Wagner - Prigozhin's March of Justice

The immediate Aftermath

(Article format of a previous (and long) thread:

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1673061212597223429 )

The immediate aftermath:

As we discussed in the previous post,

the most likely outcome was a deal. This is what happened, and bloodshed was the for the most part avoided.

As we discussed, a deal at this late stage (as opposed to the missed opportunities earlier), would be difficult. Who would believe in the guarantees? As we have discussed before, Prigozhin is a private citizen who resides in Russia, under its jurisdiction and whose family and assets are mostly under its jurisdiction as well.

The answer to this (which I did not foresee) was Belarus' Lukashenko. Ruling his own independently country, he could provide the safe heaven Prigozhin needs, at least until things calm down.

In my earlier post I did not even consider discussing the mainstream reporting which was as pathetic as usual (there far more interesting things going on). At first, they believed that a 25k militia could not possibly take on Russia in any meaningful way. Not knowing nor caring about facts, they misunderstood the tactical situation on the ground and what could and could not happen. We covered that well in our article (were local policemen going to stop the world's best large assault force numbering in the thousands and armed with heavy weapons and amour? Better yet, were they going to stop this fearsome force who they consider heroes?).

As a side note, this is indicative of what a highly mobile army that has broken through the front lines and penetrated the enemy rear, into the blue, can achieve. It’s the front, the defense in depth which typically prevents you from achieving this.

Immediately after the rapid success of "Wagner" PMC became apparent, with the total control of Rostov HQ and reaching of Voronezh, the mainstream quickly changed their tune. Now this "civil war" and "coup" led by Prigizhin would obviously succeed and the weak and corrupt Russian state led by Putin would quickly collapse.

To show an example of this we only have to go to our go-to guy for all things leftist, trendy and thoughtless, Adam Kinzinger (https://twitter.com/AdamKinzinger).

https://twitter.com/AdamKinzinger/status/1672592091787014146

The other massive flip-flop by the mainstream was of course that Prigozhin and his Wagner, only hours ago certainly terrorists, nazis and murderers (a position they had no trouble holding without any evidence or knowledge), were now freedom fighters and heroes since they had turned on Putin.

For this we need look no further than CNN.

Exactly as I have explained. First they thought it would fail. The “professional army” would not let them so quickly advance unhindered across the hinterland and towards Moscow.

Then, once they did, they were sure there would be bloody fighting but were surprised at a deal.

They, wrong on both counts as usual, while over here with a bit of the thinking that Gd graced me capable of doing called it correctly.

Words such as “professional armies” do not stop thousands of heavily armed and determined men. The entire Russian army was west of Wagner (on the front lines). The interior was open. Police, custom agents and and ministry of interior units were not going to even try to stop them let alone be able to. Russia is vast and it would take time (longer than the time for Wagner to reach Moscow) for significant combat units to gather to stop them. As those events were unfolding I explained as follows:

As for the second part, as already discussed I thought the most likely out come was a deal and no hostilities, while according to CNN at least, US intelligence was yet again stunned by the deal and cesation of hostilities.

All this we are told, with a heads up of “days leading up” to the events. Heads up and intel that we of course did not have.

Biden’s Intel and CNN wrong as usual aside…

There was even much talk about Prigozhin being a Western asset. Even Scott Ritter said this with certainty.

While I think there is a chance Putin & Prigozhin are more in cahoots then it may appear (as we have discussed previously and will later in this piece), I do not think it likely at all that he is in the West's pocket¹. He could be in contact with them, for his own purposes, but not their tool. The most probable take is that things are simply as they appear.

We see evidence of this in that it seems that I also was correct in speculating that Putin's speech in the morning was in (strategic) error (though well delivered, reasonable, and stabilizing if not inspiring) and Prigozhin's concerns were not addressed for months.

Then subsequently rather then being addressed, he was foolishly cornered and ordered to disband, and finally as he still peacefully (and brilliantly) marched on Rostov and on to Moscow Putin seemed to throw in his lot with the bureaucrat and and his academic deputy, rather with the 25 thousand patriotic warriors, heroes of Popasna, Soledar and Bakhmut.

It was especially foolish because as we could quickly see there was no good outcome, for Putin nor Russia, other than a deal. And Putin had to make that deal, after vowing to punish the "backstabbers" and “rebels”, and ordering a warrant for Prigozhin's arrest. It would have been easier to arrive at a satisfactory deal at every opportunity before there was a drive on Moscow and you (the President) have already called it treason.

In any event, a deal was reached none the less, and everything ended as if it had never started. The media once again was left dumbfounded.. what happened with the civil war and their coup? In my previous piece, I deliberately explained that there was no such uprising.

