unoriginal head of the opposition, leftist Yair Lapid jumped on the bandwagon explaining that this alone will topple the regime. Maybe he read my posts as well!
If he did, he didn’t quite understand them (his English is not nearly as good as Bibi’s anyways), and so there was a huge error in his dramatic demand.
My argument on this is worth summarizing here.
Lapid demanded the destruction of the “all the oil fields” and “energy industry” on Kharg Island. Firstly, Kharg Island houses Iran’s major oil export and processing hub. It’s major significant is that of Iran’s major (90% of total crude exports) export terminal.
The importance of the island is not its oil fields. There is some oil on the island itself, but far more surrounding it; the island is a central collection and processing point for massive offshore (and inland) oil fields. So firstly not sure Lapid understands the significant of the island - if you wanted to destroy “all the oil fields” of Iran, Kharg Island would be the least of your concerns.
More importantly, since the island sits in the Persian Gulf, and is Iran’s main crude export terminal, while the US controls the seas east of the Strait of Hormuz (and Israel & the US the skies over it), Iran’s oil exports have already dwindled to zero.
The allies can maintain that as long as they wish. On the contrary, the US is desperately trying to get the gulf states to be able to export via the Strait, working on offering insurance and escorts, without success yet. So US allies cannot export via the Persian Gulf at the moment, much less so Iran.
It goes without saying that if the goal is regime change, and you intend achieving it, having that oil infrastructure other than destroyed would be a positive for the new government, and world oil prices (which the US very much cares about). Very high oil prices benefit Russia of course most of all, but even Iran to the limited extent it can get hydrocarbons out via the Caspian and through land routes.
So what I have been talking about?! Oil refineries.
No need to rehash here, but the highly subsidized domestic fuel in Iran is critical to its economy, and obviously to its armed forced (that don’t consume crude oil). Refining, especially in Iran, is highly concentrated at a few sites and easily destroyed, unlike the hardened, and dispersed oil infrastructure that spans large parts of the country. Needless to say, Kharg Island has no major oil refinery (it is Bandar Abbas that is the largest in Iran meeting ~45% of domestic demand alone).
For a more in depth look at this oil infrastructure in general vs oil refining as it relates to strategic targets, see my discussion of the subject in the case of the Russo Ukrainian war.
So Yair Lapid, before you copy Netanyahu’s moves and claim them as your own, learn a bit more about them.
If all of this was not enough, I had also correctly speculated that it was not that all Iranian launchers had been destroyed as started to be reported a few days ago. The drastic decline in barrages, had to do with the nature of war and man.
The post speaks for itself (click on the thread if you would like to read in full).
On March 7th, reports quickly circulated that Israel estimates it had destroyed 150 launchers, and that only 100 remained for the regime’s use.
Many Israelis were surprised that Iran had that many launchers left, even by Israel’s estimates. My readers and I of course weren’t. The issue is about the likelihood of being killed while launching. In a firefight, if you suppress enemy fire, it does not mean that they are out of men, rifles or ammunition, but rather that they are afraid of getting shot and so are keeping behind cover (heads down).
Of course, over time more and more launchers will be found and destroyed.
With all this fun behind us, let us briefly comment on one aspect of the war moving forward.
Air Superiority?
In a similar vein, I do not believe complete air superiority has been achieved over the whole country of Iran by Israel and the US. The US especially I think has only achieved air superiority over a relatively narrow strip along the southern coast, while Israel has been able to open up a corridor through northwest Iran through to Tehran.
The allies are working largely in waves of attacks, and this is especially true for the Israeli air force. The targets are far from Israel and the route complex (over less than friendly territory). Israeli jets cannot maintain long mission periods over Iranian territory; and needless to say Iran is a vast and mountainous country.
The idea is or ought to be, to degrade Iranian AD systems to the point air force drones (such as the Hermes 900 and the Heron-1), which have very long flight durations, can maintain near 24/7 surveillance over large parts of the country. Since these drones are high altitude, they are fairly immune to Iran’s vast arsenal of old AA guns & artillery (best suited for short range / low altitude targets). Little by little, once the advanced Anti-Air missile systems are destroyed, the AA guns can be targeted as well, allowing cheaper and more numerous lower altitude drones to operate over Iran as well.
Until a large number of drones can be flying consistently and constantly over large parts of Iran, they will be able to maintain some level of launches; Ballistic missiles less and less, but at least drones. To date, satellites are doing a lot of this work instead, detecting forces setting up launch sites, and then with luck allied fighters are near enough to get there in time.