While I believed the threat real, it was limited to the actions of the parties involved, and I believed a deal was the likely outcome. This morning we still had Wagner movements back west being reported. Movement out of Roston-on-Don started late the previous night.

Crowds gathered to greet the Wagner forces, who have legendary status in today's Russia and were overjoyed to know there was a deal and peace. They expressed strong support for Putin and for Prigozhin.

Many youths wanted to pose with the legendary warriors and the population

made sure to express that they felt safe with their fighters and protectors.

When asked about Shoigu, the reaction of at least one couple was less enthusiastic.

It is of note that while we saw the deputy Minister of Defense & the Deputy Chief of Staff on camera with Prigozhin, and we heard from local mayors and governors on the route to Moscow (as well as within the SMO region), heard from Putin himself, the Prime Minister, Medvedev, the Foreign Ministry, General Surovikin, Duma members and many others, not a word was heard nor has been heard from the Minister of Defense Shoigu himself nor from the Chief of Staff Gerasimov. And this gets us to the heart of the matter.

What was the deal & what motivated Prigozhin? Well first I will say that I see one less likely scenario where this is a bit more orchestrated than what it may appear (actually this looks very orchestrated and I have mostly contested that it is not... so let's say more orchestrated than I have tended to believe)... I will speak about this scenario a bit later on.

First let's consider the normal scenario.

I believe the crux of the matter has been staring at us this whole time. I think late in my previous piece I may have nailed it.

I wrote in part the following:

I believe this more than anything else explains what has happened. Prigozhin cares about things and cares about taking actions. He is a man of action. He vowed to himself that his boys would be avenged "come what may". We have heard him speak how fighters have to know that there will be honor and justice, that they will not be abandoned on the field, that their deaths will be avenged.

We can easily imagine him telling his soldiers that they are off to a dangerous and volunteer-only mission. Those who wish to go with him, to seek justice for their fallen comrades are welcome. Those that do not wish the risk, may stay safely in the camps.

We can also easily imagine this would spur the great majority to come along. Who wouldn't follow a man like that, and for those reasons? I discussed this a while back when this quality of Prigozhin became apparent.

I knew he would inspire great loyalty.

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1654505262529609731

The thread reads in part:

If we understand that this was driving him, of course with all the background that we have discussed earlier including the fact that he was cornered and threatened with disbandment, that he would not be safe as a private citizen in Shoigu's Russia, and etc; then we can understand the strategy and the single-mindedness.

He gets to Rostov HQ and he ask for these two "clowns". They aren't here he is told (they had fled earlier as he approached). "Then bring them!" he responds.
When that too is not a possibility then he answers as a matter of fact that then he

will go to Moscow to get them. When Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov says that "… I kindly ask that you pull back your men", Prigozhin's response is reflexive and principled. No he tells them, no one is going anywhere until he gets Shoigu and Gersimov.

In a world of political theatre, people cannot understand a man who simply means what he says. He thus sets off to Moscow "for them". Not for the government, not for Putin, but for those two because he has a score to settle in the name of the lads who trusted in him as their commander.

Once President Lukashenko is in the picture and there are actual negotiations back and forth, with Putin in the picture, we could see that the solution would present itself clearly to everyone.
Would Prigozhin accept exile in Belarus? Would he accept absorption of his beloved Wagner into the MoD?

It turns out I believe, that he would accept a lot of things as long as Shoigu's and/or Gerasimov's heads rolled.

This is why I believe we have not yet heard the entire deal. Why we have not heard from Shoigu and/or Gerasimov. Yes Prigozhin is headed to Belarus (with how many of his guys?) and his forces back to their camps, to be absorbed into the MoD forces (likely still with some special status and/or terms), but I don't believe that is it.

That would mean Prigozhin just backed down. I think he achieved his goal... come what may he would get the wealthy "parquet (parade ground) Generals" in their mahogany offices, the ones who he believes care little for the men falling in the fields for Russia as long as they can keep their status, wealth and positions, as long as their children & wives can keep galivanting around the world first class. He would get them, and when he set out with his lads from the rear camps to the main headquarters of the SMO and Southern Military District, and subsequently headed to Moscow that is what he was doing, and my bet is that more likely than not, he achieved it.

The more Scripted Option?

So will we see Shoigu and/or Gerasimov dismissed immediately? Perhaps not, perhaps there will be some delay as to pretend the events are unrelated. Putin must be seen to replace people at will, and not under duress.

Perhaps they will be arrested and even tried, not just dismissed. We shall see.

The slightly different option I referred to previously is that there has been a more closely coordinated situation between Putin and Prigozhin. True they have been close in the past, true Putin certainly protected Prigozhin and Wagner from the MoD in the past.

True Putin respects his capabilities and that of his fighters.

We also have unconfirmed reports of a meeting between the two a couple of weeks back. So is it possible that Putin hung this formidable man and his loyal fighters out to dry? That he foolishly just gave in to whatever the MoD wanted to do on the matter?

Yes, but then it is certainly foolish.

The one scenario in which I can see this being somewhat staged between the two is in the case where Putin was afraid of the Shoigu/Gerasimov pair.

In my previous post I referred (though in the footnotes) to this "impunity" that they may have been feeling.

Prigozhin has pointed out in the hour long video that I referred to in the same post, that the pair were scared at the outset of the SMO, when everything went haywire.
But nothing happened to them (they didn't get fired), and so they now have a sense of impunity about them. They can't be fired. As the war grows in importance, and the fate of Putin's government (if not the Russian state itself) lies in the balance, the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense are all-important. Their budgets have ballooned, and their word is law, their needs priorities of everything else.

It is in the range of possibilities... that an older Vladimir Putin was unable or unwilling to attempt a change at the MoD and General Staff. Shoigu had been Minister of Defense for 12 years.

While he was likely chosen in part due to this non Russian ethnicity (Russia would be unlikely to accept a Tuvan supreme leader), and so a safe choice in that he won't initiate a coup against Putin, this could run both ways by now. All is fine as long as Putin does not try to remove him. A man entrenched at the head of the MoD for 12 years has a few friends under him. He knows the machinery of the Ministry inside and out.

Together with Gerasimov, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, someone who actually has broad military experience (even if largely an academic one) and has likewise been at his post for a decade, the pair might be a formidable duo to topple.

Gerasimov interestingly is likewise from a Tatar region, though he may be ethnically Russian (or at least a Christian Tatar - not sure).

Putin may have isolated himself from the day-to-day workings of the Defense apparatus and the strategic and operational realities of the SMO. It is possible, though far from certain and still hard to imagine, that the ageing Putin could not or believed that he could not safely remove and replace the pair or any one of them.

If this is the case, Prigozhin may have been the key to their downfall. A successful unit outside the control of the MoD and led by Putin's loyal friend.

He would start by wearing away at their reputations by consistent criticism, while he racks up success in the battlefield. When finally Prigozhin's tanks neared Rostov, and Gerasimov (and possibly Shoigu) fled, they had been outmatched. They were now out of their headquarters, away from their most loyal staff, and humiliated.

The President had all the grounds he needed to dismiss them, and the vast popularity of Wagner among the people and the army in general was enough that they could not resist. Putin then had his excuse, and could safely remove them.

This is possible, but I still believe less likely than the more plain scenario. What is also possible and even likely is that it's a little bit of both. Putin certainly used Wagner as a counterbalance and backup alternative to the MoD. The question is to what degree, and to what degree was this last phase planned.

I wish I could say that we will see as the details of the deal unfold. If we see Wagner forces assembling from Belarus and invading from the North.. if we see both Gerasimov and Shoigu replaced (and/or arrested)... it still won't tell us to what degree. Because now that what has transpired is fact, the able parties will take advantage of it. This can make it look in hindsight as if it was all planned, but it is no guarantee of it.

The main question for the moment is to see what staffing changes if any happen at the military helm. This will let us know if Prigozhin's March of Justice, in his mind, was a success.

At the end, for a promise of clemency for himself and all his guys, did he at the point of imminent bloodshed against & by his fellow Russians and at a point of no return, blinked first and was contented with the loud raucous he made against his foes, or…

Did he indeed, come what may, and as vowed, take out the comfortable and arrogant bureaucrats?

What Next?

All we know of the deal thus far is the following:

• Wagner troops are returning to their bases. They will be absorbed into the MoD.

• Prigozhin is going to Belarus, and the criminal charges against him have been dropped.

To this I have speculated that changes at the General Staff and Ministry of Defense are likely. Perhaps we will see the likes of Sergey Surovikin and Aleksey Dyumin being promoted to high leadership. The deputy minister of Defense Yunus-bek Yevkurov whom we saw on video speaking (in semi-captivity) to Prigozhin may stay in place for continuity’s sake, and a smooth transition.

If what I add as changes in the MoD end up not being part of the deal, then it is likely that Prigozhin simply went out with a bang, showed what he “could have” done, and that we may not see much of him, for a while, at least in terms of having a leading role in the war in Ukraine.

If we do see those changed in the MoD, then the deal with Prigozhin has a greater chance to have included additional terms. It is possible that Prigozhin took much of Wagner with him to Belarus and/or will continue to build it up there.

The force could be used to invade from the northern flank, or at lest threaten to do so. This is very timely because in recent days, the UA command for the first time, out of a certain level of desperation and a feeling of impunity when it comes to the northern (Belarus) border, ordered the bulk of its combat brigades guarding the northern border south and east. Two or three brigades meant to guard that long northern line have been directed to bolster the southern counteroffensive efforts and the failing Kupyansk line.