Due to reported Israeli and US drone losses during the first days of the war, I suspect that the allies may have jumped the gun on using the drones, not yet having really established the air supremacy required. Since drone losses seemed to have stopped, it is likely so did their use in many parts of the country. As the manned jet fighters pick away at Iran’s AD system and expand their area of complete air superiority, they will be able to establish drone patrols in more and more areas. These are critical to stop Iran’s strikes.
While ballistic missiles require a more involved and lengthy procedure and longer logistics tail to successfully launch, Iranian long range suicide drones can be relatively quickly and easily launched. Iran’s stockpiles of these are voluminous. While they are of little use in targeting Israel, in large numbers they are effective in hitting civilian and infrastructure targets of the gulf states, and most importantly keep the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz under threat.
I know from experience how even an air force as powerful as the IAF can never stop the firing of smaller caliber rockets, missiles and drones without the ground forces advancing and holding the ground. I have seen Hezbollah fighters time and again quickly deploy in pickup trucks, fire dozens of rockets and disappear a good 5 to 10 minutes before IAF jets show up to bomb the area. Lebanon is close and tiny compared to far off Iran, and stopping small caliber fire with air power alone typically proves very difficult if not impossible.
Now, it goes without saying that firing long range munitions that can cover the 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers is a different matter. This is why it may be possible to reduce the launching of ballistic missiles to zero or near zero levels (at a level that interceptor numbers are not an issue for Israel or the US). But the race against time is much more critical in respects to Iranian drones such as the Shaheeds. If the regime does not collapse quickly, the US must open the gulf for traffic. The plentiful Iranian drones are the main threat here.
With a critical view of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz in mind, an Admiral led Central Command destroyed much of the Artesh’s Navy. Much has been said about the “other” Iranian Navy, the IRGC Navy and their asymmetric warfare based on fast boats. Because those boats not sea drones, like Ukraine uses in the Black Sea, my opinion is that they are quite worthless. They require brave men to man them and attack the US Navy. Their theoretical swarm tactics will not amount to much, and to date have not even been dared in this conflict.
It is the suicide drones and other loitering munitions which are the major threat for ships wanting to cross the strait, and for the Gulf states in general which do nto possess the AD systems (nor the interceptor numbers) to defend their entire civilian infrastructure.
With this in mind, it is imperative for the US and Israel to extend and expand the air corridors, establish full air supremacy and as large a drone coverage as is possible over strategic parts of Iran to stop the firing of both BM and drones.
More importantly, it is imperative to advance the plan and its subordinate operations to change the reality on the ground. It is particularly important for a friendly force (if not US force) to hold the coastal strip along the Strait of Hormuz and parts of the Persian Gulf on the Iranian side in order to stop closer range weapons from being fired on commercial ships, enemy recon, spotting and observation (to direct longer range fire) ships, and to establish AD systems on the north and northeast side of the Gulf to stop suicide drones coming from further inland before they reach the gulf (knowing Trump he is likely at least considering seizing terminals, ports and Kharg island to seize certain amounts of oil exports at least temporary to offset America’s war costs and the rising oil prices).
However, getting shipping flowing across the strait again has more to do with insurance and escorts than stopping all Iranian fire. If the US can arrange escorted convoys and provide insurance for ships, we may see the flow restored, this is critical to stop oil prices from going even higher.
Because of this and other reasons, with the regime remaining in firm control for the moment, expect to see special operation forces conduct operations deep within Iran. We may see Israeli and/or American special forces reach nuclear sites, command centers (to capture leaders), missile and drone storage depots etc. A great opportunity would be using such forces, under heavy air cover, to free political prisoners from certain prisons (of course to have any effect they’d have to release them locally and not extract them from the country).
I think we will yet see some very interesting moves from Israel and perhaps the US before all is said and done.
In any case, the attrition cuts both ways, and much more so against the Iranian regime. As soon as payroll can’t be made (or under hyperinflation as they simply print money), the subsidized fuel stops, the strategic bombing campaign takes its toll, and the country starts to run out of everything… things may yet take a different turn. Once they start to unravel, it tends to happen increasingly fast. Meanwhile high oil prices are quite helpful to Russia, who has been suffering under very low prices throughout the latter pars of its war, which doesn’t bother me one bit… and the huge US shale oil industry (not to mention natural gas) which can ramp up production volumes by huge margins and simply rake in millions.
On the other hand, over $100 a barrel oil, could be tittering Cuba’s final straw. And all the “sustainable” energy folks should be really happy, as once again other forms of energy can become, at least temporarily, a bit more competitive.
Hope to next be able to briefly cover the myriad reports about water infrastructure (as a target for Iran) circulating about, and the internal political divisions within the Kurds that are playing a big part in what does or doesn’t happen. The Kurds, like everyone else, have a political left and a right (besides important regional and tribal differences) who don’t agree on much.
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