The presence of Wagner, real or imagined, in the north will make them have to reconsider. We have discussed the interesting dynamics of the fronts that run along the internationally recognized borders, which tend to favor the side that is likely to invade its foe from that line, but not to be invaded by its foe across that line (usually Russia), in several pieces (such as here:

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1667168769288839168 ).

This means one side must guard that line with much more manpower than the other. It is interesting to note that the threat of Wagner moving to Belarus affects this calculation and helps solve that issue from the Russian perspective.

Alternatively, we don’t know where Wagner forces are actually moving to, and the supposed move to Belarus could be in part a ruse to see them deploy in the Belgorod region, which we discussed previously here:

Will Wagner keep a special status within the MoD or not? Who will command them?

Will Yevgeny Prigozhin eventually return to Russia, go on to Africa and elsewhere or stay within Belarus (btw, we haven’t heard from him either, and we don’t know if the deals that were made were honored)?

Will Wagner continue to exist as a PMC operating outside of Russia (and Ukraine) such as in Mali and elsewhere?

And where are the large concentrations of Akhmat units going? They were reportedly headed to Rostov to quell the Wagner rebellion, and maybe they were, but where are they off to now?

Does Lukashenko have any ambitions with him independently (ie train a special force within the Belarussian army)? Are Prigozhin’s assets safe?

It is likely also that only a de-escalating preliminary agreement was reached. There may be ongoing negotiations between the key parties that will settle many details.

I think the events, coordinated with the President or not, have left the UA command and Western intelligence completely confused, and without credible information of where all the units went to. The chaos of the scramble saw units coming from every direction, nominally to secure Moscow and put down the mutiny, but the opportunity then presented itself to send them on to various places with relative information cover. No one knows what is going on in this respect. Perhaps Russia is taking advantage of it.

What is clear is that there are enough Russian troops to hold the line, against the weight of the infamous and ongoing UA counteroffensive, with enough personnel for regular rotations, plus an additional large core of combat quality troops. The Wagner forces, the Akhmat units, and another 140-400 thousand troops that the MoD has been raising and training. If they can concentrate them somewhere with any level of surprise, the effect can be devastating for the battered UA army.

Another perhaps unplanned and unexpected consequence is that the “cockroaches” came out of the woodwork. As the media gave merit to the idea that the mutiny was collapsing the Putin regime, other anti-Putin elements were activated. While it was clear that the UA high command was caught with its pants down and did no know how to take advantage of what was happening (nor even what was happening - another sign Wagner was not an Western or UA asset), certain folks did act. There were some public statements by Z-Storm PMC (which is supposed to be Shoigu’s counter to Wagner! Kind of pathetic) and some UA sponsored anti-Belarus and anti-Russian “freedom fighter” units. Putin and the FSB have surely identified more of them, their plans, and can now counter (if not target) them better. Heads within the MoD may roll based on this, their perceived lack of loyalty, or their performance during the mutiny.

Finally, Prigozhin and Vladamir Putin have come out probably more popular than ever. The high military command on the contrary. At the least, they now they are expandable, and not owners of the nation.

The Russian people tasted what chaos and civil war could theoretically feel like and they did not like it. They rallied around Russia, around the patriots, around their patriots and their eccentric warriors. Something tells me that we likely have not heard that last of Yevgeny Prigozhin.

1. One reported set of comments from the day before the “Mach of Justice” seemed out of place. Progizhin seemed to be saying that the war was unnecessary, or at least that the reasons for it that the MoD had given were all lies. The people had bene lied to and the President. I discussed these comments on the previous post.

Given a chance to see more of that speech, it lines up more normally again. Prigozhin likes to just say the truth (what he believes is true). Read in context, none of those comments are Western talking points. They actually agree with comments I have made since the outset of the war. The initial plan was obviously flawed, the war is basically ethnic Russians killing each other and etc. That does not mean that he wishes to lose the war, only that

1. it could have been avoided to begin with, and

2. if started it could have been wan easily at the outset if planned correctly.

These statements further make me believe that not much of this is staged… at least not in agreement between Prigozhin and the Russian government. He just likes to tell it like it is, and does not like to see incompetence among big shots cause the death of his people. He also doesn’t like the death, which he sees up front and personal, of his brave Russians and the Ukrainian brave “Russians”. Really, all comments that you could have picked out of my posts since the first days of the war (perhaps mine a bit more diplomatic, a bit less populist, with less cursing and less internal petty politics), and not at all the talking points seen and believed in the mainstream western press. They align in minimum areas by coincidence if ever, it doesn’t bother Prigozhin he isn’t big on talking points.